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THE DEVELOPMENT OF POLITICAL-MILITARY CONSULTATION IN THE UNITED STATES

IN the Cabinet room of the White House, every Thursday morning, the National Security Council gathers around a long, massive table. On the table are printed briefs reviewing some problem of national policy. Prepared by the Council staff, these briefs blend the views of many departments and agencies, but in Council discussions the members and advisers rehearse these views once again. The Secretary of State and others suggest desirable solutions to the policy problem, while the Secretary of Defense and the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff describe the military risks entailed in each alternative course of action. The President then reaches his decision, and the United States may acquire a new foreign policy or perhaps a new shading for an old policy.

Nearly all Americans agree on the need for this National Security Council. Everyone realizes that American policy has outgrown the Cabinet, just as the atom has outgrown the college laboratory. Where, fifty years ago, Secretary of State Elihu Root could disregard reports of a crisis in the Middle East, cabling the American envoy, "Continue quarrels with missionaries as usual",[1] a similar crisis today would call out instructions to diplomats all over the world, orders to military and naval commanders, anxious discussions in Washington, and an earnest session of the National Security Council. Living in a world as sensitive as a can of nitroglycerin, Americans accept the need for exact weighing of political and military factors before each policy decision.

[1] Phillip C. Jessup, *Elihu Root* (New York, 1938), II, 109.

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The nation has acknowledged this need, however, for only a short time. Not before the 1940's would the majority of Americans have endorsed the rationale that underlies the National Security Council. Yet this rationale now seems self-evident: military forces are the rooks and bishops behind the knights and pawns of diplomacy; although the rooks and bishops move less frequently, their rôle in the game is no less decisive. Before the executors of foreign policy can decide what the nation ought to do, they must learn from political and military experts what the nation is able to do. They must lay objectives alongside capabilities, in the same way that business men compare the blueprints of design engineers with the estimates of cost accountants. In making foreign policy, in other words, ends must be measured against means.

Although this rationale won acceptance only recently, it is not new, even in the United States. Nowhere, in fact, is it more vigorously summarized than in Number 23 of the *Federalist Papers*, written by Alexander Hamilton. But long years of isolated safety smothered the idea of political-military collaboration. It found no new spokesman until Captain Mahan began to preach, late in the nineteenth century. Even then, the idea was not translated into action until after the conquest of the Philippines, when a few Americans, looking across six thousand miles of water at their new colony, began to believe that the United States had grafted to itself an Achilles heel. They perceived that the safety of this faraway member could not, like the safety of the homeland, be entrusted to Providence.

Realizing the need for hard, far-sighted planning, this handful of Americans also realized their lack of any planning instruments. The State Department, as Tyler Dennett characterizes it in his life of John Hay, was an "antiquated, feeble organization, enslaved by precedents and routine inherited from another century, remote from the public gaze and indifferent to it. The typewriter was viewed as a necessary evil and the telephone as an instrument of last resort."[2] Although the Army and Navy had professionals, while the State Department had none, the armed services were still no better outfitted for strategy-planning than the State Department for policy-planning. Before the

[2] *John Hay* (New York, 1934), p. 198.

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Army and Navy could produce coherent advice, they had to nurture brains or general staff organizations, and such brains developed slowly. The Army's General Staff, for instance, was "only just growing to man's estate" fifteen years after its founding, according to the 1918 report of its Chief of Staff.[3] This General Staff and the Navy General Board faced, in addition, the problem of welding Army and Navy differences, so that military advice on policy could be based on estimates of the total military power of the United States. Until a Joint Board of the Army and Navy and the State Department, too, perfected their internal workings, the coördination of strategy and policy could only be haphazard.

During the first two decades after the War with Spain, as a result, consultation among the State, War, and Navy Departments took the antique form of correspondence among the three secretaries. The Navy Secretary, advised by his General Board, would write to the Secretary of State, proposing acquisition of a certain naval base on foreign soil. After referring the proposal to such experts as he could collect, the Secretary of State would return his judgment, either killing the idea or pushing it up for final decision by the President.[4]

Like sophomore letters home, these begging communications from the Secretary of the Navy sometimes hinted casually at subjects under study. The Navy revealed its concern with Panama, for instance, by requesting bases across all the sea approaches to the Isthmus—on the coast of Peru, off the Pacific coast of Panama, on Fonseca Bay, and in Cuba.[5] Never,

[3] *Annual Report of the War Department, 1918: Report of the Chief of Staff*, p. 3.

[4] See Seward W. Livermore, "American Strategy Diplomacy in the South Pacific, 1890–1914", *Pacific Historical Review*, XII (March 1943), 33–51, and "American Naval Base Policy in the Far East", *ibid.*, XIII (June 1944), 113–135.

[5] Livermore, "American Strategy Diplomacy in the South Pacific, 1890–1914"; Jessup, *op. cit.*, I, 326. The following from Record Group 80, the General Records of the Navy Department, in the National Archives (hereinafter cited as Navy Dept. Arch., RG 80): C. Darling (Acting Sec. of Navy) to J. Hay, Mar. 5, 1903 (carbon), 8480–8; G. v. L. Meyer to P. C. Knox, Feb. 23, 1910 (carbon), 8480–9; J. Daniels to R. Lansing, Feb. 28, 1920 (carbon), "Spindle File"—State Department. The following from Record Group 45, Naval Records Collection of the Office of Naval Records and Library (hereinafter cited as Navy Dept. Arch., RG 45): J. D. Long to McKinley, Dec. 13, 1901 (carbon), Confidential Correspondence, vol. III.

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before completion of the canal, did the Navy General Board say that the Isthmus was of vital importance to the military security of the United States. Alert eyes in the State Department might have detected this thought in the Board's selections of naval bases. And eyes even less alert might have perceived the concept in two bolder letters, reminding the State Department that no great Power should be allowed to perch on Ecuador's Galápagos Islands or on Haiti's Môle St. Nicholas.[6] But the Navy and Army rarely let fall such clues to their strategic thinking.

Neither did the State Department share its political thinking with the services. In the archives of the McKinley, Roosevelt and Taft Administrations, I have yet to find a letter from a Secretary of State, asking for a military cost accounting before some diplomatic stroke. Although Taft's Secretary of State did occasionally ask the fleet to back up his diplomacy, he never inquired ahead of time about the fleet's location and make-up. Thus, in May 1912, when unrest was sweeping Cuba, the Secretary asked for "a considerable naval force . . . in the vicinity of Havana." Only by chance, or as a result of naval clairvoyance, did nine warships happen to be handy at Key West.[7]

Letter writing in the State, War, and Navy Departments failed to bring about effective coördination of policies. As a rule, in fact, diplomatic and military recommendations reached the White House separately, and the relationship between political aims and military capabilities had to be gauged, if at all, by the President. Although this rule-of-thumb system could work for a strategy-minded President like Theodore Roosevelt, it displayed its failings even in his time.

In the summer of 1907, for example, the budding American high command, the Joint Board of the Army and the Navy,

[6] Livermore, "American Strategy Diplomacy in the South Pacific, 1890–1914". Rear Adm. H. C. Taylor to W. H. Moody, Nov. 10, 1902 (original), Confidential Corr., vol. III, Navy Dept. Arch., RG 45. Jessup, *Elihu Root*, I, 562–563; and the following from the General Records of the Department of State, National Archives (hereinafter cited as State Dept. Arch.): Daniels to Lansing, Jan. 2, 1920 (orig.), 822.014 0/287.

[7] Knox to Meyer, May 25, 1912 (orig.); B. Winthrop to Knox, May 25, 1912 (carbon)—both in 27868–4, Navy Dept. Arch., RG 80.

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discussed the hostility growing between the United States and Japan. Realizing that war, if it came, would find most of the American fleet in the Atlantic, the Board proposed a precautionary shift of battleships to the Pacific, then asked the Secretaries of War and the Navy to suggest such a shift to the President. The Secretaries did so, writing to Roosevelt at Oyster Bay, and Roosevelt agreed, choosing, however, to disguise the movement as a good will cruise. Although he seems to have reached this decision without delay, Roosevelt waited from late June until mid-July before notifying his Secretary of State, who was still in Washington. For several weeks, therefore, the Secretary of State duelled with Japanese diplomats, wholly unaware, so far as the records show, of the Navy's preparations for a warlike gesture![8]

The first advances from haphazard coördination-by-letter to coördination-by-conference were made, paradoxically, under an administration that would never have endorsed the rationale of political-military collaboration. President Woodrow Wilson may even have denied the need for long-range military planning. At any rate, two generals swore after World War I that Wilson had given verbal orders forbidding the Army and Navy to construct hypothetical war plans.[9] During his Administration, furthermore, a pacifist sat for two years as Secretary of State, a near-pacifist ruled the Navy Department, and a Quaker became Secretary of War.

Perhaps a prevailing attitude of the Administration was expressed on one occasion by this pacifist Secretary of State, William Jennings Bryan. Renewed tension with Japan had brought before the Cabinet another Joint Board recommendation for a fleet movement to anticipate the possibility of war.

[8] Hermann Hagedorn, *Leonard Wood: A Biography* (New York, 1931), II, 79–81; Thomas A. Bailey, *Theodore Roosevelt and the Japanese-American Crises* (Stanford, 1934), pp. 211–227. Taft to Roosevelt, June 22, 1907, Private Papers of Theodore Roosevelt, Manuscripts Division, Library of Congress. Roosevelt to H. C. Lodge, July 10, 1907, in Elting E. Morison *et al.* (eds.), *The Letters of Theodore Roosevelt* (Cambridge, Mass., 1951–1954), V, 709–710; Roosevelt to Root, July 13, 1907, *ibid.*, pp. 717–719.

[9] Frederick Palmer, *Newton D. Baker* (New York, 1931), I, 40–41; Hagedorn, *Leonard Wood*, II, 205.

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According to one member of the Cabinet, David F. Houston, this recommendation angered Bryan, who "flared up . . . got red in the face and was very emphatic. He thundered out that army and navy officers could not be trusted to say what we should or should not do, till we actually got into war; that we were discussing not how to wage war, but how not to get into war."[10]

Yet the Wilson Administration, with Bryan as Secretary of State, saw uniformed officers and black-tied diplomats sit down together to discuss questions of foreign policy. Tension with Mexico, during the first year of the Administration, brought Bryan himself to the White House for a conference with the War and Navy Secretaries, the Army Chief of Staff, and the head of the Navy General Board.[11] After war exploded over Europe, Bryan and his subordinates found a recurring need for special consultations with representatives of the Army and Navy. The uncertain character of neutral rights and duties brought into being a permanent Joint State and Navy Neutrality Board, an advisory body on diplomacy and international law. The amount of correspondence among assistant secretaries of the three departments increased three times over the pre-war average. And Bryan's successor, Robert Lansing, met almost daily, according to his desk diary, with officers from the Navy General Board and the Army General Staff.[12] Thus conferences, letters and committee meetings began to knit the three departments together.

But American policy failed to benefit from this increasing teamwork, for Wilson reached his decisions with little assistance from any of the three departments. Lansing had come into office, in Colonel House's words, as a man "to do the details intelligently,"[13] and his Department's share in policy-making was never large. Meanwhile, the military planning agencies lacked not only the Administration's trust but also the ability to justify such trust if it were handed them. The Joint Board

[10] *Eight Years with Wilson's Cabinet* (Garden City, 1926), I, 66.

[11] Ray Stannard Baker, *Woodrow Wilson* (New York, 1926–1937), IX, 328–329.

[12] Private Papers of Robert Lansing, MS Div., Library of Congress.

[13] E. M. House to Wilson, June 16, 1915 (orig.), Private Papers of Woodrow Wilson, MS Div., Library of Congress.

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of the Army and Navy had virtually disbanded, because one of its recommendations had piqued the President.[14] The Army General Staff had slipped into torpor, while the Navy General Board languished as a casualty of Josephus Daniels' perpetual feud with his admirals. Collaboration among these powerless agencies could result, at best, in a coördination of futilities.

The idea of political-military collaboration nevertheless survived. Since the war had revealed defects in the State Department and in the Army and Navy, the post-war years saw reforms in all three: the Rogers Act for the State Department, reorganization of the Army General Staff, progressive change in the new Office of Naval Operations, and creation of a new and stronger Joint Board of the Army and Navy. To some men in the War and Navy Departments experience had also proved the need for regular, official consultation with the State Department. And these men put forward two successive proposals for consultative organizations.

The first and most ambitious of these proposals came from Franklin D. Roosevelt, then acting as Secretary of the Navy. On May 1, 1919, Roosevelt wrote to the Secretary of State:

> It is a fundamental principle that the foreign policy of our government is in the hands of the State Department. It is also an accepted fact that the foreign policy of a government depends for its acceptance by other nations upon the naval and military force that is behind it. . . .
>
> It is probable that certain policies are of such importance to our national interests that they must be defended at all cost.
>
> On the other hand certain policies are not, by the expense they would entail, justified if they lead to war.
>
> Hence it is submitted that in the framing of our policies, it is necessary for the State Department to know how much they will cost to maintain by force, in order to assign them their relative importance.
>
> Conversely, it is necessary for the Navy Department to know what policies it may be called upon to uphold by force, in order to formulate plans and building programs.[15]

[14] Diary of Josephus Daniels entry, for May 16, 1913, Private Papers of Josephus Daniels, MS Div., Library of Congress.

[15] (Orig.), 110.7/56, State Dept. Arch. The copy in the Franklin D. Roosevelt

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Enclosed with this letter was a giant sheet of blueprint paper, charting with boxes and arrows an organization for planning against all possible wars. Prepared by the Naval War College, this neat chart outlined duties for a State Department planning agency, for the Army General Staff, for a naval general staff, and for a Joint Plan Making Body, composed of officers from all three staffs. To this Joint Body was to go responsibility for estimating national resources, both American and foreign, and the key rôle of defining American objectives for each possible war and assessing the force needed for success.

Although this grandiose scheme was probably unworkable, hard-headed discussion of the Navy's proposal might have engineered some practical organization for national defense. No such discussion ever took place, and, in fact, Roosevelt's letter was not even acknowledged. The letter and its enclosure went, by mistake, to the State Department's Division of Latin American Affairs. After some misspent months in that Division's filing cabinets, the document was interred in the general records, never opened by the Secretary of State.[16] Indeed, when I found the original of Roosevelt's letter in the State Department archives, the blueprint was stapled to it, closed, and, as far as I could tell, the staple had never been removed, the blueprint never unfolded. Such was the fate of the first proposal for a National Security Council.

The second proposal came on December 7, 1921, this time sponsored jointly by the Secretary of the Navy and the Secretary of War. Considerably less pretentious than the original Navy blueprint, this joint proposal offered only the idea of collaboration between the State Department and the Joint Board of the Army and the Navy. But the reasoning in the service secretaries' letter closely resembled Roosevelt's.

They put forward three proposals. The State Department should designate "a responsible official" to sit in with the Joint Board when "questions involving national policy are under

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library is described in Frank Freidel, *Franklin D. Roosevelt: The Ordeal* (Boston, 1954), pp. 19–20.

[16] Memo, Division of Latin American Affairs to Index Bureau, July 21, 1919, 110.7/56, State Dept. Arch.

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consideration." For similar discussions, one or more State Department people should sit in with the Joint Board's Planning Committee. Finally, the State Department should "refer to the Joint Board those national policies which may require the potential or dynamic support of the Army and Navy" and find out "whether the Army and Navy as at that time constituted and disposed are capable of supporting the policy in question. . . .All such opinions and recommendations of the Joint Board", the Secretaries added, "will be referred to the Secretaries of State, War and Navy for approval."[17]

This letter at least reached the desk of Secretary of State Charles Evans Hughes, but Hughes brushed it into his "Out" basket, noting: "This appears to me to be in substance a suggestion that at least provisionally matters of foreign policy be submitted to the Joint Board. I question the advisability of this." Taking their lead from Hughes, the undersecretary and the assistant secretaries questioned its advisability even more seriously. Consequently, Hughes suavely replied: "The only officials of the State Department who can speak for it with authority on questions of national policy are the Secretary and Undersecretary of State, and it is impossible, in the existing circumstances, for either of them to undertake this additional duty."[18]

Since War and Navy Department officials believed their proposal to be of great importance, they refused to accept the Secretary of State's negative reply. They countered with a new suggestion: the Joint Board should inform the State Department "whenever a subject comes before them for consideration which in their opinion is interwoven with the international policies of the United States." The Secretary of State or his representative could then attend the Joint Board's meeting. To this proposal the Secretary of State gave perfunctory agreement, thus providing the Army and Navy with a valve for

[17] (Orig.) 110.7/123, State Dept. Arch.

[18] Hughes to Fletcher, Dec. 12, 1921 (orig.); F. M. Dearing to Fletcher, Dec. 13, 1921 (orig.); W. J. Carr to Fletcher, Dec. 22, 1921 (orig.); Dearing to Fletcher, Jan. 4, 1922 (orig.), noted "(Mr. Fletcher concurs: JBS)"; Hughes to E. Denby and J. W. Weeks, Jan. 17, 1922 (certified carbon)—all in 110.7/123, State Dept. Arch.

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starting a flow of military-political discussion.[19] But the military leaders did not open this valve for over thirteen years.

Perhaps this long delay resulted from the series of slights administered to the military departments by the Secretary of State during the Washington Conference on Naval Limitation. Preparing for that conference, Secretary Hughes "worked closely with the Navy," his biographer says, and "was scrupulous in exploring the Navy's point of view while insisting that civilian statesmanship rather than naval strategy should guide the conference."[20] The General Board, anxious to push the Navy's ideas, presented Hughes with long, hard-thought essays on the questions apt to come up for negotiation. The Board advised that the United States fleet should equal the combined fleets of Britain and Japan, cautioned against any let-up in the naval building program, and portrayed the vital importance of fortifying Oahu, Guam and Manila Bay. But Hughes rejected each item of the Board's advice. In his opening speech to the conference, he not only proposed a 5:5:3 ratio among the three naval Powers but also offered to scrap thirty American capital ships. Later he proposed a general agreement not to fortify islands in the Pacific.[21] Undoubtedly, Hughes based these stands on careful reasoning and broad advice, but the Navy's feelings were badly hurt, and a sense of resentment over the Washington Conference colored the writings of Navy and Army officers for decades.

As a result, these officers became even more circumspect than before in dealing with political questions. Furthermore, they fell altogether from public favor, as, during the twenties, newspapers and magazines drummed disillusionment, isolationism, and new forms of pacifism and anti-militarism. Whereas to Secretary Hughes a suggestion for political-military collaboration had seemed only imprudent, to either of his successors a similar suggestion would have seemed rash and startling. When Hoover's Secretary of State was preparing for the new naval

[19] Denby and Weeks to Hughes, Jan. 25, 1923 (orig.); Memo, Fletcher to Hughes, Feb. 20, 1922 (orig.); Hughes to Weeks and Denby, Mar. 14, 1922 (certified carbon) —all in 110.7/124, State Dept. Arch.

[20] Merlo J. Pusey, *Charles Evans Hughes* (New York, 1950), II, 460.

[21] *Ibid.*, pp. 460, 462, 477.

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conference of 1930, for instance, he rejected out of hand suggestions from the General Board and took with him to the conference only one uniformed adviser, an admiral "carefully selected . . . by the administration's civilian leaders," one who "took a different position . . . from most of his colleagues."[22]

During these years, nevertheless, the general staffs were improving their minds by cloistered study of possible wars, and junior officers in the armed services were building friendly ties with their counterparts in the Foreign Service. They were exchanging intelligence data, a practice started soon after World War I, and they were meeting on various interdepartmental boards, like the Radio Advisory Committee and the committee on strategic raw materials. Early in the twenties, too, Foreign Service officers began to attend the Army and Navy War Colleges and to give lectures before War College classes.[23] Thus the future heads of divisions and branches within the three departments laid a foundation for later coöperation on questions of policy.

Over this foundation a structure began to rise shortly after Franklin D. Roosevelt became President. His Secretary of State, Cordell Hull, found himself dealing with a newly barbarous Germany, an emboldened Italy, and a hostile Japan. As Hull stated to the Pearl Harbor investigators:

> . . .soon after I came into the State Department, when I would be talking with the representatives of the thugs at the head of governments abroad. . .they would look at me in the face but I soon discovered that they were looking over my shoulder at our Navy and our Army and that our diplomatic strength. . .goes up or down with their estimate of what that amounts to.[24]

[22] Henry L. Stimson and McGeorge Bundy, *On Active Service in Peace and War* (New York, 1947), p. 168.

[23] Memo, A. Dulles to "Mr. Merle-Smith", Sept. 21, 1920 (orig.), 110.72/8, State Dept. Arch. J. C. Grew to E. Young, Oct. 18, 1924 (orig.); Davis (Asst. Sec. of War) to Grew, Oct. 20, 1924 (orig.); Grew to Davis, Oct. 23, 1924 (certified carbon)—all in 110.72/29, State Dept. Arch. J. M. Wainwright (Acting Sec. of War) to Hughes, July 8, 1922 (orig.); W. Phillips to Weeks, Sept. 1, 1922 (certified carbon)—both in 110.72/13, State Dept. Arch. Rear Adm. W. V. Pratt to Grew, Feb. 25, 1926 (orig.); Grew to Pratt, Mar. 11, 1926 (carbon); T. Dennett to Grew, Mar. 8, 1926 (orig.)—all in 110.75/20–21, State Dept. Arch.

[24] *Hearings before the Joint Committee on the Investigation of the Pearl Harbor Attack*, 79 Cong., 1 sess. (hereinafter cited as *Pearl Harbor Hearings*), Pt. II, p. 455.

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Consequently, Hull took more interest than his predecessors in military plans and opinions. Preparing for yet another naval conference, he asked the Navy to detail its wishes, and he sent to London, not just a "carefully selected" admiral, but the Chief of Naval Operations and a sizable band of naval officers. In the same year, too, he named a high State Department officer to sit in with the Joint Board's Planning Committee for a reëxamination of America's military position in the Far East.[25] Early in his term, thus, Hull began to seat military and political thinkers at the same tables.

As Europe's war drums beat more insistently, Hull drew the State, War, and Navy Departments closer together. After suggesting special conferences on Axis infiltration of Latin America, he proposed a standing interdepartmental committee to consider, among other things, "matters of national policy affecting the three departments." He nominated Undersecretary Sumner Welles to represent the State Department. The President chose the Chief of Naval Operations and the Army Chief of Staff to be the committee's other members, and this three-man group took the name, Standing Liaison Committee. Thus was formed the first American agency for regular political-military consultation on foreign policy.[26]

The Standing Liaison Committee lasted until 1943. Though it handled chiefly questions of hemisphere defense and Good Neighbor relations, it still gave the military chiefs an opportunity to learn the trends of policy thinking in the State Department. Later, too, it gave the State Department's second officer a chance to learn highly secret Army-Navy plans for possible war, plans formerly withheld from State Department eyes.[27]

Rarely, however, did questions of policy come up for the Committee's discussion, perhaps because the members had little time for talk. The military chiefs were busy, fabricating fleets, armies and air forces out of raw metal and rawer men,

[25] George H. Dern and Claude A. Swanson to Cordell Hull, Nov. 26, 1935 (carbon); Hull to Dern, Nov. 27, 1935 (orig.)—both in WPD 3887, General Records of the War Department, National Archives.

[26] Mark S. Watson, *Chief of Staff: Prewar Plans and Preparations* (Washington, 1950), pp. 89–92.

[27] *Ibid.*, p. 90.

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while the undersecretary and his department were swirling through diplomatic crises that absorbed their time and powers. So the Liaison Committee failed to march with the perilous times.

In only one instance did the Liaison Committee handle an important issue of policy, and then it patched together a compromise instead of building a solution. The issue came before the Committee in the summer of 1940, when Hitler was looking acquisitively at the Vichy fleet. The Army and Navy, fearing that Germany might seize control of the Mediterranean, proposed a shift of the American battle fleet from the Pacific to the Atlantic. But the State Department disagreed. More fearful of a Japanese attack on Southeast Asia than of German naval expansion and aware that Britain held the same fear, the State Department believed the fleet more effective, stationed at Pearl Harbor, where it might deter Japan from rash aggression. Since the undersecretary and the military members all stood fast behind their differing views, the Liaison Committee's decision solved nothing. The fleet, they agreed, "should be withdrawn from Hawaii only if the Germans actually secured control of the French fleet." If that happened, of course, the issue would still exist and would simply be more urgent.[28]

Other than this decision, the Liaison Committee accomplished little that touched the great issues drawing the United States toward double war. After November 1940, furthermore, its functions shifted to other committee and council tables. A new Secretary of War started weekly conferences with his State and Navy counterparts.[29] The President began to deal directly with his chiefs of staff, by-passing not only the State Department but also the civilian Secretaries of War and the Navy. By the autumn of 1941, in the tempestuous twilight before Pearl Harbor, the President was convening a War Council, made up of his State, War, and Navy Secretaries, and his chiefs of staff.[30]

[28] William L. Langer and S. Everett Gleason, *The Challenge to Isolation, 1937–1940* (New York, 1952), pp. 596–597.

[29] *Ibid.*, p. 10; Watson, *Chief of Staff*, p. 91; Stimson in *Pearl Harbor Hearings*, Pt. XXIX, p. 2065.

[30] *Pearl Harbor Hearings*, Pt. XXIX, p. 2066.

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Despite the resemblance of this War Council to the present-day National Security Council, it hardly served as a palette for the mixing of military and political views. Rather, it provided the President with a platform from which to announce decisions already reached with the help of the chiefs of staff. After November 5, 1941, the War Council spent its time devising ways to carry out the strategic concept long ago devised by the Joint Board and now ratified by the President: "War between the United States and Japan should be avoided while building up the defensive forces in the Far East, until such time as Japan attacks or directly threatens territories whose security to the United States is of very great importance."[31] Then, when war broke out, the President stopped inviting Hull to the War Council's meetings, and the Council, while it lasted, became nothing more than a board of strategy.

The idea of coördinating strategy and policy seemed, indeed, to die out with the onset of war. The President began to consult only with his chiefs of staff and with a few para-military officials like Harry Hopkins. Not only was the Secretary of State excluded from meetings of the War Council, but he was left at home when the President went abroad to meet British and Russian leaders and even left outside when Roosevelt met with Churchill in Washington and Quebec.[32] During most of the war, as a result, the State Department became almost an auxiliary arm of the military services.

Uniformed officers meanwhile filled the chairs left vacant by diplomats. Eisenhower, Stilwell and Wedemeyer negotiated with allied governments. The service chieftains, reorganized as the Joint Chiefs of Staff, met face to face with their allied counterparts and negotiated agreements that were, in effect, military treaties, requiring for ratification only the countersignature of the President. Although the Joint Chiefs continually disclaimed any authority in political affairs, their decisions, in fact, directed American policy. When they concluded, for example, that Russian aid was essential to victory

[31] *Ibid.*, Pt. XIV, p. 1062; William L. Langer and S. Everett Gleason, *The Undeclared War, 1940–1941* (New York, 1953), p. 846, and chapters xxvi–xxviii.

[32] *The Memoirs of Cordell Hull* (New York, 1948), II, 1109–1111.

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in the Far East, they said, in effect, that American diplomacy should subordinate other aims in order to bring about a Russian declaration of war on Japan. Had professional diplomats desired to challenge this ruling, they would have been unable to do so. In 1944, as a matter of fact, when the State Department wanted the Dumbarton Oaks conferees to begin discussions of post-war boundaries, the Joint Chiefs checked any such discussions.[33] Quarrels among the Allies might result, the chiefs asserted, and Russia might find cause for delaying her entry into the Pacific war. Thus, during World War II, the strategists took command, and the military-State Department relation was reversed. No longer were the military leaders seeking parity with diplomats; on the contrary, the diplomats were looking for space alongside the chiefs of staff.

Not until the last year of World War II did the State Department begin to regain its lost status. Then the need for military government directives and surrender terms caused the creation of the State-War-Navy Coordinating Committee, the National Security Council's immediate ancestor.[34]

This Coordinating Committee, composed of assistant secretaries, prepared the plans for occupying Germany, Austria and Japan, and pondered, in addition, many other questions of post-war policy. Since most or all of these questions involved fleets and forces in the theaters of war, the Coordinating Committee had to clear its decisions with the Joint Chiefs of Staff, and officers representing the Joint Chiefs sat in with the Coordinating Committee's staff groups. Before the Committee's recommendations went to the Secretary of State and the President, therefore, any differences with the Joint Chiefs had already been discovered and explored.

[33] See Department of State, *Post-War Foreign Policy Preparation, 1939–1945* (1949), pp. 276, 660–661.

[34] Howard W. Moseley, Charles W. McCarthy, and Alvin F. Richardson, "The State-War-Navy Coordinating Committee", *Bulletin* of the U. S. Department of State, XIII (Nov. 11, 1945), 745–747. Ray S. Cline, *Washington Command Post: The Operations Division* (Washington, 1951), pp. 326–330. John Carter Vincent, "The Post-War Period in the Far East", State Dept. *Bulletin*, XIII (Oct. 21, 1945), 644–648; "Germany and the Occupation", *ibid.*, XIV (May 26, 1946), 910–914; John H. Hilldring, Velma H. Cassidy, "American Policy in Occupied Areas", *ibid.*, XV (July 14, 1946), 47–48, (Aug. 18, 1946), 291–296.

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Such a process brought forth, as an example, the Committee's recommendations on post-war aid to China. Had these recommendations been compounded by the State Department alone, Herbert Feis tells us in his recent book, *The China Tangle*, they "would have subordinated the program of military aid to the satisfaction of . . . political ideas"—democratic government and political unity for China.[35] Recommendations drafted by the Army, Navy, and Air Forces, on the other hand, would have fixed on two different objectives—territorial unity for China and military strength for the Chinese government. Thus, while the State Department thought of aid for China as a means of exerting pressure on the Kuomintang, to force a political strengthening of the Nationalist government, the armed forces tended to think of this aid solely as a means for strengthening the battle capabilities of the Nationalist forces.

Since the choice between these points of view depended at all times upon detailed, expert information, the State Department and the military had to reconcile, or at least define, their differences before going to the White House with a program for immediate post-war aid for China. The State-War-Navy Coordinating Committee was an obvious arena where these views might be tested against each other.

The State Department drew up a statement of China policy, emphasizing the political objectives of unity and democratic government. Although this statement of policy has not been printed, an earlier model of it is visible in the MacArthur hearings, and the views of the State Department's chief Far Eastern planner, John Carter Vincent, have been published at length in the records of the McCarran committee.[36] In the final proposals of the State-War-Navy Coordinating Committee, quoted in Feis's book, one can therefore detect phrases written in with stubby blue pencils by the War and Navy Departments and the Joint Chiefs of Staff:

[35] Princeton, 1953, p. 374.

[36] *Hearings before Committee on Armed Services*, Committee on Foreign Relations, U. S. Senate, 82 Cong., 1 sess., "Military Situation in the Far East", Pt. IV, pp. 2929–2930. *Hearings before Subcommittee on Internal Security*, Committee on Judiciary, U. S. Senate, 82 Cong., 1 sess., "Institute of Pacific Relations".

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> The achievement of [American] objectives in China requires a friendly, unified, independent nation with a stable government resting, *insofar as practicable*, on the freely expressed support of the Chinese people. . . . The following should be established as policies of the United States: . . . .
>
> (b) *To assist and advise China in the development of modern armed forces, ground, sea and air, for the* . . .
>
> (1) *Maintenance of internal peace and security in China including the liberated areas of Manchuria and Formosa.* . . .[37]

One can see also the unaltered will of the State Department in such a sentence as: "The extent to which political stability is being achieved in China under a unified, fully representative government is regarded by the U. S. as a basic consideration which will at all times govern the furnishing of economic, military, or other assistance to that nation. . . ."

Thus were political and military views brought into line, through the agency of the State-War-Navy Coordinating Committee. That line admittedly jogged and wavered. And one can argue that events in the Far East would have followed a different course had the opinions of one department or the other prevailed. It remains true, nevertheless, that the State Department and the military departments disagreed, and this disagreement was due, not to a personal difference between John Carter Vincent and some general or admiral, but to a real difference between political and military perspectives. General Marshall, while Chief of Staff, opposed the State Department's idea of using aid to promote reforms in the Chinese government. Then, when he became Secretary of State, he defended this very idea against challenges voiced by the new chiefs of staff.[38] Such real disagreements between the State and military departments had to be reconciled in some place like the State-War-Navy Coordinating Committee, or such a committee had to define the points at issue for the President's adjudication.

But the Committee had its limitations. It suffered, in the

[37] Feis, *China Tangle*, p. 375 (italics mine).

[38] U. S. State Dept., *United States Relations with China with Special Reference to the Period 1944–1949* (1949), pp. 251–252, 255–256, 269–273.

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first place, from its inability to make policy. Although the Committee was capable of rapid staff work, as evidenced in its eight-day fabrication of a workable surrender instrument for Japan,[39] its mill of subcommittees hummed uselessly in the spring of 1945 when Marshal Tito threatened to march against Allied forces in Trieste. The question of American action simply fell beyond the powers of the assistant secretaries who made up the Coordinating Committee; and the Trieste decision had to be made by the President and his Cabinet Secretaries with little or no preliminary staff study.[40]

In the second place, the Committee went to work only when a question was referred to it by one of the departments. As a result, it failed to handle some questions well within its purview. The four-Power arrangements for occupation of Berlin were worked out hastily by soldiers and diplomats in the European Theater and approved by a nod from President Truman.[41] The Coordinating Committee never had a chance to examine these arrangements, and no provision was made for guaranteeing access to the city.

The nation needed the Coordinating Committee, but it also needed a policy-making agency with the power to review all questions. President Truman fully realized this need, and so did his Cabinet Secretaries, particularly Secretary of the Navy James Forrestal. Within two years after World War II, consequently, Mr. Truman, Mr. Forrestal, and a staff of experts had worked out a plan for a National Security Council. Bedded in the unification act of 1947, this plan received the approval of Congress, and the United States acquired a regular, legally established, cabinet-level agency for the coördination of political and military views on foreign policy.

Fifty years of growth and experiment lay behind this Council, and additional years of experiment lay ahead of it. The original Council showed signs, some said, of being dominated by its military members. As a result, Congress changed the member-

[39] *Hearings*, "Institute of Pacific Relations", *passim* (see index under "E. H. Dooman", "J. C. Vincent").

[40] Joseph C. Grew, *Turbulent Era* (New York, 1952), II, 1474–1485.

[41] Speech by Mr. Truman, *New York Times*, Oct. 5, 1952, p. 82. Speech by Mr. Eisenhower, *ibid.*, Oct. 8, 1952, p. 23.

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ship in 1949, dropping out the Secretaries of the Army, Navy, and Air Force. And the composition of the Council has since been altered several times, by executive order or simply by invitation. Thus, for example, President Eisenhower has invited his Secretary of the Treasury to sit with every session of the Council, so that dollar costs may be reckoned with political and military costs.

These alterations, of course, reflect a change in the Council's functions. Still the patching and mending is all applied in one place, on the National Security Council, and with one aim—to perfect that Council. Instead of replacing one experiment with another, in other words, we are striving now to improve a working model.

Mechanically, of course, the National Security Council is still in its scraps-of-wire and bits-of-chewing-gum stage. While its general purposes are clear, its specific functions are not. There seems real doubt, particularly, whether the Council is meant to resolve differences of opinion or simply to bring them into the open. Is it to copy the British Committee of Imperial Defense, where variant ideas are exposed to endless debate, or Japan's pre-war Liaison Conference, where decision was the goal, and difference often resulted in resignation? Which direction the National Security Council means to take is, at this writing, far from sure.

A reflection of this uncertainty has been the tendency of the Council and its predecessors to work like church councils or party platform committees, rather than action groups. Compromises have been forged, it seems, simply for an inner feeling of righteousness and an outward appearance of unanimity. In the State-War-Navy Coordinating Committee paper on China quoted earlier, for example, the State Department and the military departments did not really reconcile differences. They simply agreed on an ambiguous formula. With easier consciences, thus, each department could do what it wanted to do in the first place. Forrestal's notes on subsequent National Security Council discussions, testimony at the MacArthur hearings, and Chalmers Roberts' reports in the Washington *Post and Times Herald* on the Indo-China and Quemoy mix-ups of 1954 suggest that there have been later instances of meaning-

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less compromise.[42] Realization of the need for a coördinating committee has, in other words, sometimes obscured the truth that decision-making can become more realistic, but it cannot become easier. Coördination is no substitute for thought.

Neither has the problem of coördination itself been fully solved. While executive departments may treat one another with increasing frankness, the executive branch and the Congress retain the relationship of unfriendly sovereignties. Beside the monumental problem of harmonizing executive and congressional foreign policies, the relatively recent and minor problem of harmonizing executive views shades into insignificance. Even the simplest questions of executive-congressional coördination present absurd difficulty. "If you tell Congress nothing," as James Reston remarked, "they go fishing; if you promise nothing, they go fishing; if you tell them all, they go wild."[43] And, as Hanson Baldwin states the larger question: "Are national policies ever really forged in secrecy and by a small group? Do they not require the support and substantiation of Congress and public opinion?"[44]

These unsettled questions of function and competence, relations with Congress, and relation to public opinion ought not to cloud the progress that has been made. A committee that effects some political-military coördination has come into existence. Fifty years ago such a committee could not openly have existed in Washington. Had it existed in secret, it would very likely have been ineffective. During World War I, when a need for coördination was recognized, actual coördination was at best haphazard, and the new crises attending World War II saw one experiment tumble after another. The National Security Council is thus the product of a long and painful history. Whatever its present inadequacies and whatever the trials that lie ahead, it is still an institution. It answers an enduring need, and it is likely to be a permanent feature of American government.

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[42] Walter Millis (ed.), *The Forrestal Diaries* (New York, 1951), pp. 454, 517–518. Roberts synthesized his newspaper articles in "The Day We Didn't Go to War", *The Reporter*, XI (Sept. 14, 1954), and "Battle on 'The Rim of Hell': President vs. War Hawks", *ibid.* (Dec. 16, 1954).

[43] Quoted in Millis, *Forrestal Diaries*, p. 444.

[44] Letter to the author.

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COMMUNISM VS. PEASANTRY IN THE SOVIET UNION

THE dramatic declaration by G. M. Malenkov, read at the Session of the Supreme Soviet of the USSR on February 8, 1955, in which he asked to be released from the duties of Chairman of the Council of Ministers, must again attract attention to one of the most crucial problems still unresolved in the USSR: the relation between the Communist Party and the peasantry. In his statement Malenkov explained his desire to retire from the leadership of the Soviet government by referring to the unsatisfactory state of affairs that had arisen in agriculture—a state of affairs for which he was "guilty and responsible".

The real reasons for Mr. Malenkov's resignation are unknown here at the present time, and it is very possible that the real causes which prompted his decision are of quite another nature. Still it is evident that the state of affairs in agriculture would never have been chosen as an explanation for his step if great inefficiency in this field did not exist at all. Thus, his declaration is significant as an acknowledgement of the lasting difficulties on the agricultural front.

In the Resolution of the Central Committee of the USSR Communist Party of March 2, 1954, taken on N. S. Khrushchev's report, it was disclosed that the growing needs of the population for grain production were not met in 1953. Despite the fact that the total sowing area was increased by 6,800,000 hectares[1] in 1953 over 1940, that sown to grain decreased by 3,800,000 hectares; to grain feed crops, by 6,800,000 hectares; to groats crops, by 1,300,000 hectares; and to leguminous grain by 800,000 hectares. It also was stated in the Resolution that collective farms did not fulfill the 1953 plan for livestock breeding and that an important decrease in the number of cows took place in many regions of the Soviet Union in 1953.[2]

[1] One hectare equals 2.471 acres.

[2] *Pravda*, March 6, 1954.

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Strong measures have been taken to increase agricultural production in the face of this failure of the peasantry to cooperate with the established plans. The Party Central Committee and the USSR Council of Ministers decided to sow grain over 28,000,000 to 30,000,000 hectares of virgin and idle land in 1956. According to Khrushchev, more than 3,500,000 hectares of virgin land were sown in 1954 and more than 17,000,000 plowed up for 1955.[3]

One hundred thousand *Komsomol* (Young Communist League) members have been mobilized for work on this land equipped with 120,000 tractors and 10,000 combines.[4] It is easy to imagine under what strained conditions these young people work and live in the desert. It is, however, very significant that the Soviet government did not dare to repeat the experiment of 1928–1932, the collectivization years, by forcible shifting of peasants from other parts of the USSR to the virgin land. For the herculean task in view, it had to take young people inexperienced in agricultural work.

The tremendous extension of the sown area and the use of non-peasants for the work on it are other indications that the Soviet government is unable to force the collective farmers to work more efficiently on the existing arable land, that it cannot overcome the passive but permanent resistance of the peasantry in spite of repressive measures taken to that effect. One of the measures was the increase in number of compulsory workdays to be spent by farmers on *kolkhoz* land.[5] Indicative of the tension is also the new law sharply increasing punishment for the damaging of fields: every time the Soviet government increases punishment for a criminal action it is a sign that such actions have been perpetrated on a larger scale.

On the other hand, the Soviet government has tried to relax the tension and improve relations with the peasantry. In

[3] Interview given by Khrushchev to Professor John Bernal on September 25, 1954 and published in *Pravda* on December 24, 1954.

[4] Khrushchev asserted that 150,000 city dwellers were sent out for this work in 1954 and 165,000 will follow in 1955. *New York Times*, March 13, 1955, p. 1.

[5] See N. Nazartsev in *Sel'skoye khozyaystvo* (*Agriculture*), August 31, 1954. A *kolkhoz* is a peasant collective farm.

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September 1953 the agricultural tax was lowered, quotas for compulsory delivery of agricultural products were reduced, and the prices paid for these products by the government were raised. These measures proved fruitless, however. Nor are decisive results to be expected from the regulations of March 1955, signed by Bulganin for the government and by Khrushchev for the party. These introduced a change in the system of agricultural production planning: emphasis was shifted from the area of sown land to the actual volume of production.

Thus, the everlasting fight between communism and the peasantry, which started almost immediately after the seizure of power by the Bolsheviks in 1917, is going on. It is evident that no measures, aside from the liquidation of the peasantry as a class of society, or a radical change in the Soviet régime, can solve the problem, since the antagonism between communism and peasantry is deeply rooted in communism itself.

Let us briefly review the dramatic phases of the struggle and take a look at its sources.

* * * * *

The fight against the peasantry was started by Lenin in the period of War Communism, slowed down during the New Economic Policy and resumed with new vigor by Stalin in the years of collectivization. It gained new impetus in the form of amalgamation of *kolkhozes* and creation of agrocities according to N. S. Khrushchev's plan; and, after Stalin's death, Khrushchev again launched a new drive in agriculture, as described above.

Peasantry has never been favored by Marxists. According to Marx himself, the peasant does not belong to the family of workers because he is not a wage-earner. It is unimportant that he works more than the industrial worker. He was for Marx, and remains for his faithful disciples, a "petty bourgeois", a small landowner, one who must be "proletarized", must lose the ownership of the means of production in order to join the brotherhood of workers.

"It is clear", wrote Lenin, "that for a complete elimination of classes it is necessary not only to overthrow exploiters, landowners and capitalists, to abolish their private ownership,

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but to eliminate every ownership of means of production; it is necessary to remove both the differences between city and countryside and between men occupied with physical and those with mental work."[6] He branded the peasantry as the last capitalist class in Russia.

The discrimination against the peasant was reflected in the 1924 Constitution of the Union. According to Art. 9, workers elected, for every 25,000 electors, one deputy to the Congress of Soviets of the USSR, whereas the peasants elected one deputy for every 125,000 inhabitants. For the purpose of proletarianization the peasant was deprived of his land and forced into a collective farm by Stalin.

Collectivization, however, created for the peasants a peculiar position in Soviet economy. In the first place, although the collective farms are coöperative enterprises within the framework of the "socialist" economy and the land which farmers till does not belong to them, still it is the collective farms and their members, and not the state, which own the collective means of production and dispose of them. The state helps only by leasing its machine tractors under a contract to collective farms. Secondly, whereas all products of industrial enterprises are state property in the USSR, those of the collective farms are the property of the collectives. Thirdly, while the organization of labor and the wage scale are set by the government agencies for industry, the collective farm members determine themselves the distribution of labor and income.

Moreover, when the collective farm has fulfilled its obligations of supply toward the state and its other statutory duties, it is free to sell the rest of its products on the market, as is every member of the collective farm with regard to products he receives as his share of the collective harvest and dairy products. Finally, the products of the farmer's individual plot and of the small number of livestock and poultry allocated to every household of the collective farm can be sold on the free market at prices regulated by the capitalistic law of supply and demand.

These peculiarities of collective farm economy produce different conditions of labor, management and income in agri-

[6] V. Lenin, *Sochineniya* (*Works*), 3rd ed., vol. 24, p. 337.

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culture as compared with those in all other branches of Soviet economy and create a specific class of peasants or collective farmers within the socialist society in contradistinction to workers and intelligentsia. In addition to this, the peasant has retained his individualistic frame of mind, which has manifested itself in the terrific number of violations against collective farm property. The peasant hates the collective farm, strives to break the chains which it imposes on him, and longs for economic freedom. Striking evidence in support of this assertion may be found in the fact that in the beginning of the war Germans were in many instances received as liberators by Soviet peasants. The Germans, well aware of expectations of the peasants, promised to dissolve the collective farms and reintroduce individual farming. They did not fulfill their promise, and this was one of the main reasons for the reversal of the attitude of the rural population toward the invaders.[7]

About six months before Stalin's death, and on the eve of the Nineteenth Congress of the Communist Party, his last work, the *Economic Problems of Socialism in the USSR*,[8] was published. It presents his views on some basic questions, among which is his opinion on the existence of a class of peasants in a socialist society. He expressed his opinion on this subject in connection with another problem—commodity production in the USSR.

Engels asserted in *Anti-Dühring* that "the seizure of the means of production by society puts an end to commodity production. . . ."[9] Referring to this assertion some Soviet economists ventured the opinion that the Communist Party had been wrong in maintaining commodity production after it had seized power and nationalized the means of production. Stalin in his last work repudiated these charges, quoting another passage in *Anti-Dühring* from which he concluded that Engels had in mind the seizure of "*all* means of production" by society,

[7] This has been testified by a great number of Displaced Persons. See also on this subject the account of an eyewitness, Nicholas Laskovsky, in *The American Slavic and East European Review*, April 1952, p. 123.

[8] I. Stalin, *Ekonomicheskiye problemy sotsializma v SSSR* (Moscow, 1952).

[9] Frederick Engels, *Herr Eugen Dühring's Revolution in Science (Anti-Dühring)* (New York, 1939), p. 309.

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"the possession of *all* the entity of the means of production" as a premise for the abandoning of commodity production.[10] However, this premise, in Stalin's opinion, does not yet exist in the Soviet Union because two forms of socialist production are used there: the state form and the *kolkhoz* form. Only the first one has a public character. Stalin wrote:

> This situation is responsible for the fact that only the state can dispose of the production of state enterprises, whereas the *kolkhozes* dispose of their produce as of their own property. But the *kolkhozes* do not want to alienate their products in another manner than in the form of commodities, in exchange for which they wish to receive commodities necessary to them. At the present time the *kolkhozes* do not accept any other form of economic relationship with the city than the form of commodity exchange through sale and purchase. . . .
>
> Of course, when one universal production sector possessing the right to dispose of the entire production of consumers' goods in the country will replace the two basic production sectors—that of the state and that of the *kolkhozes*—then the circulation of commodities with its "monetary system" will disappear as a needless factor of national economy.[11]

Thus, according to Stalin, the *kolkhoz* system, in which the contemporary peasantry is organized in the USSR, is the obstacle to the dropping of the exchange of commodities, the elimination of the monetary system; in a word, to the advent of the second phase of socialism—communism. The peasant still stands in the way of communism as he stood thirty-six years ago when the fight against him was started by the Bolsheviks. Let us recall the dramatic events of this fight.

* * * * *

The Bolshevist Revolution of October 1917 was carried out with the help of the slogan: "The land belongs to those who till it." The Bolsheviks promised to the peasants the land which they craved, whereas the Provisional Government had referred the question of the land distribution to a future Constituent Assembly. This slogan also helped the Bolsheviks to win the civil war by attracting the peasantry to their side,

[10] Stalin, *op. cit.*, p. 11. [11] *Ibid.*, pp. 16, 17.

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On October 30, 1922, a land code was enacted[14] which confirmed the exclusive ownership of land by the state[15] on the one hand, and perpetual land tenure by the peasants on the other.[16] The size of the individual plots was established according to the factual tenure as of May 22, 1922.

It must be emphasized that the Land Code of 1922 permitted the peasants to choose between communal and individual land tenure.[17] Art. 24 of the Code conferred the right to the tenant to exploit the land at his discretion, to erect buildings on it, and to use it for business or housing. Art. 25 provided that constructions, harvest products, plants—in general everything connected with the allotted land is the property of the tenant. Thus, according to the Land Code of 1922, the peasants remained on the land they possessed as individul farmers or members of a collective, free to use it at their discretion, with the sole limitation that the land belonged to the state, so that they could not sell, mortgage or lease their plots.

Lenin died on January 21, 1924. The fight for the succession lasted till about 1928. When Stalin had disposed of his competitors and opponents, the experiment of socialism in one country could be continued. The New Economic Policy, which allowed Russia to recover and reach the production level of 1913, was liquidated and industrialization by means of the Five-Year Plans and collectivization of agriculture was started. The fight against the peasant was resumed. It was directed first of all against the so-called kulaks, the well-to-do peasants, who had to be eliminated in the process of collectivization. Collective farms had existed before: they originated in the period of War Communism. However, as of 1929, their number was quite insignificant (not more than 4 per cent of all the peasant families lived on collective farms). The decree of the Communist Party of January 5, 1930, proclaimed general collectivization and the elimination of the kulaks.

Both goals were reached in six to eight years approximately. In 1935 the agricultural yearbook of the USSR announced that of 5,618,000 kulaks registered in 1928, only 149,000 remained

[14] RSFSR Collection of Laws, 1922, Item 901.

[15] *Ibid.*, Art. 2. [16] *Ibid.*, Art. 11. [17] *Ibid.*, Arts. 10 and 2.

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since the policy of the White generals was to restore to the landlords the possession of land occupied by peasants.

After the democratic Revolution of February 1917, the peasants began to seize the estates of the landlords, clergy and the state, but after the Bolsheviks took power they did not distribute the land to the peasants as private property in accordance with their promise, but nationalized all privately owned land without exception and abolished private land-ownership completely by the decrees of November 4, 1917[12] and February 19, 1918.[13] The land occupied by the peasants was left to be held by them in perpetuity but not in property.

In the beginning of their rule the Bolsheviks came into open collision with the peasants. War Communism and the civil war completely disorganized industrial production. Inflation and depreciation of the ruble assumed terrific proportions. The peasantry refused to sell agricultural products for paper money, and famine spread over the country. The government organized workers' brigades which invaded the villages in order to requisition grain and other agricultural products for the cities. The peasants often met them with machine guns and hand grenades brought home from the war. In a considerable number of provinces strong peasant revolts took place in 1920–1921.

By 1920 Russian industry was totally disorganized and the sown area reduced to 60 per cent as compared with 1913. Lenin admitted at the Tenth Party Congress in March 1921 that tremendous mistakes had been made, that social and economic changes had been pushed forward too rapidly, and that serious retreat was inevitable. In particular, the Bolsheviks were powerless to overcome the economic gap between city and countryside, to close the famous "scissors".

The collapse of the Russian economy forced Lenin to introduce the New Economic Policy (NEP) in 1921, that is, to abandon the attempt to establish socialism in Russia at one stroke. Peace with the peasants was also necessary. Agricultural product levies were abandoned and replaced by taxation in kind.

[12] RSFSR Collection of Laws, 1917–1918, Item 3.

[13] *Ibid.*, Item 346.

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as of January 1934. They were physically destroyed or banished to remote labor camps of Siberia, and their property confiscated to the collective farms. By 1937, 18,500,000 peasant families, or 93 per cent of all the peasant households, became collectivized in 242,000 *kolkhozes*.

Characterizing this period of Soviet rule, Professor John N. Hazard writes: "Agriculture was being collectivized on a large scale, often against the strong opposition of the peasants who resisted. The middle and poor peasants were encouraged to expropriate their land and livestock and merge the latter into the new formed collective farms."[18] The ruthless manner in which collectivization and elimination of the kulaks were carried out is well known. Millions of peasants were deprived of the land they tilled, of their houses, cattle and other property. Collectivization cost not only about six million human lives (three million perished in the fight against the government and in banishment, and three million starved to death during the famine in the Ukraine in 1931–1933), but also a terrific number of animal lives (about 50 per cent of the entire livestock), since the peasants preferred to slaughter their cattle rather than surrender them to the *kolkhozes*.

Nothing can better characterize Bolshevist methods of "big lies" and their unrestrained faculty of fact distortion than the attempt to present collectivization as a popular movement based on voluntary decision of the peasants. Indeed, Art. 1 of the Statutes of Agricultural Artels provides that the forming of collective farms shall be an act of free determination. In his famous article "Dizzy with Success" Stalin wrote: "The success of our collective farm policy is due, among other things, to the fact that this policy rests on the voluntary character of the collective farm movement. . . ."[19]

These words were written in 1930, when the impact of the collectivization drive seemed exaggerated even to Stalin himself, when millions of peasants were slaughtered, banished and expropriated! And in the official *History of the Communist Party* it is declared that the collectivization movement was

[18] *Soviet Legal Philosophy* (Cambridge, 1951), Introduction, p. xxviii.

[19] *Pravda*, March 2, 1930.

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> a very deep revolutionary upheaval, a leap from the old qualitative state of society into a new qualitative condition, tantamount, with regard to its consequences, to the Revolution of October 1917. The peculiarity of this revolution consisted in the fact that it was carried out from *above* on the initiative of the state power with the direct support from *below* on the part of millions of peasants who struggled against the yoke of the kulaks for a free *kolkhoz* life.[20]

In 1929, Stalin wrote triumphantly:

> The last hope of capitalists of all countries, who are dreaming of restoring capitalism in the USSR—"the sacred principle of private property"—is collapsing and vanishing. The peasants, whom they regarded as material manuring the soil for capitalism, are abandoning en masse the lauded banner of "private property" and are taking to the path of collectivism, the path of socialism. The last hope for the restoring of capitalism is crumbling.[21]

In order to carry out collectivization individual peasants and rural communities had to surrender the land transferred to them "in perpetuity" by the Land Code of 1922, as well as their livestock. Thus, with regard to land tenure the peasants were deceived by the Bolsheviks for the second time. The new collective farms received land from the state for free use again for an unlimited period of time, "in perpetuity" as provided by Art. 2 of the Statutes of Agricultural Artels and Art. 8 of the 1936 Constitution of the Soviet Union.

One concession was made to the peasants: to every household within the collective farm a small plot of land, not larger than one hectare, was allocated for use, as well as a house and some livestock, with the exception of horses.[22] The individual plot remains the last cherished token of personal possession and economic freedom of the peasant. He often devotes to its tilling more time than he is supposed to and he tries to extend the size of his plot by all means, even committing crimes against state property.

[20] *Istoriya Kommunisticheskoy partii: Kratkiy kurs* (*History of the Communist Party: A Brief Course*) (Moscow, 1938), pp. 291–292.

[21] Stalin, "A Year of Great Change", in *Problems of Leninism* (New York, 1942), p. 143.

[22] Statutes of Agricultural Artels, Art. 8.

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Strong measures for preventing the peasants from unlawful occupation of collective farm land were taken in 1932. The Law of August 7, 1932[23] introduced the death penalty as maximal punishment for the pillage (misappropriation) of public property to which also collective farm property belongs. The Law of May 27, 1939, On Measures for the Preservation of Public Land from Squandering, prescribed for all collective farm members the minimum number of assigned workdays on collective farm land.[24] According to Art. 13 of the same law the People's Commissariat of Agriculture of the USSR, with the help of special revisers, had to carry out periodical checks of the actual size of collective farm land and personal plots. The Ukase of April 15, 1942 increased the obligatory minimum of workdays per annum on collective farm land. Violations of the minimum were punishable with six months of corrective labor and the loss of 25 per cent of income.[25]

In the joint decision of the USSR Council of Ministers and the Central Committee of the Communist Party, On Measures for the Liquidation of Violations of Statutes of Agricultural Artels of September 19, 1946,[26] it was stated that "the pillage of public land is being committed along the line of increasing the size of private plots by arbitrary occupation of public land." The same decision created the Council for Collective Farm Affairs, attached to the Council of Ministers of the USSR, the main task of which is the control of public and personal land tenure by the collective farms and their members.

All these measures, however, did not stop violations of state property and grabbing of *kolkhoz* land. A. A. Andreev, at that time a member of the Politbureau and Chairman of the Council for Collective Farm Affairs, reported to the Plenum of the Communist Party on March 6, 1947, that an investigation throughout the country had established 2,255,000 cases of misappropriation of collective farm property as of January 1, 1947. As the result of the investigation the collective farms

[23] USSR Collection of Laws, 1932, Item 360.

[24] Collection of Orders and Decisions of the USSR Government, Item 235.

[25] *Ibid.*, 1942, Item 61.

[26] *Ibid.*, 1946, Item 255.

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regained 4,700,000 hectares of land.[27] Deeply disturbed by the extent of crimes against public and collective farm property, the Soviet government enacted another law (of June 4, 1947)[28] concerning penal responsibility for the pillage of state property. It severely reinforced the punishment for individual transgressions, without, however, applying the death penalty, abolished by a law of May 1947.[29]

This measure did not work. Complaints about violations of public property were constantly to be found in the pages of the Soviet press. *Izvestia* of September 1, 1951, for instance, published an article by V. Yarovtsev, Altay Territory Representative of the USSR Council for Collective Farm Affairs, in which he stated that outright theft of collective farm land was going on in the Territory. In the session of the Molotov Province Soviet of April 19, 1951, measures against violations of the Statutes of Agricultural Artels were discussed. Many district Soviets and prosecution offices were sharply criticized for condoning statute violations in the collective farms of the Province. Instances of grabbing of collective farm land were reported.[30]

It was evident that collectivization had not sufficiently "proletarized" the peasant. He remained the double-faced Janus of Soviet economy: a toiler and at the same time a petty bourgeois whose income and labor distribution are based on quite different principles than those of the industrial worker, "the vanguard of the proletariat" and the core of socialist society.

Over thirty-six years of Soviet rule have failed to eradicate capitalistic features from the peasant's frame of mind and to convert him into a communist. At the present time, in spite of collectivization, the peasant remains a small-scale producer, the petty bourgeois which he was before the revolution. And if we consider that peasants still form more than 50 per

[27] *Izvestia*, March 7, 1947.

[28] *Vedomosti Verkhovnogo Soveta* (*Gazette of the Supreme Soviet*), 1947, No. 19.

[29] Reintroduced in 1950, the death penalty was provided for treason only, then extended to murder in April 1954.

[30] *Izvestia*, April 12, 1951.

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cent of the population of the Soviet Union (130,000,000 of 210,000,000, approximately), the desire to eliminate them as a class becomes quite comprehensible.

This is also necessary in order to achieve a classless society in the USSR. As mentioned above, not all ownership of means of production has been abolished, nor have the differences between countryside and city been removed with regard to peasants; hence the striving of Communist leaders to accelerate the process of elimination of characteristic features of the peasant class. In order to push the peasant forward on the path to communism a new drive was conducted in 1949–1951: the amalgamation of small collective farms into mammoth agricultural units and the moving of millions of peasant families to huge agrocities.

From an article by I. A. Benediktov, USSR Minister of Agriculture at that time, we learn that the number of collective farms was reduced from 242,000 to 123,000 in 1951, and that two thirds of the collective farms were merged into 60,000 large ones.[31] Working on huge agricultural units, living in large agrocities, separated from his individual plot and performing specialized work, the peasant was supposed to lose his characteristic features of a farmer and become converted into an agricultural worker.

The new attack against the peasant involved a new expropriation of land and redistribution of land tenure. In the collective farm merging process the "perpetual" tenure was broken for a third time by the Soviets. Again the land was taken from the previous tenants, this time the *kolkhozes*, and redistributed among the amalgamated collective farms. And, what was most unfavorable to the peasants, the merging process was bound to a further reduction of the individual plot.[32]

Of course, the merging drive was again presented as an act of free determination. The official version is that the party organizations must only convince the members of the collective farms of the advisability of merging and recommend to them

[31] *Sotsialisticheskoye zemledeliye* (*Soialist Agriculture*), March 3, 1951.

[32] The size of the individual plot had already been cut to three fourths of an acre by the Law of May 27, 1939.

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the best way to reach this goal. The decision itself must be taken by the majority of voices in a general assembly of the collective farm members which must be attended by two-thirds of all the members of the collective farm. Moreover, the merging decision must be discussed and approved by the District Executive Committee which has to check carefully on the advisability of the amalgamation. The approval of the District Executive Committee confers validity on the merging decision. After the confirmation of the merging, a general assembly of the amalgamated farm must be convoked in which the by-laws of the new-formed collective farm, the internal order, the productional quota and labor valuation are adopted and the administration elected. The administration of the new collective farm merges the property of the farms involved in the amalgamation process. The amalgamated farm receives a new deed for the "eternal" tenure of its land.

In behalf of merging "no administrative pressure is admissible", writes I. V. Pavlov.[33] According to the Soviet press, the merging drive is based on the same "freedom of determination" which characterized the collectivization "movement" of 1928–1932; "initiated from above", it finds allegedly unanimous support "from below". However, signs of the real situation reached us through the iron curtain. It appears that in some places the peasants reacted against amalgamation in the same manner as they did against collectivization. The *Moskovskaya Pravda* of September 2, 1950 reported that in the Shakhovskoy District, Moscow Province (where the merging action was most intensive), the collective farms had squandered and slaughtered their sheep during the winter and spring and had delivered to the state only two sheep in account of the obligatory meat supply.[34]

Some other examples of "free" merging are to be found in the Soviet press. *Pravda* of November 20, 1950, related that in the regular Plenary Session of the Ukrainian Party Central Committee, Sokolov, the Representative for the Ukrainian SSR in the USSR Council on Collective Farm Affairs, called

[33] *Sovetskoye gosudarstvo i pravo* (*Soviet State and Law*), 1950, No. 11, p. 43.

[34] Quoted by B. I. Nikolayevsky, *Novy Zhurnal* (*The New Review*), New York, 1950, vol. XXIV, p. 199.

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attention to a number of errors made in amalgamating the collective farms. According to him, various Soviets and agricultural agencies violated the Statutes of Agricultural Artels and collective farm democracy in deciding questions of amalgamation. In a number of villages in the Nekhvoroshchansky District of the Poltava Province the question of amalgamation was decided at meetings which lacked a proper quorum. *Izvestia* of May 17, 1951, reported that in June 1950 the Executive Committee of the Vassisky District, Omsk Province, adopted a resolution joining two collective farms to the Kirov Industrial Collective Farm, without asking the consent of the collective farms' members. Six months later five other collective farms were merged with the Kirov Collective Farm under the same conditions.

In this manner the peasant had to be brought closer to communism; however, he has not yet reached the stage of communism in which, allegedly, he will definitively lose his individualistic psychology and will become equal to the industrial worker.

When will it happen? According to the Bolshevist doctrine, the peasant will definitively lose his petty bourgeois characteristics when the artel, in which he lives now, will be replaced by a full-fledged commune. In his address to the Seventeeth Congress of the Communist Party in 1934, Stalin said:

> The commune of the future will grow out from the well-developed and prosperous artel. The agricultural commune of the future will appear only when on the fields and farms of the artel there will be an abundance of grain, cattle, poultry and all other products; when the artel will have mechanized laundries, modern kitchen-factories, bread-factories, etc.; when the collective farm peasant will understand that it is more profitable to obtain the milk and meat from the farm than to acquire his own cow and small stock; when the collective farm woman will see that it is more profitable to eat in a communal restaurant, to obtain bread from a mechanized bakery and have the laundry done in the communal laundry than to engage herself in all this work.

In the discussions on the means of gradual transition from socialism to communism, organized by the Communist Party

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at the Economic Institute of the USSR Academy of Sciences in June 1950, which was attended by 200 economists, the main reporter, I. A. Anchishkin, emphasized that

> the liquidation of the line separating the workers and the peasants will be intensified by the development of collective farms into communes in which the individual plots of the farmers will not be needed. The distinction between the class of workers and peasants will disappear completely. . . . The workers and peasants will become the working people of communist society.[35]

In 1934, speaking to the Seventeenth Congress, Stalin put the same question: "When will this happen? . . ." And he answered: "Of course, not soon. But it will come." And he added: "It would be a crime to accelerate artificially the process of the growth of the artel into the commune. This would mix up all the cards and would help the cause of our enemies. . . ."

However, time passed too slowly for the Bolsheviks. No sign of the predicted abundance was to be seen, and fifteen years later, despite Stalin's warning, an attempt was made to "accelerate artificially" the process of transforming the collective farms into communes by the amalgamation of *kolkhozes*. Amalgamation did not justify the expectations of the Communist Party. The peasantry fought back by frustrating the production plans established by the party.

It is evident that up to the present time the Soviet government has been unable to gain a decisive victory in the fight against the peasantry. Certainly, the peasants had to submit to collectivization, amalgamation and other drastic measures to which they were subjected. But the Communists have not overcome the opposition of the peasantry which is seldom manifested openly but is invariably latent. Whether the party will resort to the last measure—the liquidation of the peasantry as a class—remains to be seen. In any case, every measure, short of liquidation, will function as a palliative only.

Samuel Kucherov

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[35] *Voprosy ekonomiki* (*Problems of Economics*), 1950, No. 10, p. 100.

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HERBERT CROLY AND THE PROMISE OF AMERICAN LIFE

NO book written in the twentieth century has exerted so direct an influence on American politics, and perhaps none has indirectly so influenced American literature, as Herbert Croly's *The Promise of American Life*, published in 1909. It helped supply Theodore Roosevelt with the theory of his New Nationalism, and Woodrow Wilson and Franklin D. Roosevelt with much of the intellectual content of the New Freedom and the New Deal. In important respects it prefigured Wilson's thinking on international relations. And in an altogether different way it supplied a point of view for an able generation of American novelists, playwrights, poets and literary critics, as well as a vast fringe of literary dilettantes.

Herbert Croly died in 1930, after editing for sixteen years the weekly journal *The New Republic*, which his book called into existence in 1914. The theoretical bridge that he had hoped to build between an American national purpose and the self-interest of individual Americans was a structure of contradictory ideas, rearranged in various ways and left open against the sky. But the search for the bridge spans our age. Though out of print and unread today, *The Promise of American Life* quickened the faculties of Americans. There is no better key to an understanding of the successive phases of American political thought for the past forty years than the pages of this prophetic book.

In the early 1900's, American intellectual life was stung to activity by the developments which followed the transformation of the United States from an agricultural to an industrial society, and from a regional state to a world Power. What was the part to be played in American life by the suddenly enormously enlarged number of urban workers in industry, so many of them new arrivals unable to read the language of the Declaration of Independence, not a few of them carrying in their baggage political theories remote indeed from Thomas Jefferson's? What kind of Americans would they be? What kind of America would they make? What were Americans to make, figuratively

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and practically, of the two larger than life-size characters which had emerged with the new industrialization—the captain of industry and the big city boss—presiding together over a central area of American life in which, as a young New York lawyer, Charles Evans Hughes, had recently made clear, financial and political corruption seemed as ordinary as breathing?

Only a constantly decreasing minority of the population of the United States could any longer even pretend that the American dream of 160 acres and a self-contained livelihood would become a reality for them. If most Americans were to be employees of a fictitious and seemingly unreachable person called a corporation, what now was the yardstick of individual independence? What in these new circumstances was the meaning of democracy? Was it all "grab" and no "give"? In so fierce a fight for individual rewards and individual survival, who took responsibility for the welfare of the country as a whole? What were the responsibilities and opportunities of this mighty nation in international life? What, indeed, was the common interest of New York and Kansas? Would their state legislatures recognize any, and how could they provide for it if they did? Confidence and discontent rubbed together in the same minds. "We have reason to congratulate ourselves that coincident with our prosperity there is an emphatic assertion of popular rights and a keen resentment of public wrongs", declared Hughes,[1] the plainest voice of a multitude of aroused speakers and writers. Herbert Croly's book won a special and powerful audience, for he supplied what no other writer gave—a theoretical answer in American terms to the question of what had happened to America, which channeled discontent and confidence both. Over the course of a generation the streams so diverged that it is difficult to believe that the men who first drew upon Croly's ideas had read the same book. That they had is one of the most interesting things about it.

I

The opening chapter of *The Promise of American Life* is the only part of it that is still familiar. Croly began with large

[1] Merle J. Pusey, *Charles Evans Hughes* (New York, 1951).

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and combative assertions—that he intensely disliked the mixture of optimism, fatalism and conservatism which held that America could realize its promise by remaining true to the traditional American ideals and ways of behavior. All of that must go overboard: Americans must be prepared "to sacrifice to the traditional vision of a better future even the traditional American ways of realizing it." Yet he insisted that America was committed to the democratic ideal; if the promise was to be fulfilled, Americans must be prepared to follow "whithersoever that ideal may lead."

The effort to shock with these contradictory abstractions did Croly's major theme a disservice, and disguised it. Much of the subsequent argument in the 450 pages of the book was intended explicitly to disprove the notion that the democratic ideal must be followed "whithersoever" it led. Croly was a Hamiltonian, and his thought, like that of other young Republican leaders at the turn of the century, was focused on an idea which scarcely emerged in his introduction—the national purpose. The actual problem for Croly, as for them, was how to reinterpret the democratic ideal so that it would serve the national welfare, a quite different matter. His book was an effort to construct a more serviceable theory of individualism.

Croly, who had been editor of an architectural publication, was a New Yorker of Irish descent who had studied at Harvard, was widely traveled on the Continent and well acquainted with the young British Fabians. Yet, in a characteristically American way, he was a high-flown homespun philosopher. He was an evangelist, calling for repentance, a washing away of sins, and a new life. He wanted to make all his fellow citizens discontented with the lives they were leading—but for patriotic ends. It was an effective approach in an era in which great new sources of power were evident but objectives seemed to be lacking.

What he wanted, getting past the belligerent beginning, was "the transformation of the old sense of a glorious national destiny into a sense of a serious national purpose." And he insisted that the fulfillment of a national purpose was "a matter of conscious work". It was in this emphasis on the need for

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clarification of objectives, no less than in his declaration that "the 'common people' have not been getting the Square Deal to which they were entitled under the American system," that he reflected the feeling of such perceptive men as Stimson, Root, Roosevelt and Hughes. They wished, as he did, to disentangle the national idea and give it dignity. And they believed, as did Croly, that "the American idea is no longer to be propagated merely by multiplying the children of the West and by granting ignorant aliens permission to vote." He questioned the suitability of a definition of democarcy that described it merely as a method for expressing the will of the majority completely and instantly.

"The promise of American life is to be fulfilled", he said, "not merely by a maximum amount of economic freedom, but by a certain measure of discipline; not merely by the abundant satisfaction of individual desires, but by a large measure of individual subordination and self-denial." Croly was thrusting at laissez faire, and at the extremely uneven distribution of wealth for which it was held responsible. But he qualified this part of his indictment carefully. "I shall not disguise the fact that, on the whole, my own preferences are on the side of Hamilton rather than of Jefferson." He was far from wishing to assert that this concentration of economic power was necessarily undesirable, or that those men in whose hands it was gathered—"the money power"—deserved moral reprobation.

> That certain existing American fortunes have in their making been of the utmost benefit to the whole economic organism is to my mind unquestionably the fact. Men like Mr. J. Pierpont Morgan, Mr. Andrew Carnegie, Mr. James J. Hill, and Mr. Edward Harriman have in the course of their business careers contributed enormously to American economic efficiency.

In truth, Croly was not much interested in this aspect of the general question: he touched upon the theme of a fairer distribution of wealth only in scattered references, and when he made concrete suggestions for action, economic proposals were minor. His instinct was sound in this regard; the competitive American system would distribute its products more widely than any economist had dreamed, and the forces that were to fill this

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overflowing cornucopia were already observable. The essential question was political, and to be argued in a new frame of reference—not the question of the size of the respective slices of a pie of fixed and limited richness, but the purpose to which the poured-out wealth of the American cornucopia was to be put. Croly was in no way limited by the blinkers of Marxism which so falsified the picture of the American economy for intellectuals who had brought with them from Europe the view of the landscape from which they were retreating; there is no trace of the characteristic Marxist meanness, envy and malice in his writing, nor any reflection of Marx's supposition that an increase in the supply of products for consumers must inexorably drive down workingmen's wages. The questions of the relationship of individual Americans to this American strength and wealth, and of the rôle of the United States in the old international society, were the crucial problems.

Croly sought his answers by seeking to place an estimate on American political ideas and achievements. For one generation only, he insisted, had American political thought been vigorous and fruitful; the failure of Americans to criticize their own ideas had permitted them to stagnate. At the beginning, Hamiltonian principles had made for "national fulfillment", Jeffersonian for "national distraction". But neither set of principles was complete in itself, and the task of combining Republicanism and Federalism had never been accomplished. Indeed, in his view, Hamilton had perverted the national idea almost as much as Jefferson had perverted the democratic idea: the men of both parties were interested chiefly in "the great American task of improving their own condition in this world." Both wanted a government which would secure them freedom of action for this purpose. For Croly, the evil was selfishness. The Federalists, the larger owners of property, sought from a government mainly protection, and hence were especially distrustful of the state governments, largely in the hands of unruly democrats whose ideas tended to be "narrow, impractical and hazardous." Jeffersonians, he believed, sought freedom from any control. All had a common interest, but it was simply this: that if they were not then property owners, they expected to be. This common interest, however, helped the Constitution to succeed.

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But eventually, continued Croly, Jefferson triumphed completely—and the result was that "the democratic political system was considered tantamount in practice to a species of vigorous, licensed, and superficial selfishness"; in a word, individualism. Or, rather, "rampant individualism"—or sometimes, "excessive" or "automatic" or "blind" individualism. Croly never used the noun without an adjective, and in the adjective lay the meaning of the word for him. "The test of American national success was the comfort and prosperity of the individual; and the means to that end—a system of unrestricted individual aggrandizement and collective irresponsibility." Lack of leadership was the Jeffersonian principle of government, in his opinion. Yet even so, there had been in the past, he noted, a rough kind of combination of Federalism and Republicanism—of "union" and "liberty"—however "purposeless" and "precarious". It was in these terms that Croly set forth his formula. "If for liberty we substitute the word democracy, which means something more than liberty, and if for union we substitute the phrase American nationality, which means so much more than a legal union, we shall be looking in the direction of a fruitful alliance between the two supplementary principles." In short, the American people must be "nationalized", and democracy was to be a "formative principle". The remainder of *The Promise of American Life* was devoted to an effort by Croly to show what this meant, and how it could be achieved.

To our ears in the 1950's, alert for the verbal tricks of dictatorships, and with unhappy experiences of the excesses of nationalism, a reinterpretation of democracy as something "more than" liberty sounds an instant alarm. And indeed the ambiguity inherent in this formula, which led so easily to the conclusion that the state should be urged to be selfish, while the individual shouldered the duty of disinterestedness, was to involve Croly in insoluble difficulties; it could mean only that the individual was to be the instrument of state or "social" purposes. Yet in the America of 1909, it corrected a swing of the pendulum which had gone too far in the other direction and indicated a way out of real and present problems.

The heart of the practical problem was that there was an area between state and federal governments in which powerful special

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interests were out of hand. There were "business specialists" and "political specialists", noted Croly; in other words, the familiar captains of industry and bosses, "independent and co-ordinate powers." Each performed necessary tasks, the business specialists creating the new industrial communities and the political specialists, in backhanded fashion, humanizing them. "But both neglected their civic duties." Moreover, the traditional governing group in America, the lawyers, had also found that they must specialize rigidly if they were to achieve success in their profession: "the average lawyer has become a less representative citizen." And the growth of trade unions offered a further complication, for here was another set of specialists, all "materialistic", Croly felt, and some arrogant and lawless, even "sinister". The mercilessness of the competition in which the industrial workers were plunged made the unions necessary; but here too, he said, there was evidence that an attachment to such monopolistic groups was becoming more important for their members than attachment to their country. The founders of the Republic never expected the development of such well-organized special interests.

The corrective formula of equal rights for all and special privilege for none, offered by such reformers as William Jennings Bryan, William Randolph Hearst, Frederic C. Howe, Henry George, William Travis Jerome, was insufficient, he asserted, and because it skirted the real problem gave rise to irresponsible and extremist proposals. "Reform is both meaningless and powerless unless the Jeffersonian principle of non-interference is abandoned."

Croly's principle was "nationalization". He did not use the term in the sense in which it has since become familiar in such phrases as nationalization of industry. And it is vital for an appreciation of his thought—and of the misunderstandings to which it led—to recognize the distinction which Croly made between nationalization and mere centralization of government. Nationalization was a broad and, as Croly pursued it, ever more mystical process of regeneration and dedication by the American people. A greater degree of centralization of government in Washington was but one relatively small part of the larger purpose.

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Croly weighed the scales in favor of a conservative approach to the question of state and federal powers. Whether a given function should be exercised by the federal government was a matter of expediency only, he said, and the burden of proof should rest on those who proposed to alter any existing constitutional arrangement. The central government itself was in need of "nationalization"—that is, it needed to be freed from subjection to special interests, in respect to soldiers' pensions, for example. No particular piece of legislation or policy was national merely because it was federal. When a state or municipal administration asserted the public interest against private interests, it was acting for the welfare of the whole country. As a matter of expediency American democracy did demand an increasing amount of centralized responsibility—a direct result of the increasing concentration in industry. But the functions which should be bestowed on the central government were not those which the states happened to perform badly, but those which they could not possibly perform at all, such as the regulation of interstate commerce. "The best friends of local government are those who seek to have its activity confined within the limits of possible efficiency." National interest is as likely to demand decentralization as centralization—as in the Prussia of Frederick the Great, for instance, he said. Centralization was but one of the various measures which might or might not be appropriate in given conditions.

Croly's specific recommendations for domestic problems were modest. He saw no need for changes in the Federal Constitution; he wished to strengthen the machinery of state and local government by reform of state tax systems. The governor of the state should be the political boss of the party organization (a favorite theme of President Woodrow Wilson of Princeton, at this time). He much doubted the desirability of undermining representative government through the devices of the initiative and referendum, then the favored panaceas for legislative ills. He would remedy some of the evils of corrupt state governments by reorganizing them, not as small replicas of the federal government, presumed to be independent countries, but as administrators of an important part of public business which lay outside the sphere of the

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central government. This required concentration of responsibility in the local executive, not checks and balances, unnecessary in state governments. He recommended direct primaries, municipal corporations, regulatory commissions. He would end the conflicting and piecemeal regulation of the great corporations whose activites transcended the boundaries of states: the federal government would have to take on the task, "not because there is any peculiar virtue in the action of the central government," but as a matter of common sense. To add this to the responsibilities of states would not invigorate local government, but enfeeble it; the strength required was beyond their resources. Bryan's effort to solve the problem of encroachments by the great corporations on the domain of small business by destroying their efficiency seemed to Croly to have nothing to recommend it. The aim should be to extend the benefits of these efficient organizations more widely.

As with corporations, so with labor unions. They deserved to be favored because they were effective in improving the economic and social position of the laboring class. But unions which violated the public interest should be opposed and if necessary broken up; there were good and bad unions, just as there were good and bad corporations. The main conclusion was the obvious one: these great concentrations of power, corporate and labor, required a corresponding concentration of governmental power. The question was simply the degree to which it was necessary. Passions for or against it, as a doctrine, were equally pernicious.

Croly apologized for the humdrum nature of his immediate recommendations. He was pursued always by the particular demon of liberalism—the desire to make moderate proposals sound more revolutionary than the revolutionists. It was here, however, when he remained within the pragmatic tradition of English and American politics, that he made his most helpful contribution to domestic political problems. The theory of the extension of powers of the central government, not as an ideal but as a necessary expedient, with the burden of proof on those who claimed it necessary and with a complementary extension of local powers, was the sound and sensible basis on which American

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government was to develop. Croly, of course, did not originate the theory: despite his proclaimed desire to break with the past, its strength was the strength of the tradition behind it. But his demonstration constituted a fresh analysis of the old Hamiltonian-Jeffersonian quarrel.

Theodore Roosevelt's famous speech at Ossawatomie, Kansas, in 1910, to which he gave the name "The New Nationalism", was virtually a summary of Croly's thesis;[2] significantly, however, Roosevelt did not trouble himself, or his audience, with the distinction between centralization and nationalization. The qualifications which the theorist had put on the one were matter-of-factly assumed by the politician to belong to the other also. It was in this speech that Roosevelt created an uproar by his criticism of the Supreme Court, which in its recent invalidation of the New York Bakeshop Law had refused to perceive the danger of what was going on in the area in which neither state nor federal governments could exercise control. Justice Hughes and others were presently to widen judicial horizons in this field. And Woodrow Wilson, with his Federal Reserve Board and Interstate Commerce Commission, was to build on this same foundation in his first term in the White House. Franklin D. Roosevelt assumed that he was carrying forward this essentially conservative tradition in his major New Deal measures.

II

In the field of foreign relations, Herbert Croly's work was farsighted. He was one of the few who were aware in 1909 that the development of the American nation could be understood only in relation to the forces outside it. He saw clearly that international socialism was the enemy of his principle of nationalization. If it was socialistic to consider democracy inseparable from a constant attempt to study and remedy social problems, then he would willingly accept the label. But, he said, "There are some doctrines frequently associated with socialism, to which the proposed conception of democracy is wholly inimical." "Revolutionary socialism", an international organization of a

[2] A letter of Theodore Roosevelt's dated September 12, 1912, now in the possession of Burnham Carter of Cornish, New Hampshire, indicates that Roosevelt hoped that Croly would be his biographer.

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single class, was, he thought, headed "absolutely in the wrong direction." No condemnation could be more forthright:

> The destruction or the weakening of nationalities for the ostensible benefit of an international socialism would in truth gravely imperil the bond on which actual human association is based. The peoples who have inherited any share in the Christian civilization are effectively united chiefly by national habits, traditions, and purposes; and perhaps the most effective way of bringing about an irretrievable division of purposes among them would be the adoption by the class of wage-earners of the programme of international socialism.

These were days before the First World War, when Croly could say, as an axiom, that the modern national state was "the most intelligent and successful attempt which had yet been made to create a comparatively stable, efficient and responsible type of political association." It was so, he said, for two reasons: first, because the responsibilities of self-government best provided for the self-development of individual men and women; and, second, because the modern national state best offered security from foreign attack. Croly never doubted the validity of the first clause of his premise, but he was aware of the uncertainty along the narrowing shores of the Atlantic which clouded the second. He looked to the time when national development would be correlated with improved and defined international relations, "embodied in some set of international institutions."

Croly warned that current enmities in Europe would not be dissolved by noble sentiments—obscuring his own meaning, unfortunately, by reaching for the shocking phrase, as so often when he donned the robe of prophet: "The federation of Europe, like the unification of Germany, will never be brought about by any congresses and amicable resolutions. It can be effected only by the same old means of blood and iron." Croly did not, in fact, mean that the strongest European state would unify Europe by blood and iron, as Prussia had unified Germany. He explicitly declared that to be impossible, foreseeing shrewdly that the threat of aggression in Europe by a domineering Power would, in modern circumstances, bring "other continents" to Europe's assistance, in their own interest. What he meant was that the nations of the world would never agree to unite until

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they had learned from experience that they had more to gain from a policy of coöperation than from military conquest. And he urged the Powers sincerely desirous of peace, which he named as France, Italy, England and the United States, to keep as well armed as their more belligerent neighbors—Germany and Russia—since their weakness would encourage aggression. But this blood-and-iron phrase, and other similar passages, won Croly a reputation as a militarist; he did not deserve it, for all that he lent justification to the charge by his inability to forgo the pleasure of using sensational language.

Nationalism, for Croly, was the opposite of the doctrine of isolationism. "Any country which declares itself too good (or too democratic) to associate with the other nations and share the responsibilities and opportunities resulting from such association is comparable to an individual who declares himself to be too saintly for association with his fellow-countrymen." But he insisted that a satisfactory system of international relations would come only through practice and experience. The objective was not a "universal nation" (as much a contradiction in terms as would be the idea of a "universal individual", he remarked) but nations living in peaceful association. "A nation seeking to destroy other nations is analogous to a man who seeks to destroy the society in which he was born." Here again he was building on the lessons of the American past, which he pretended to be disowning—the tradition of the equality of coördinate states in the American federation.

Croly developed his argument with prescience, though what is remarkable in it, in retrospect, is not the particulars in which he guessed right or wrong about the form of international association in the future, so much as the courage of this early endeavor to analyze and identify American interests in foreign relations and to prefigure a conscious program to protect and advance them. Through *The New Republic* his thinking in this field was to reach to the center of American policy. He was aware that America's geographical aloofness was coming to an end, and that the part played by the United States in world affairs would exert a great influence on domestic developments. Indeed, responsibility at home was impossible so long as we were

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irresponsible abroad, he said. Like it or not, America could not avoid having a "career in the world", nor an increasingly complicated set of international ties and duties.

The only intelligent response to the new conditions which were drawing the nations of the world closer to the shores of the North Atlantic was to use the influence of the United States to support the forces which made for international peace, Croly reasoned. The first step, however, he foresaw, must be the construction of a stable international system in the Americas—an agreement among all countries in this hemisphere to renounce their right of going to war in return for a guarantee of national independence: this, he said, was the foundation of an opportunity for social and economic development in Latin America.

Simultaneously, Croly urged, the United States must act to put her relations with Canada on a better footing, through utmost freedom of trade, and a treaty in which Great Britain and the United States jointly guaranteed Canada's independence. He reasoned that if the United States agreed to lend Britain naval support in the event of a general European war, Canada would join the American system. He supposed that Canada would act thus from economic interest, and in this he was mistaken. But the first and decisive American "great debate" on foreign relations thirty-one years later (1940–1941), between the advocates of hemisphere defense and a world policy, validated his essential argument.

The popular conception of the Monroe Doctrine—a belief in the essential incompatability of European and American standards—would "survive its own utility," he remarked, because it flattered American democratic vanity. But other forces and ideas would be stronger: the search for hemisphere defense (in the later phrase) would lead west and east, as well as south and north, for the interests of the United States were now world-wide.

> To make Pan-Americanism merely a matter of geography is to deprive it of all serious meaning. Pan-Slavism or Pan-Germanism, based upon a racial bond, would be a far more significant political ideal. The only possible foundation of Pan-Americanism is an ideal democratic purpose—which, when translated into terms of international relations, demands, in the first place, the establishment

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of a pacific system of public law in the two Americas, and in the second place, an alliance with the pacific European Powers, just in so far as a similar system has become in that continent one of the possibilities of practical politics.

Toward colonial problems Croly was a child of his time. He would not even argue the legitimacy of the principle of the possession of colonies by a democratic nation: its validity was manifest, he declared, if one assumed the incapability of the colonial peoples for efficient national organization. Some colonies were "worthwhile", some not. The Philippines were "an expensive obligation"; but they offered one plain advantage to the United States: they would keep the American people "alive to their interests in the grave problems which will be raised in the Far East by the future development of China and Japan."

What form the Chinese question would assume, after the inevitable political and industrial awakening, could not in 1909 be predicted; but the maintenance of traditional American policy—territorial integrity of China and free commercial development—would, he prophesied, in a generation require a concentration of American naval strength in the Pacific. It was highly improbable that China could be protected without a great deal of diplomacy and more or less fighting. "During the life of the coming generation there will be brought home clearly to the American people how much it will cost to assert its own essential interests in China."

Croly summed up in an impressive forecast:

> The inference inevitably is that the isolation which has meant so much to the United States, and still means so much, cannot persist in its present form. Its geographical position will always have a profound influence on the strategic situation of the United States in respect to the European Powers. It should always emancipate the United States from merely European complications. But, while the American nation should never seek a positive place in an exclusively European system, Europe, the United States, Japan, and China must all eventually take their places in a world system. While such a system is still so remote that it merely shows dimly through the obscurity of the future, its manifest desirability brings with it certain definite but contingent obligations in addition to the general obligation of comprehensive and thoroughgoing national

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> efficiency. It begins with the obligation of interfering under certain possible circumstances in what may at first appear to be a purely European complication; and this specific obligation would be the result of the general obligation of a democratic nation to make its foreign policy serve the cause of international peace. Hitherto, the American preference and desire for peace has constituted the chief justification for its isolation. At some future time the same purpose, just in so far as it is sincere and rational, may demand intervention. The American responsibility in this respect is similar to that of any peace-preferring European Power. If it wants peace, it must be spiritually and physically prepared to fight for it. Peace will prevail in international relations, just as order prevails within a nation, because of the righteous use of superior force—because the power which makes for pacific organization is stronger than the power which makes for a warlike organization. It looks as if at some future time the power of the United States might well be sufficient, when thrown into the balance, to tip the scales in favor of a comparatively pacific settlement of international complications. Under such conditions a policy of neutrality would be a policy of irresponsibility and unwisdom.

Croly was so sure of himself here that he could write quietly. Noninterference in European affairs was then conceived by Americans, not as a policy contingent upon certain conditions, but as absolute law, he granted; yet he saw that the question of a warlike or peaceful organization of states was sure to come. No one could tell how the issue of American intervention would be raised, or whether it would be raised in a form which the United States could accept. But the point, said Croly, was simply that when the issue of joining with other states to keep the peace was raised, "the American national leaders should confront it with a sound, well-informed, and positive conception of the American national interest rather than a negative and ignorant conception."

Croly believed that America would reach a true understanding of her interests. Our experience in foreign affairs was just beginning, and traffic with Asia and Europe was so certain to increase that Americans would have every reason to study the question of peace throughout the world in its relation to American interest. He thought that the world system he had foreshadowed

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might come in several generations. It was taken up as a practical task ten years later.

III

After his commentary on foreign policy, Croly's return to social problems at home was an anticlimax. He had still to construct his new theory of individualism—the bridge, as he called it, between the nationalized state and the American men and women who lived in it. And the problem to which he addressed himself was real. To the reforming politicians who read *The Promise of American Life*, the theoretical definition of the place of the individual in this more centralized (or nationalized) state did not then greatly matter. The relationship of the individual American to his government seemed just what it always had been, as stated in the Declaration of Independence: of course man came first, his rights preordained and unquestioned. The pragmatic formula for the extension of federal and state powers made no change in the given principle.

But the very unanimity of discontent with the conditions of 1909 showed that the matter was not so simple. In theory and practice, the individual, in his factory or his office, was a smaller man than he had been on his farm. The new powers of the central and local governments were intended to rescue him from the industrial steamroller and to restore to him as much as possible of his old security and importance. But Croly knew that that part of the answer was incomplete. In some respects, at least, Americans were going to be different kinds of men and women than their rural forebears had been—different in their relationships to each other, different in their attitude toward the government which they had, in fact, called to their rescue, and different in their relationships to other peoples of the world. A greater sense of collective responsibility was needed for the successful functioning of this close-packed industrial society. That such social adjustments might much better be made purposefully than blindly, Croly wisely saw. And he saw too that, basically, it was a moral problem, as any definition of purpose must be. But the particular question was: whose purpose was to be determining —that of the individual, as before, or that of the state and an impersonal "society"?

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The method by which the stronger sense of collective responsibility which Croly sought could, in practice, be developed in America was close to his hand. When Americans wanted to improve American life in some particular, he noted, they did not turn to the governmental apparatus; they tried to see if they could not do it themselves by "unofficial associated" effort. The appeal to government was a last resort. It was through the development of innumerable and powerful unofficial associations that American democracy was, as it happened, to adjust itself to the new personal, civic and foreign responsibilities in the industrial age.[3] Americans had always been quick to take new responsibilities, when the need became apparent; and in these vital and varied associations for getting practical things done, which mushroomed in the new industrial society, they were to relate the process of government simply and directly to their own experiences and capabilities as business men, trade unionists, teachers, parents, citizens. It was precisely by drawing upon this traditional method of expressing their own aims and interests that they were to be able not merely to use government for their own purposes, but, as the phrase goes, to put it in its place.

But this was too simple an answer to the problem for Croly—too much like the method that had always been used. Here his grandiose prospectus came back to plague him, for had he not pledged himself to emancipate Americans from their traditional ways of behavior and to find something "more than" liberty to bridge the gap between the old Jeffersonian heedlessness and the national welfare? He turned his back on the past and, in the name of constructing a new individuality for Americans, made short work of individuals. The rock on which his thought foundered was his assumption that the old individualism was unmoral precisely because it advanced the self-interest of Americans. In his analysis of foreign relations he had assumed that morality began with an expression of conscious aims; at

[3] As Lewis Galantiére has said: "Americans are, in this sense, the world's most enthusiastic collectivists." He points out that this is the particular in which foreign opinions of American society most unfortunately go astray. "America Today: A Freehand Sketch", *Foreign Affairs*, July 1950. Currin V. Shields has also written interestingly along this line in an article, "The American Tradition of Empirical Collectivism", *The American Political Science Review*, March 1952.

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home, however, self-interest was the given enemy. That self-interest might be widened by a better understanding of new circumstances, in a word, by the exercise of intelligence—the concept of individualism which his contemporary, Warner Fite, was at that moment developing in lectures at the University of Chicago[4]—seemed a prosy conception beside the magnificence of sacrifice.

The collective effort must be "disinterested". And that assumed, he concluded, all too truly, that it could be achieved only if the apparatus of government were deliberately used to "put the collective power of the group at the service of its ablest members." Americans could realize their personal aims only by losing themselves in a "sovereign national will". In short, for liberty he substituted authority:

> A people are saved many costly perversions, in case the official schoolmasters are wise, and the pupils neither truant nor insubordinate; but if the lessons are foolishly phrased, or the pupils refuse to learn, the school will never regain its proper disciplinary value until new teachers have arisen, who understand both the error and its consequences, and who can exercise an effective authority over their pupils.

But who was to be schoolmaster in the national school? Paul Elmer More, the author of a body of authoritarian doctrine of the opposite persuasion, had used the same analogy. But More faced that question frankly. A "natural aristocracy", he replied, which would take the decisions and use the wisdom of the Greek philosophers to reconcile the pupils to their lot. Croly never attempted a logical answer. Sacrifices, he said, would create a "higher type of individual and associated life"; and the forging and functioning of the morally authoritative sovereign will would gradually achieve "an individual and social amelioration." His phrases raced about as if seeking their own meaning. "For better or worse the American people have proclaimed themselves to be a democracy, and they have proclaimed that democracy means popular economic, social and moral emancipation." "The national principle becomes a principle of reform and reconstruction, precisely because national consistency is constantly

[4] *Individualism* (New York, 1911).

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demanding the solution of contradictory economic and political tendencies." "The American democracy can, consequently, safely trust its genuine interests to the keeping of those who represent the national interest. It can do so, and it must do so."

Suddenly, after all, he was in the thickets of Utopian socialism. The man who "proposes to become an individual", he said, must free himself from bondage to the acquisitive motive. "The popular enjoyment of practically unrestricted economic opportunities is precisely the condition which makes for individual bondage." Why, he did not explain; but he was certain that men must henceforth make money by sheer excellence of achievement: "The ultimate end is the complete emancipation of the individual, and that result depends upon his complete disinterestedness." And he quoted with approval John Jay Chapman's dictum that the merit of democracy does not lie in giving every man a chance to pursue his own ends, but in the reverse: "Democracy contemplates that every man shall think first of the state and next of himself. . . . Democracy assumes perfection in human nature." This was political nonsense, and when Croly came to the point of considering what would be done to forge this sovereign will in the actual circumstances—that is, among Americans who, as he knew, had not the slightest intention of sacrificing self-government to this mystical process of nationalization—he fled from the consequences of his own argument.

A radical theory does not demand equally radical action, he suddenly remarked as his inquiry came to a close. It is necessary to apply theory only as far as conditions will permit. Croly did not explain whether his further program embraced, say, the abolition of private property, or merely, perhaps, the short ballot. Enough that whatever was advocated be described in provocative words. Before anything could be done, a new type of individual had to be created; and, meanwhile, intellectuals would make themselves fit instruments for the future regeneration of American life by devoting themselves "unscrupulously" to their own advancement. Croly's thought had come full circle. Only "individual emancipation" would create the new public which would make political action possible, he declared, and individual intellectuals would create

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this public by writing novels, constructing plays, painting pictures, building houses, and, in general, expressing themselves creatively. With a fervor that made the selfish Jeffersonians, against whom the original onslaught was directed, seem models of civic responsibility, he added the injunction that each emancipated individual should beware of subjecting himself to the domination of another and should seek to create his own following.

The process was to be carried on in four steps. First, "peculiarly competent, energetic, and responsible individuals" would assume the task of leadership; second, these leaders would seek first-rate technical training; third, they would display superior competence at their jobs; but fourth—simply and providentially—they would first go abroad. The Younger Generation was born! Individual emancipation—"unscrupulously" pursued—and technical excellence—seriously studied—became the watchwords of an era. Herbert Croly was its sire.

IV

His manifesto did not, of course, create the conditions which made the flight from politics an actuality in America ten years later. In the false dawn of the early twenties—when war seemed merely a stupid mistake never to be repeated, when men's relations with men (and women) had presumably changed forever with the departure of the Victorians and the arrival of the psychologists, when there were a thousand new things to see and report at home and a rediscovered City of Light abroad to compare them with—all this fed this effort of art and literature. Croly was serious; and, as always, what he had to say was related to a real problem. There was a valid reason for protesting against the shoddy, jerry-built, slap-dash work of many Americans in those boom-town days, and against an incongruously enervated literature. And with his concern for professional competence—always remembered under the roof of the periodical he founded—he helped to steady many young Americans who were carried away by the passion for finding words and colors and materials to express in art this gigantic new industrial civilization. The casualty of the era was the national interest. Charles A. Beard, one of the most talented of Croly's school, was to bring the

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interval to a close with a book, *The Idea of National Interest*, in which he employed all the resources of scientific research, and every trick of debating, to bury in derision the very idea on which Croly had focused *The Promise of American Life*.

To balance cultural gains against political losses is a profitless calculation: the gains were great—in literature, and, through that, in the self-understanding of Americans; and the political losses were high, and paid from every quarter. Responding to the post-war forces which drove the intellectuals, American business had enjoyed its own flight from politics during the decade; and politicians in the highest places congratulated themselves on the surrender of their responsibilities. Eventually all returned to politics and to earth, not because individuals were atrophying in plenty, but because in 1929 the money suddenly gave out. But when Croly's audience of 1909—intellectuals, industrialists and politicians—reassembled to face a common problem in the thirties, they were strangers to one another. Some of Woodrow Wilson's pupils had attempted to hold the field, and there were other exceptions. But, in the main, intellectuals had no respect for the American past; serious men had no respect for the political judgment of intellectuals; business men and politicians thought they were enemies. The confident association of American politicians and intellectuals, which had earlier been so fruitful for both, had been severed. Croly, who had broken with Wilson over defects in the Treaty of Versailles and petulantly disowned the League of Nations, which he, more clearly than any other American, had heralded, ended his life a disciple of the erratic mystic, Gurdjieff.

Though Croly's formulation of the problem of extension of federal powers was to supply the rationale of the New Deal, *The New Republic* had little but criticism for Theodore Roosevelt's cousin during the thirties, and Theodore Roosevelt's own party seemed to have forgotten his existence. Not again until the presidential campaign of 1944 could any political reporter have imagined using the phrase "Republican intellectuals". There was, of course, further reason for these developments. The weakness of the American economy throughout most of the thirties, and the rise of national socialist power in Russia and

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Germany, had given new significance to the old question of centralization. Even in America, it became what Croly hoped it never would be—a doctrine for passionate acceptance or rejection. The pragmatic position was discredited in the hopes and fears aroused by a new set of political objectives as far from Utopian socialism as from Jeffersonian individualism. Only the concrete threat to America's survival in the forties, from one and then the other of the warlike Powers of 1909, was to restore a semblance of the old working-partnership of Theodore Roosevelt's and Croly's day, and to prompt a wide new concern, in theory and practice, with the promise of American life.

Byron Dexter

South Woodstock, Vt.

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UNCLE SAM'S FOREIGN LABOR GUESTS

SOME months ago, on a brief visit to the United States, former British Labor Minister Alfred Robens said: "I don't think the average Britisher can possibly understand the average American until he has had the kind of experience I have been fortunate enough to have had." Mr. Robens mirrored in these words the reactions of nearly a thousand visitors who have come to our country over the past five years with the specific aim of studying American techniques in the field of labor, and of seeing at first hand American democracy in action.

The steady flow of these labor visitors who have been invited from all the continents is a reflection of the attention being paid by the United States to the growing influence of labor around the world. Whether it be through its rôle as the government itself or as the major opposition party or even as a political force upon which a major party relies for support, labor in an increasing number of nations has come to exert a significant influence upon national policies, both foreign and domestic. Where labor is not politically articulate, it is frequently an important consideration in the policies of governments, if only because it constitutes the largest numerical group of citizens.

In this growing influence of labor around the world the United States clearly has a major stake. Constructively, it is in the American interest to encourage responsible and evolutionary worker progress within the framework of free democratic societies; and our country through its traditions and institutions has much to contribute spiritually, philosophically and technically to such a purpose. Defensively, too, we must counter the constant efforts of imperialist communism to subvert labor to its own aggressive aims. And here again the United States has much to offer by its example and ideals as a leader in the free world's determination to resist communist aggression and promote evolutionary progress for all under the freedom of democracy.

These practical concerns of the United States with the grow-

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ing influence of world labor have been recognized by the Congress in legislation enacted over the past several years, and particularly in its provision for the exchange of influential visitors from many fields, including labor.[1] In the implementation of these laws, the Department of State and the Foreign Operations Administration have relied upon the Department of Labor to arrange programs for those visitors who have a special interest in labor affairs, whether they be from government, management, educational or other fields. This rôle of the Department of Labor has been formalized by inter-agency agreements which recognize the special technical contributions which the Department has to offer in this regard.

In administering the labor visitor program, the Department of Labor has concurred with the Department of State and the Foreign Operations Administration in the belief that labor ramifications are to be found in a far broader range of national and international interests and activities than trade unionism alone. Government abroad, as a general rule, plays a much more direct and extensive rôle in labor affairs than in our country, and labor abroad generally tends to participate far more actively and directly in politics than in the United States. Management obviously has its own immediate concerns with labor developments. Universities and private organizations are increasingly attentive to labor affairs.

As a consequence, while those foreign visitors who are most directly interested in American labor are primarily trade unionists and labor party officials, the labor visitor program includes men and women from many other fields who desire to have a detailed look at our country from the labor point of view. These

[1] The United States Information and Educational Exchange Act of 1948 (Smith-Mundt Act, Public Law 402, 80th Congress), the Appropriation Acts for Government in Occupied Areas (Germany and Austria), and the Finnish War Payment Resolution (Public Law 265, 81st Congress) provide for invitations to be issued by the Department of State for foreign labor visitors and specialists to come to this country.

The Mutual Security Act of 1954 (Public Law 665, 83rd Congress) continued earlier authorizations to the Foreign Operations Administration to carry out programs, including inviting labor visitors to this country, designed to assist underdeveloped countries to "develop their resources and improve their working and living conditions". In particular, the Act declared it the policy of the United States "to strengthen free labor unions". Section 413.

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labor visitors are selected, in coöperation with foreign governments and organizations, from those who are leaders in their field, as well as from those technicians who are potential leaders but who are more closely concerned with detailed aspects of the labor picture.

While these visitors are most commonly grouped in homogeneous labor, management, government or other "teams" having common interests, on occasion teams composed of all three groups have been programmed with success. The primary aim, however, is to select as visitors those who will be best able to profit from and utilize effectively the information and impressions they obtain, and who will be able to impart to their colleagues at home what they have gained. The ideal result that is sought is typified by the words of a German steelworkers' team after their return home: "The seed planted is bearing a hundredfold fruit here. We are making the best possible use of our American experience in many talks, discussions and speeches, and also in printed articles. We have pointed to good American examples in large plant meetings before thousands of our colleagues."

Programs for visitors in the labor field are coördinated by the Office of International Labor Affairs in the Department of Labor, and where specialized fields of interest are involved itineraries are worked out in detail both by the Office of International Labor Affairs and by appropriate bureaus of the Department, such as the Bureau of Labor Statistics, the Womens' Bureau, the Bureau of Apprenticeship or the Bureau of Labor Standards. The programs are developed in detail, however, only in close coöperation with the visitors themselves. While the Office of International Labor Affairs and other Labor Department Bureaus carefully adjust programs to the special needs and problems of the visitors' country and to their individual fields of interest, every effort is also made to take into account the various personal preferences and desires expressed by the visitors themselves. As much freedom as possible is given them to choose where they wish to go and what they wish to see within the objectives of the program and the inexorable limits of time and funds. The visitors appreciate the opportunities

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given them to sample American life at will within the framework of their itineraries.

Another impressive aspect of the development of these labor visitor programs is the indispensable reliance placed upon private "sponsors" for the majority of arrangements. In keeping with the American philosophy of minimal governmental interference in normal labor-management relations, the Department of Labor deliberately restricts its rôle to that of general program developer and coördinator, counselor and administrator. Primary responsibility for the success of the programs rests of course with the Department of Labor, but a major and essential contribution is made by hundreds of sponsors scattered throughout the length and breadth of the country, groups and individuals who give generously of their time and knowledge to see that the visitors learn at first hand the facts both about their technical interests and about the United States. The visitors see America through its citizens of all walks of life; and this voluntary participation of America's labor, management, universities, private individuals and civic groups in arranging plant visits, meetings, appointments with key persons, side trips and other activities is a major key to the effectiveness of this important adjunct of foreign policy. Where appropriate, assistance is requested of the regional offices of the Department of Labor as well as of state and city officials. But the labor visitor program is primarily a citizen effort.

Visitor groups are met by government representatives upon arrival, usually in New York or San Francisco, and are generally brought at once to Washington for discussion and arrangement of the final details of their program. An intensive introduction is then arranged to American life, history and institutions, particularly as they relate to the labor field. Some groups are given this background on a limited basis in the Department of Labor, other government agencies and private organizations, such as the International Center and American University, in Washington. Other teams, depending upon their composition and needs, are given special programs in leading universities, usually not far from the capital. At Pennsylvania State University, for example, a recent group of Indonesian labor visitors

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was given a concentrated introductory program of lectures and discussions both on key aspects of the American labor movement and on fundamental characteristics of economic, political and social life, and institutions in the United States.

Once the groups of visitors are provided with such essential background information about the United States, their programs have two intermeshing aims. First, factual and technical interests are met. Secondly, during their stay, every effort is made to expose all visitors to American democracy in action, to develop understanding and to make friends for our country. These twin aspects of the program may perhaps be best illustrated by the activities of five teams which present a representative cross section of recent labor visitors:

1. A joint labor-management-government team of six leaders from India, who spent three months in nine states.
2. Sixteen Indonesian labor leaders, predominantly from the Railway Workers' Union, who after a more elaborate university program spent five months in nine states.
3. Thirteen labor, management and government leaders and technicians from the Mexican oil industry, who were programmed in twelve states during a five-month visit.
4. A six-man team from the Chilean labor movement (a crane mechanic, an electrician, a weaver, a boilermaker, a newspaper make-up man and a technical educationist), who spent time in eleven states over a three-month period.
5. A joint ten-man group composed of labor, management and government representatives from the German steel industry, programmed in nine states during a three-month stay.

While these, and other visitor teams, have covered much ground (indeed, such visitors have been programmed in all forty-eight states and two territories), theirs is no pure sightseeing tour; each working day is full. They most commonly make their headquarters for a week or more in a limited number of cities. From these bases they fan out during the day to surrounding communities as their interests and needs may indicate. In this way, an effort is made to avoid confusing the visitors

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with a kaleidoscopic mixture of impressions, yet at the same time to provide as broad and representative a picture of the United States as possible.

II

The factual and technical interests of labor visitors run the entire gamut of labor, as well as manufacturing and industrial techniques and problems in their individual industries. In the labor field, the following subjects are representative of those explored by the visitors with members of American labor, management, government and private organizations:

Trade Union Problems

Organization	Administration	Finances and Records
Organizing Methods	Education Programs	Collective Bargaining
Publications	Research Programs	Philosophy of Labor
Cooperatives	Jurisdiction	Dues and Collection
Community Activities	Anti-communism	International Activities

Rôle of Government in Labor Affairs

Conciliation	Mediation	Arbitration
Safety	Women	Cost of Living Index
Child Labor	Apprenticeship	Statistical Techniques
Social Security	Legislation	Employment Services

Labor Relations and Techniques

Job Descriptions	Wage Rates	Time and Motion Studies
Human Relations	Productivity	On-Job Training
Incentives	Pensions	Personnel Managers
Shop Stewards	Foremen	Grievance Procedures

These and other problems are exhaustively explored and discussed by the visitors with American labor and management. All groups thus meet with AFL, CIO and other union leaders around the country, as well as at headquarters and at the offices of the union international representatives in Washington. The Indonesian team, for example, discussed with union officials and workers in Akron, Ohio, such questions as union finances, pension programs, labor, education and jurisdictional problems. In Pittsburgh the Germans explored with the United Steel Workers of America techniques and problems of collective bargaining and labor-management relations.

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Care is taken, however, that both sides of the American labor picture be presented. All visitors meet frequently with officials of a broad cross section of individual plants, and in addition most of them meet with the National Manufacturers' Association or Chambers of Commerce and other business organizations. The German group did not confine their discussions in Pittsburgh to the United Steel Workers, but also spent much time with the United States Steel Company. The Indians held penetrating discussions with the National Association of Cotton Manufacturers in Boston.

On these visits and in related discussions and interviews, visitors also have the opportunity to learn at first hand the latest American technical procedures in their industries. The Indonesian team, for example, not only probed into labor-management relations problems with trade unionists and business executives, but also paid particular attention to the technical problems of railroading. They visited the National Labor Relations Board in Washington and the Railway Retirement Board and the National Railway Adjustment Board in Chicago, but they also saw locomotive factories, railway stations and freight yards, and the techniques of other aspects of railroading in Hamilton, Ohio, and elsewhere. A high point of their trip was a ride in the cab of a Diesel engine.

A particularly successful approach to such technical training was that of the Mexican group at Houston and Phillips, Texas, and Los Angeles, California. In and around these cities they spent weeks roaming oil fields and refineries, storage depots and ports, seeing and learning at first hand the latest American techniques. A random sampling of their interests includes such esoteric matters as distillation, alkylation, fractionating, catalytic and thermal cracking, polymerization and wax packing. They saw and on occasion actually participated in off-shore as well as normal drilling, rig installation, packing and transportation, safety and fire prevention measures, and a host of other aspects of oil industry operations.

On this technical side of visitor programs, however, an opportunity also is given for exposure to industries other than those from which the visitors come. The Indian team, although

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interested primarily in the textile industry, visited plants which manufactured such diverse products as radios, cameras, automobiles, food products, and aircraft. The Indonesians saw foundries, farms and dairies, automobile and cement plants, steel mills and breweries, in addition to their primary field of railroading. The German steelworkers saw agriculture and other manufacturing enterprises as well.

III

Interwoven with these technical aspects of labor visitor programs is the constant effort to expose the guests to American democracy in action, to American life at the grass-roots level. To this end, while nearly all guests request to visit the major cities of which they have heard so much, a large proportion of their program is carefully channeled to smaller towns and communities where they can see other facets of American life. Such exposure, imposed on top of their technical programs, is designed to promote friendship and an understanding of American life and customs which will endure after their return home; as in the case of one recent labor visitor from Chile who wrote: "What the communists promise for the distant future, the American worker already enjoys; and he is free, more free than we had imagined."

On week ends and in evenings, of course, the visitors are avid sight-seers and are free to roam and sample American life at will. Effort is also made to assure that they will have occasional breaks from their heavy formal schedules and, where possible, normal routing from one city to another (travel wherever feasible is arranged on week ends) is planned so they may stop over for a few hours to see famous landmarks. The Mexican and German teams thus were able to see Niagara Falls, and the Mexicans to see Constitution Hall in Philadelphia. Other groups have visited the Tennessee Valley Authority. The Indonesians and Chileans visited Indian pueblos, the latter group having the good fortune to be invited by an Indian trade unionist whose family actually lived in the pueblo. Most groups pay calls at the United Nations while in New York and at their Embassies in Washington. The Latin-American guests gener-

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ally visit the Pan American Union and the Organization of American States as well.

All visitors attend churches of their choice throughout their trip. The Mexican team also saw a Mission in Los Angeles, and the Germans visited the Mormon Tabernacle at Salt Lake City. Other aspects of community life are included in programs, and the hospitality offered from a broad cross section of local and national organizations is impressive. The Chileans were entertained by the Elks and the Moose at Harrisburg, Pennsylvania, the Indonesian group by the Lions and Rotary at Hamilton, Ohio, and the Indians by the Kiwanis at Wichita, Kansas.

One of the most gratifying aspects of the program has been the generosity and spontaneous hospitality of American workers in receiving visitors into their homes, a privilege for which these visitors universally hope. The Chileans, for example, were entertained in worker homes in Harrisburg, Pennsylvania, and Albuquerque, New Mexico, and were especially impressed by the hospitality offered by a Negro worker in York, Pennsylvania. The Mexican group was entertained by workers in Gatlinburg, Tennessee, Houston, Texas, and Berkeley, California. The Germans visited worker homes in Seattle, Washington, and Grand Rapids, Michigan.

Visitors are especially interested in American culture and make it a point to attend concerts wherever possible. Museums are a popular attraction, public libraries particularly attracted the Indonesians, and all groups are given exposure to American education. In addition to their initial introduction to universities in or near Washington, visitors call at other universities along their route. The guests not only "see the sights", but also hold penetrating discussions with officials of institutions. Other aspects of American education are not neglected. The Indonesians visited a high school at Harrisburg, Pennsylvania, a trade and vocational school at Chicago, a teachers' college at Springfield, Missouri, and trade-union educational programs in several cities. Worker education of all types is a subject of general interest to these guests.

On the lighter side, all visitors seem interested in American

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sports. The Mexicans were enabled to see football at the University of Pennsylvania and baseball at St. Louis. The Indonesians saw not only football at Hamilton, Ohio, but also soccer at Pennsylvania State University and a rodeo at Denver. The range of other types of activities experienced by the visitors might be typified by the Mexicans, who took a boat ride around New York City, attended television and radio shows, saw a show boat at St. Louis, and the battleship Iowa at Los Angeles. These experiences were in addition to individual sightseeing and explorations.

The operation of state and city government is of particular interest to most visitors, and busy officials have given generously of their time. The Mexicans were especially interested in meeting these public officials and they talked with governors of New Mexico, Colorado, Massachusetts, as well as with the mayors of Chicago, Philadelphia, Denver, Cheyenne, St. Louis and New York. Other groups, like the Indians, attend Senate and House committee hearings and talk with individual Senators and Congressmen. For some, the high point of their trip has been a meeting with President Eisenhower or Vice President Nixon. From these contacts with American officials, the visitors are able to probe into the working of all levels of government. The Indonesians attended a City Council meeting in Allentown, Pennsylvania, and the Germans a similar meeting in Grand Rapids. The Mexican group visited the city courts in Los Angeles, and the Germans saw such courts, and the police department, in Seattle. The Chileans and Indonesians attended sessions of the State Legislature in Denver.

In all these activities it is interesting that the visitors in most cases offer as much as they receive. They are interviewed on radio and television at many points throughout their trip, including the United Nations in New York. They talk freely with the press, both in formal interviews and on visits made to newspaper offices. Many individuals accept invitations to speak to widely varied organizations about life in their own countries. And, of course, in their innumerable private and group discussions they offer wherever they go an illuminating picture of the problems, outlook and aspirations of their lands.

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IV

These are but a few selective illustrations of what some of our labor visitors see and do in their all-too-short stays in this country. Their interest ranges far and wide over the entire spectrum of American life. They see as much as time and their specialized interests permit—both that of which we are proud and that which still remains a challenge to progress. They meet Americans from all walks of life, from all sections of the country. They are fascinated by what they see—and exhausted yet insatiable at the end.

The labor visitor program has been in operation for some years now—enough to enable one to see its tangible accomplishments, both in contributing to progress in friendly nations around the world and in making staunch friends for the United States within labor movements which are exercising increasing influence in national and international affairs. The importance of enabling our foreign labor friends to see America at first hand is shown by a letter recently received from a group of labor leaders from Chile: "Before our visit to the United States, stories about American industry had seemed like fantasy, but now they no longer do. We are particularly impressed by the degree to which the American worker can consume what he produces and with the complete freedom found everywhere." A large proportion of current officials in national labor organizations around the world have been afforded this American experience, and the indication is that it will bear a rich harvest in international understanding.

JOHN C. FUESS

ARLINGTON, VA.

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"COMPETITIVE COEXISTENCE" AND THE COMMUNIST CHALLENGE IN ITALY*

THE Administration's new foreign aid proposals represent an important step in the recent development of American cold-war strategy. They are based on the assumption that there will be no shooting war soon, and that some kind of peaceful coexistence with the potential enemy will characterize the next several years. The theory behind them is that this cannot be a passive coexistence on our part, or even one which relies primarily on growing military strength to prolong it. It must be what is coming to be called a "competitive coexistence"—not competitive in the sense of an arms race, but competitive in the sense of a contest for the loyalties of the uncommitted areas of the world. Such a contest, it is recognized, is likely to be decided by the demonstration of the economic and social superiority of one system over the other, rather than by military might or political propaganda. Hence, the policy of competitive coexistence returns to the emphasis on economic development which was an underlying tenet of the Marshall Plan before it was driven into the background by overemphasis on purely military aid.

Most of the current discussion centers on Asia rather than Europe, and on underdeveloped areas in particular. But the basic assumption—that economic improvement and rising living standards can halt the rise of communism—has already been tested to some extent in the European aid programs, and particularly in Italy. The fact that, in electoral terms, the Communists are stronger today in Italy than when the Marshall Plan began in 1948 has led many to conclude that the assumption is false. At the very least, this fact suggests careful reappraisal of the hypothesis. In addition, Southern Italy—where communism has been growing most rapidly despite an economic

* The writer wishes to express his appreciation to the Center for International Studies at Massachusetts Institute of Technology for the use of its facilities and the assistance of its research staff.

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development program of major proportions—is in many respects an underdeveloped area of the kind the Administration's program is aimed at bolstering against encroachment in this period of peaceful competition. If an economic development program cannot prevent growing Communist strength in Italy, where free democratic and economic institutions are already established, it may well be asked whether such programs can be successful in those underdeveloped areas of the world where democracy and capitalism are only words, and perhaps even bad words.

It is the thesis of this paper that the Communist challenge in Italy is essentially an economic challenge, and that an understanding of its relationship to recent political developments in that country will throw some light on the soundness of economic programs as a bar to Communist growth in general. An examination of this thesis requires some appraisal of the nature of the Communist challenge in Italy, the economic aspects of Italian politics, and the consequent outlook for the survival of Italian democracy.

The Nature of the Communist Challenge

In recent months there has been considerable speculation as to how long Italy could continue to resist the growing internal strength of communism. For most of the post-war period there has been at least a surface stability in Italian politics, despite the continuance of a large, active and well-financed Communist party. But in the most recent parliamentary elections (those of June 1953), the far Left polled more votes than it had five years earlier, while the Center was reduced in strength to the point at which cabinets began to fall almost with the rapidity of the French. Since then, popular journals have been posing the question as to how soon the Communists would take over.[1] This rather enthusiastic speculation has subsided now, probably because the cabinet of Mario Scelba

[1] See, for example, Luigi Barzini, "Italy's Creeping Communism", *Harper's*, vol. 209, pp. 84–89, October 1954; Gabriel Vogliotti, "Can Italy Be Saved?", *Collier's*, vol. 134, pp. 30–33, September 17, 1954; E. Hughes, "Red Specter That Haunts Italy", *Life*, vol. 37, pp. 92–94, August 1954.

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has managed to survive longer than its immediate predecessors; but the basic question remains.

1. *Decline of the Democratic Parties*

In the elections of June 1953, the Center coalition which had governed Italy since 1948, when it received almost 62 per cent of the popular vote, fell just short of 50 per cent of the vote. The strongest party, the Christian Democrats, fell from 48 per cent in 1948 to just over 40 per cent in 1953. The three minor Center parties which made up the remainder of the coalition fell off much more sharply, although the coalition as a whole retained enough seats in the legislature to constitute a slender majority if party discipline held good and the parties stuck together. But the minor parties, faced with the threat of virtual extinction, fought to reëstablish their identity and perhaps their voter appeal by staying out of the government. This was especially true of the largest of them, the Democratic Socialists. The result was a succession of prime ministers—four in less than a year—until the coalition was re-formed in the present Scelba cabinet. It is a shaky government which runs the risk of losing either its Right wing or its Left wing if it takes any very positive action.

But this situation is not entirely unfamiliar in continental politics, and would not alone justify the conclusion that democracy was in crisis. What does suggest such a conclusion is the continued increase of strength on both the far Left and the far Right, leaving very little room for democratic maneuvering in the continental sense or for a systematic "loyal opposition" in the Anglo-American sense. In 1953, over 48 per cent of the electorate was willing to vote for extreme solutions of the Right or Left. There is no evidence that this situation has changed since then. This in itself constitutes a threat to democratic institutions. The prospect of government by a coalition which must be something less than vigorous in dealing with serious economic and social problems suggests that the threat may continue to increase.

The Communists and their captives, the Socialists, polled over 35 per cent of the vote in 1953, as compared to 31 per cent five years earlier. The Neo-Fascists and the Monarchists

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polled 12.7 per cent in 1953 as compared to less than 5 per cent in 1948. These figures seem to reflect a growing disenchantment with democratic political institutions which not even the substantial American aid programs have been able to stem. Actually, an examination of the nature of the reasons for the loss in Center strength, and an examination of the nature of the Communist threat, leave more hope for Italian democracy than bare election figures or scare headlines in American journals would indicate.

The degree of stability deriving from the strength of the Center forces since 1946 and especially since 1948 has been, in a sense, highly illusory. The factor which, more than any other, kept the Christian Democratic party strong enough to form a stable government, and which kept other Center groups strong enough to contribute materially to the Center coalition, was the fear of communism. Communist activities internally, plus the fall of Czechoslovakia just before the 1948 elections, drove otherwise reluctant adherents into the ranks of the Center parties, and especially the Christian Democrats, as the only force capable of containing this threat. The abnormal and fear-inspired concentration of votes for the Center in 1948 was misleading to the extent that it conveyed a wrong impression of the real strength and positive cohesion of the Center group.[2] Even for the Christian Democrats themselves, the vital element holding the party together as a functioning mechanism was essentially the negative factor of the fear of the Left. The painful paradox for the Center coalition during the years following 1948 was that as they succeeded in reducing the threat of a Communist take-over they were weakening one of the vital ties making a stable Center government possible. The gradual recession of the spectre of the Communist *coup* internally,

[2] The Center parties had polled only a little over 46 per cent of the popular vote in the 1946 elections for the Constituent Assembly; in the crisis-ridden 1948 elections, they polled almost 62 per cent of the popular vote for the Chamber; by the time of the 1951–52 local elections they were down again to around 51 per cent; and they dropped to just below 50 per cent in the elections in the spring of 1953. The reverse pattern, not quite so sharp, prevails in the votes for the far Left in these elections. From almost 40 per cent in 1946, the Left dropped to 31 per cent in 1948, then returned to just under 35 per cent in the 1951–52 local elections and just over 35 per cent in 1953.

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and the growing strength of the West as a bulwark against external aggression, set the stage for vital defections from the Center coalition and for the resurgence of sharp factionalism within the Christian Democratic party.

In the light of this, the Christian Democrats showed rather unexpected strength in retaining over 40 per cent of the vote in 1953 as compared to 48 per cent in 1948. If elections had been by a plurality system rather than by proportional representation, the Christian Democrats would have won in all but three of the thirty-one electoral districts, and would have won in all but fifteen of the ninety-one provinces. Combining *Partito Socialista Italiano* [PSI] with Communist votes would have made the contest close in many places, but still the Christian Democrats would have carried all but nine of the thirty-one electoral districts.[3] Another factor of some interest is that, while the Christian Democrats have lost heavily compared with the 1948 elections, they remain stronger throughout the country than they were in the elections for the Constituent Assembly in 1946.[4] This tends to confirm the point that the election of 1948 was the abnormal one, which overstated Center preferences as a shield against the felt imminence of the Communist threat.

Nevertheless, when all this is said, the steady and substantial loss of Center strength from the peak of 1948 is one of the most crucial political trends in Italy. A striking feature of this loss is the decline in strength of the minor Center parties. The Democratic Socialists and the Liberals, which had generally maintained or improved their positions in the local elections, have been greatly weakened since 1953; the Republicans have been virtually annihilated.

2. *Appraisal of the Communist Gains*

Although election figures suggest the opposite, it is in a sense correct to say that the Communist menace has diminished steadily in the post-war period. It is necessary to distinguish the Communist party as a mechanism for the forceful take-over

[3] Joseph La Palombara, "Italian Elections and the Problem of Representation", *American Political Science Review*, vol. 47 (Sept. 1953), p. 700.

[4] Elio Caranti, "I risultati delle elezioni del 7 giugno", *Civitas*, June 1953, p. 18.

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of the government, from the Communist party as a vote-gathering medium of political protest. In the second sense it has remained strong and has even perhaps increased its appeal; certainly the Communists and Nenni Socialists together have improved their vote-getting capacities since 1948. If, in the future, they can command enough votes to assure instability and futility in the operation of parliamentary institutions, they may be able to create a situation in which their prospects of a forcible take-over are increased. But during the post-war period in general, the Communist threat, in the sense of a direct seizure of power *à la* Czechoslovakia, has steadily declined. This is due to a number of things, including the loss of monopoly control over organized labor, improved security measures by the government, and a lessening sense of desperation among the people as reconstruction and recovery began to make progress. These factors, however, did not reduce the volume of votes on the Left. The Communist party as a vehicle for political protest may in fact have been strengthened as it became clear that the Communists had no immediate prospect of taking over the state.

The 1953 elections emphasized the over-all gain in the strength of the far Left from 31 per cent to over 35 per cent. They also revealed a significant geographical trend. While the advance of the Left has been stopped or retarded in most parts of the North, it has accelerated rapidly in the South.[5] As a counterpart of this, the Communist gains seem to be largest, not among the urbanized industrial proletariat, but among agricultural day laborers and sharecroppers. In the case of the former, the saturation point has about been reached. In the case of the latter, especially in the South, the possibilities of expansion are great.

3. *Party Structure*

Part of the explanation may lie in the structural weakness of the democratic parties as compared to the Communists.

[5] Based on proportion of total votes polled in comparison to 1948, the PCI (*Partito Communista Italiano*) and PSI together gained 2.8 per cent in the North, 4 per cent in Central Italy, just under 6 per cent in the South, 8.4 per cent in Sicily, and 9.9 per cent in Sardinia.

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There are only two parties in Italy which have the attributes of national parties. One is the Communist party, which is well organized, well led, and well financed throughout the country. It is the only party, as such, which has a grass-roots organization on a block-by-block, area-by-area basis. The other is the Christian Democratic party, which has or shares these attributes primarily through the functioning of Catholic Action and the Church itself. To the extent that the leadership of the party and of Catholic Action do not always agree, the effectiveness of the party is weakened. Strictly in terms of organization, discipline, financing and ability to reach the people directly and continuously, the Communist party has no rival. Most of the other parties, Christian Democrats aside, have a rather limited class or regional appeal. The Monarchists and the Neo-Fascists are predominantly southern parties. The Liberals and the Democratic Socialists are weak in the South, and the Republicans are virtually nonexistent there.

The class character of the parties is striking. Dividing the people into four broad classes based on income, observers find party preferences strongly stratified by socio-economic status.[6] The Communist party gets 50 per cent of the lower-class vote; among the upper class it gets virtually none. It receives only 18 per cent of the lower middle-class vote. The sharp distinction between the lower class and the lower middle class fortifies the class-basis interpretation of the strength of the Left in Italy. If the Nenni Socialist preferences are added, one finds that well over 60 per cent of the lower-class vote goes to the extreme Left. Support for the Christian Democrats is not so clearly stratified. The upper and middle classes give more than 40 per cent of their votes to the Christian Democrats, but even the lower class gives some 22 per cent and the lower middle class almost 40 per cent. This can perhaps be attributed to the political influence of the Church. The Democratic Socialists have almost no lower-class support and are weak even in the lower middle class; they seem strongest among the

[6] "Italian Political Party Preferences", a survey prepared for the Center for International Studies, Massachusetts Institute of Technology, by the International Public Opinion Research, Inc., August 14, 1953.

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gains in the South suggest that the Church is losing its predominant hold there as well.

5. *Shortcomings of the Christian Democrats*

Obviously the most important place to look for the reasons for the decline in Center strength is in the shortcomings of the Christian Democratic government in the preceding five years.

This is not the place to discuss all the things the Christian Democrats might have done or should have done during their five years in power to strengthen the political position of the democratic Center. A discussion of the more important weaknesses would include: (1) inability to make any visible progress in solving the unemployment problem; (2) lateness in starting and lack of sustained vigor in pushing fiscal reform and land reform; (3) almost complete lack of progress on bureaucratic reform; (4) inability to dispel suspicions of widespread corruption within the party; (5) inability or unwillingness to work with the minor Center parties without, in effect, destroying their separate political identity; (6) the fact of being a clerical party, and the suspicion of moving toward a clerical "régime".

A number of others might be mentioned. Some of them, such as failure to implement important provisions of the Constitution, seemed not to have much political significance in fact. Perhaps one of the most important obstacles for the Christian Democrats as they approached the election was simply that they were the party in power, and had been for several years. In any case, the important and all-pervasive element in the Center losses was the conviction of the country that fundamental economic problems remained unsolved, and some loss of confidence that the Center forces were likely to make much headway in solving them. The evidence is that this was uppermost in the minds of most Italians in the days just before the election, far overshadowing others such as the threat of communism or the danger of external aggression.[7] This conviction was a primary political fact with which the Center had to deal in the campaign, and with which it dealt, on the whole, somewhat unsuccessfully. Emphasis on what had been accomplished—the line generally taken by the Center on this

[7] See M.I.T. survey, "Italian Political Party Preferences".

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middle-class intellectuals and professional people. The Nenni Socialists are about as strong as the Communists with the middle and lower middle classes (they find their greatest strength in the lower middle class), but they are much less popular with the lower class. Neither the Monarchists nor the Neo-Fascists seem sharply stratified by economic class, although both tend to be stronger with the middle and upper classes.

Occupation as a source of party preference is also worth noting separately. Communist strength is not as exclusively identified with the industrial workers as often supposed. These, as a group, give the Communists only 32 per cent of their votes, as compared with the agricultural laborers who cast 50 per cent of their votes for the Communist party. The third vocational group in which the Communists are strong is that of the farm tenants, 28 per cent of whom vote Communist although some 35 per cent still vote Christian Democrat. Both Communists and Nenni Socialists are strong in mass appeal, and the Communists are notably strong in organization and financing. The Center parties, except for the political influence of the Church, are weak in both respects.

4. *Political Decline of the Church*

Another important factor affecting the position of the Center is the apparent decline of the political strength of the Church.

Almost all Italians are Catholic, but the rôle of the Church in Italian political preferences and, indeed, in the activities of the Christian Democratic party itself has been less decisive than often assumed. The most dramatic evidence of the first proposition is undoubtedly the inefficacy of the Church's action in excommunicating the Communists in 1949. This step had no visible effect on Communist party organization or voting strength. Evidently the two million or so party members are not influenced by church sanctions; and apparently others in the nearly ten million who vote Communist or Nenni Socialist do not construe this as coming under the ban. Or, if they do, they are unimpressed. In fact, except in large areas in the South, the Italian tends to resent church intrusion in political affairs and has no serious trouble in reconciling his Catholicism with disobedience in the political sphere. The recent Communist

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point—could not obscure the magnitude of what remained to be done nor the fact that no clear-cut Center program to do it really existed. It is doubtful whether public attitudes on this matter have changed much since the election.

The Economic Determinants of Post-War Italian Politics

We are thus brought to the contention that to understand the Italian political crisis we must know something of the economic factors which underlie it. First we should look at the economic conditions which have themselves determined the range of policy choice in post-war Italy.

The range of actual choice of policy in any country is conditioned and limited by the economic context within which the government must operate at the time. The government may and must affect that context over a period of time, but the rate at which that may be done and the choice of specific means to that end are determined largely by the underlying structural situation of the economy as well as the sum of the more transient factors. Nowhere is this more strikingly true than in the case of Italy in this period. The choices of policy available to democratic policy-makers in Italy after World War II are in fact harshly limited by the economic consequences of the war and Fascism, and by the more fundamental realities of Italy's skimpy natural endowment in the economic sphere. Without some appreciation of these facts, it is not possible to understand the course of Italian politics and particularly the built-in advantages for the politics of opposition and protest.

1. *Degree of Dependence on the Outside*

Italy is peculiarly vulnerable in an economic sense because of her almost complete dependence upon others for the attainment of even moderately satisfactory levels of economic life. Unable to grow enough on her mountainous peninsula to feed herself, and almost totally lacking in important mineral resources, she must depend upon trade with her neighbors. Foodstuffs, raw materials, and most fuels must be imported. Farm products and the manufactured goods of Italian factories must find export markets in order to pay for imports and to prevent the spread of unemployment. While this is true of other coun-

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tries, it is the acute degree of this dependence which makes it a factor of prime political importance in Italy.

In the immediate post-war period, this dependence on the outside was of course magnified by the devastation and destruction left in the wake of the war. Italy began rebuilding immediately, but the process would have been painfully long and arduous—even if not interrupted by a political revolution of some variety—without external assistance of considerable proportions. Responsible political leaders could not but be aware of Italy's reliance on outside help in the elemental processes of relief and reconstruction, nor could they ignore the fact that any real progress toward recovery and long-range improvement of Italy's economic prospects meant continued need for extraordinary help of this character. Yet the fact that Italy was so obviously dependent on the good will of her neighbors and especially of the United States gave the parties of the opposition a never-ending series of clubs with which to beat the government. It was this fact that made so necessary an unwavering effort to treat Italy with dignity as a partner, to consult continuously on matters of common concern, and to bring Italy into multilateral discussions and negotiations which involved her interests. Americans who should have known better were continually being surprised by the virulence of political reaction in Italy when these steps were not taken. The effective reaction was not in fact against America so much as against the parties in power which, it was felt, ineptly let Italy be duped, humiliated and ignored. There was an undoubted element of this in the 1953 elections, though how decisive it may have been is difficult to say. It continues to be an important element today.

There is another respect in which the Italians have felt dependent on the outside world for help in solving their economic problems. This is in connection with emigration. The Italian population problem, which has been serious since the United States virtually closed its doors to immigration, was magnified by the repatriation of Italians from North Africa, Venezia Giulia and elsewhere following World War II. Unemployment was accentuated. The birth rate, though not especially high,

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was sufficient to bring into the labor force each year just about the number being absorbed by the creation of new jobs. Hence, there was a moving "blob" of unemployment of virtually unchanging proportions, including large numbers of young people who had recently entered the labor force. Some of those who gladly would have emigrated found no place to go. Others, who did, often underwent extremely unpleasant experiences in the receiving country. Frustrations of this kind not only had a deep effect on attitudes toward the government parties, but also led many to question the efficacy of parliamentary democracy in general. Continual discussion of rather grandiose schemes for greatly increased emigration outlets was not very helpful and, of course, backfired when each turned out to be considerably less than spectacular. The United States contributed its share to this situation when from the rather imposing immigration proposals of the President came forth the unhelpful McCarran Act. While many who have worked with Italian problems feel that Italy tends to exaggerate the emigration aspects as a partial excuse for lack of a more positive program for internal absorption of manpower, most students of the situation would agree that the solution must lie in a combination of both. To this extent, Italy does in fact depend on the good will and coöperation of potential recipient countries. Even more important, Italian recognition and perhaps exaggeration of this deeply color the political climate.

2. *Chronic and Massive Unemployment*

Unemployment is in many ways the most pervasive and all-conditioning economic fact of the Italian post-war situation. It is more important in its political implications than the dependence on the outside world, except that it is, hopefully, less permanent. Unless substantial progress can be made in solving this problem, the future of democratic institutions in Italy is dim. The present strain on those institutions is in no small degree a reflection of the inability to make adequate progress in this direction. It is difficult to exaggerate the extent to which the burden of unemployment and the consequences of given policy decisions on the level of unemployment lie at the heart of Italian political discussions. With some two million unemployed, and another

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two million only seasonally employed or badly underemployed, some 20 per cent of the labor force either are or feel essentially unemployed, while many others feel themselves continuously on the thin edge. This is a political fact of monstrous proportions, not only in terms of response to party or parties in power but more significantly in terms of loyalty to existing institutions of any kind. The government is hampered in taking otherwise desirable steps because of their short-run impact on unemployment. These include rationalization of government-owned industries, increased productivity, even acceleration of public works. The Communists, of course, have always proclaimed the inherent inability of the present régime, and indeed its unwillingness, to solve the plight of the workingman. They find the high levels of unemployment a rare asset and would reap even richer rewards if government actions should substantially increase it.

Yet the effect on unemployment levels has not consistently been the decisive element in Italian policy decisions. Since 1947, for example, the government has generally chosen the path of fiscal conservatism even though a more venturesome attitude toward levels of public and private investment would almost certainly have softened the unemployment situation. Indeed, its critics have said that the government tended to give unemployment considerations a decisive weight where they should not have had it, and to give them somewhat less weight where they might well have been thought controlling. This can be understood only if alongside the fear of unemployment we put another pervading fear of Italian post-war economic life—the fear of inflation.

3. *Inflation and the Memory of Inflation*

From September of 1947 on, one of the basic preoccupations of the Italian government has been to prevent further inflation of the currency. Prices had risen more than fifty times above pre-war levels, with the usual distortions and dislocations brought on by such a rapid drop in the purchasing power of the currency. Faith in the stability of the lira had been severely shaken if not destroyed, and the so-called "Einaudi policy" of rigid deflation was a necessary effort to restore the confidence

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in the currency and willingness to save without which an essentially free-enterprise effort at reconstruction and recovery could not succeed. The sharp memory of the recent inflation remained present throughout the period. Even the mass of the ordinary workers and peasants seemed painfully aware of inflation dangers. It was difficult, for example, to keep small coins in circulation because the people would bury them as a hedge against the future even though they were intrinsically valueless. They were metal, and everyone knew what had happened to paper money.

The concern with inflation became rooted in government policy through the men who occupied the key positions affecting such decisions. Einaudi himself, a respected classical economist and author of the tough deflationary policy of the fall of 1947, became the President of the Republic and exercised an influence on economic policy considerably beyond that which the President in a parliamentary system might be expected to wield. Menichella, the Governor of the Bank of Italy and a dominant figure in currency and fiscal policy matters, shared Einaudi's views. Pella, Minister of the Treasury and effective head of the interministerial committee on reconstruction policy, was of the same school. These men exercised decisive power whenever there was a basic issue of economic policy involving protection of the lira during the De Gasperi régime. De Gasperi himself was relatively uninterested in economic matters as such, and especially financial matters. He tended to regard them as essentially technical questions and to accept the answers provided by his top technicians—in this case, Pella and Menichella. One of his most difficult jobs was to mediate between the Left wing of the Christian Democrats, which restlessly and insistently demanded something more closely approaching a full-employment policy, and the Right wing which generally supported the Pella-Menichella line. One further factor, perhaps, is that most of the respected economists in Italy outside the government circles were also essentially classical and orthodox in this respect. There were relatively few Keynesians or "New Dealers" among Italian economists, at least among the older and more influential men. Hence, the anti-inflation policy has been unusually strong

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with the country, resting on painful popular memories, deep convictions of the men in the key posts in government, and the blessing of academic economists.

Italian Economic Policy and Political Trends

From the interplay of these basic factors, the Center coalition has fashioned its economic policies in the post-war years. It would be difficult to say that this or that specific policy was responsible for the Center losses. There are many factors which operate to cause a loss of support for a party or combination of parties in power. It probably comes close to being a political axiom that the exercise of power and responsibility in a democracy carries with it a necessary erosion of public support. It is notable, for example, that the Communists themselves have lost strength in the recent elections in areas in which they have been the "ins".

Nevertheless, there are good reasons why the impact of the economic policies of the government in power may be regarded as having a primary and perhaps fundamental relationship to political trends in Italy. In the first place, in a country as beset by economic problems as Italy is, the issue of general economic conditions and particular prospects for employment and security is always high on the list of national preoccupations. In the second place, the very nature of the Communist ideology stresses the economic basis of public policy and sharpens the economic aspect of the protest against the Center. Finally, the availability of large amounts of economic aid from the United States served to spotlight the question whether the government was utilizing that aid to the best interests of the nation as a whole. Economic policies are always of fundamental importance in understanding political trends; the above factors made this even more true in the particular time and place of post-war Italy.

1. *Net Effect of Economic Policies Accentuation of Protest Vote*

There can be little doubt that the continuation of unsatisfactory economic conditions has greatly strengthened whatever might be regarded as a normal trend of protest against the "ins". It may be argued that the government policies have accomplished

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all that could possibly have been done to mitigate these conditions, and hence that the problem is not one of the correctness of government policies. Few would take the position that strongly. In any case, the continuation of a number of economic conditions over the years since 1948 with little or no improvement has become a heavy political liability for the Center parties. First among these, of course, is the lack of improvement in the unemployment situation. There were about two million registered unemployed in the spring of 1948; five years later when the nation went to the polls there were still some two million unemployed. This meant that at least a million to a million and a half jobs had been created during that period—but no more than enough to absorb the net increment to the labor force. Progress had undoubtedly also been made in reducing "hidden" unemployment and underemployment, both in factories and on farms. But none of this could offset the fact that there were and are still some 10 per cent of the labor force chronically and bitterly unemployed, another 5 to 10 per cent badly underemployed, and another unknown but large segment of the population in constant fear of falling into one of these categories.

The cost of living has remained relatively high, especially for middle-class, fixed-income people, and for unskilled or unorganized workers. Industrial workers have generally more than kept up with rising living costs, and came into the elections of 1953 with real incomes rather higher than before the war. They were inclined, however, to regard this as something they owed to the General Italian Confederation of Labor rather than to the government or the parties in power. Part of the reason for the government's fight against further inflation, of course, was the recognition of what it had done and would do to the middle-income groups. It is doubtful whether the government has earned any great support on this basis; these groups felt oppressed and desired something more than policies designed to prevent that oppression from becoming still worse.

Other economic conditions which have remained unsatisfactory include those of the agricultural workers, both sharecroppers and day laborers. These are problems which could not be solved by land redistribution alone, even assuming that it had been commenced earlier and had proceeded more rapidly. A co-

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ordinated attack on the agricultural problem would have involved a number of things, including a reform of agrarian contracts legislation, better provisions for agricultural credit, assistance to agricultural coöperatives, broadened system of technical aids to farmers, and many others. The land reform program has had a very great political and psychological importance; but it has contributed very little to the actual solution of the agricultural problem.

Taxes have remained high for those who paid; and it has been well known that there were many who did not pay. Tax reform was relatively slow in starting. Considerable progress had been made by the time of the 1953 elections—more, probably, than the most optimistic observers had expected. Yet evasion was common and colorful stories of evasion were much more common. The sanctions in the new law were mild, and there was no easily comprehensible evidence for the public that the situation was rapidly improving.

Even in the areas in which the economic achievements of the government were the greatest, the benefits seemed to flow first and predominantly to the few rather than the many. The outstanding feat of the government's economic policy since the fall of 1947 has been the maintenance of the stability of the lira. This has been accomplished through heavy injections of American economic aid and through the pursuit of an essentially conservative budgetary and fiscal policy. It was undoubtedly to the advantage of the nation as a whole to avoid the continuance of a disastrous inflation. But the salvation of the lira did not make a very strong appeal to the large numbers of Italians who had none to speak of; and especially since the policy was made to appear as one which could be successful only at the expense of a vigorous fuller employment policy. Whether in fact a substantially more vigorous attack on unemployment through an expanded investment program would have brought real and imminent dangers of inflation was one of the serious questions of Italian policy throughout this period.

In the field of reconstruction and expansion of basic industrial plant, the Italian government has also made remarkable strides. Here again, however, the appearance has been that of favoring

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the few. Government grants and loans, many of them financed from the lira counterpart fund under the Marshall Plan, went to privately owned industrial giants such as FIAT and Montecatini or to state-owned industries held by the Institute for Industrial Reconstruction financial holding company for the government. Many hundreds of such loans went also to medium-sized and small enterprises all over Italy, but except for textile mills these tended to be less basic and urgent than steel, chemicals, mechanical products, and electric power. Most of the basic sectors were dominated by large companies, either private or government-owned. It was necessary to reconstruct these basic sectors of the economy. Hence, a large share of the funds made available by the government for industrial reconstruction went to big companies. Any explanation that this was a necessary prerequisite for economic recovery in general tended to sound like a "trickle down" theory of economic activity, and was no more acceptable to economically depressed masses in Italy than it is anywhere.

Other areas of activity in which excellent progress was made—such as the rebuilding of the railway and transport system, the repair and reconstruction of war damage, the rebuilding of the merchant fleet—all seemed to have very limited political appeal except perhaps in so far as they supplied employment for the duration of the projects.

In the above cases, any assistance to the general mass of the people was indirect, and was likely to be deemed by the people to be too indirect. But even in the cases where government economic policy was aimed directly at the dispossessed and distressed classes, the political consequences seem to have been mixed. The *Cassa per il Mezzogiorno* (embodying a long-term southern development program), the land reform, the housing program, the fiscal reform—all these seemed to bring much more meagre political results than the Center parties had hoped and perhaps expected. Perhaps they were too little and too late, in the eyes of the economically depressed groups of the nation. In any case, there remains a large body of protest, oriented primarily around economic considerations, and the bulk of this protest has moved toward the left.

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2. *Economic Interpretation of Italian Communism*

The above considerations raise a central problem in connection with economic policy and its relation to communism in Italy. That problem relates to one of the West's basic hypotheses in its global struggle against communism. We have generally proceeded on the assumption of a rather oversimplified "economic interpretation" of communism. The proposition has been that civilized people do not want communism; that it will flourish only where the masses of the people are economically depressed; and that if the standards of life of these people can be raised, the Communist threat will disappear. This has certainly been a basic element in our thinking about the problem of communism in Europe; and it has conditioned our thinking about communism in the so-called "underdeveloped areas" in connection with Point Four. It is central to the concept of economic aid for purposes of "competitive coexistence".

A tentative and imperfect test of the hypothesis is provided by Italian political experience since the war. In some respects, it would seem that the political developments in Italy negate, or at least seriously qualify, the proposition. In the first place, much of Italian Communist strength seems to be based on historical and traditional factors, including those connected with anti-clericalism, rather than on any discernible economic basis. Indeed, the only two regions in Italy in which the PCI and PSI received more than 50 per cent of the vote in 1953 were Tuscany and Emilia—which are, generally speaking, areas of fairly high living standards compared to other parts of Italy. In these two regions, there are historical and traditional factors which help explain the very heavy Leftist vote. The apparent nonapplicability of the economic hypothesis might be explained by saying that it is probably the rate and direction of economic change, rather than the absolute level of economic conditions, which are significant. The situation in the South is similar but in reverse order. Living standards for the mass of the people border on the desperate. It is here, therefore, that one might have expected the greatest strength on the Left in the terms of the original hypothesis. Yet the Communists have been relatively weak in the South until

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very recently. And even the fact of their rising strength casts doubt on the proposition, since it is precisely in the period of the two or three years preceding the election that the government's southern development program began to have measurable effects in improving economic conditions in the South. Despite general economic improvement there, the steady trend toward the left under way since 1946 has accelerated rapidly in the last few years. Even in connection with the areas in which the land reform program was undertaken, the record is far from clear and would not support any general conclusion that the adoption of such a program of itself will reverse a leftward trend.

Nevertheless, making due allowance for traditional and other qualifying factors, there is much in the Italian political picture to sustain the soundness of the proposition. In the first place, the outstanding fact of recent political developments is the growth of a protest vote against the Center coalition and the inability of that vote to find a home in a truly democratic alternative. It is this homeless protest which is moving to the extremes on the Right and the Left. It is the absence of a democratic home for it which reflects the dilemma of the minor Center parties. More important in this connection is the fact that this protest against the Center is at bottom an economic protest. It is a protest overwhelmingly colored by existence of continued large-scale unemployment with little real or tangible hope for its substantial reduction. It is a protest which ranks economic conditions at the very top of the problems which the government must solve and at the very top of the issues on which the last election turned.[8] It is a protest which has moved left in greater numbers than it has moved right. This, it might be argued, is because the parties of the Left stress precisely the economic problems while the parties of the Right tend to give more emphasis to nationalism, the glories of the past, the institutions of monarchy and Fascism, and the like.

Moreover, economic improvement does weaken the Communists. The tremendous strides made by the Center coalition in the basic reconstruction of a war-ravaged economy reduced Communist electoral as well as revolutionary strength over the

[8] See M.I.T. survey, cited *supra*, note 6.

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post-war period as a whole. It is interesting to recall that the PCI and PSI in 1946 polled almost 40 per cent of the vote for the Constituent Assembly.

More specifically, steps to improve the economic status and outlook of the people in the communities where land reform has made some tangible progress seem to have yielded positive results in slowing or reversing the trend of the protest to the left. Here it must be noted that the pattern varies widely from one land reform area to another, for at least two reasons. The first is that the vigor and efficiency of the several administrations vary considerably. The second is that the stage of progress of the program at the time an election comes along is very important. The promise of land reform, and even the initial steps in that direction, are not enough to have any appreciable effect. There have been too many promises in the past. Moreover, there is a noticeable "lag" in the political effects of such a program; and the first reactions may be not simply indifference but actually increased opposition to the government. The first stages of land reform involve the alienation of the landowners and conservatives generally through the expropriation of the land; they are also likely to increase the irritation of the peasants because so few can be given land, those few get less than they hoped for, and the improvements necessary to make the land tillable and livable seem to come too slowly. Hence, the first stages of such a program are likely to be "counter-productive" in a political sense. In addition, in many areas, the Communists have managed to get a good share of the credit for the land reform program itself, partly because of the government's slowness which lends color to Communist claims of having forced a reluctant government to move.

Despite this, there is evidence that in those areas in which land reform has made most progress, positive political results have been forthcoming. In communities in Calabria in which land redistribution was under way at the time of the elections, the Christian Democrats actually gained 1.4 per cent in votes compared to 1948; in the electoral college as a whole, the Christian Democrats lost 17.3 per cent. On the same basis, the Communists gained only 2.2 per cent in the land reform communities, whereas they gained some 7 per cent in the electoral

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college as a whole.[9] This whole subject needs closer examination, but a tentative conclusion seems justified. It is that, with few exceptions, voting in land reform communities was considerably more favorable to the Christian Democrats (even when they lost votes) and considerably less favorable to the PCI-PSI (even when they gained votes), than it was in the respective electoral colleges as a whole or for that matter in the South as a whole or the nation as a whole. The pattern seems too clear to be coincidental, and offers some support for the basic proposition relating to the economic interpretation of Communist voting strength.

A clear positive correlation of voting pattern with economic levels or rates of change would be hard to show in all cases. One could not say, based on Italian experience, that economic improvement and rising living standards will always be accompanied by a decline in Communist voting strength. One could say, however, that economic misery is not only directly related to communism, but provides the dynamic margin around which it grows. It is in the economically miserable areas of Italy that communism is expanding most rapidly and has the greatest hope for continued expansion; election statistics confirm the conclusion that, while communism may be strong in some of the relatively richer areas of the North, its potential for expansion there is very limited. The rapid acceleration of strength is in the hitherto "safer" regions of the South; and the impetus is primarily that of economic destitution and hopelessness. The problem for the Center is to increase the rate of economic improvement in the South in general, and to concentrate certain economic measures in particular areas, in such a way as to emerge from the period of the "lag" before electoral disaster comes. This is not only important for the South; it is crucial for the country as a whole.

Political Outlook

Despite the disappearance of political stability in Italy, and despite the really substantial and threatening gains on the Left, there is no likelihood of an early Communist take-over.

[9] For other data showing a similar reduction in Communist strength in land reform communities in Matera (made famous by Carlo Levi's *Christ Stopped at Eboli*), Cerignola, Crotone, Andria, and elsewhere, see Compagna e De Caprariis, "Geografia delle elezioni italiani dal 1946 al 1953", reprinted from the review *Il Mulino*, Bologna, May 1954.

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On this point, American opinion in general seems to alternate between complacency and panic, with neither being justified. Barring external intervention or a general war, the Communists will not be able to come to power unless the internal situation deteriorates much further. Despite their increased electoral strength, they are in a much poorer position to bring off a forceful *coup* than they have ever been since the war. And they are not likely to be called to the government peacefully, either to share in its responsibilities directly or to enjoy an entering wedge through the PSI. So long as the Christian Democrats remain strong, this would be done only as a last desperate measure if at all. It is much more likely that, if political maneuverings looking to splitting off of PSI rank and file should fail, a coalition with Rightist elements (excluding, perhaps, the more extreme Neo-Fascists) would be regarded as the lesser of evils.

For the short run, however, it would also seem probable that there will be no early move toward a Center-Right coalition on a national scale. It is likely that the Christian Democrats will read the signs of the times and will increasingly explore all possible avenues for a broadening toward the left. This is true not only because the greatest threat is on the left and their survival as a vital political force requires that some of the thunder be stolen from the Left's appeal to the masses. It is enforced by the fact that the Christian Democrats themselves have moved to the left in terms of the internal composition of their parliamentary party.[10]

It seems likely that a flimsy Center coalition dominated by the Christian Democrats will characterize the government until the next election. This coalition will exist at the mercy of the Democratic Socialists so far as program or any rightward tendencies in general are concerned. The present manifestation of that coalition, the Scelba cabinet, reveals in its structure the extent of the concessions to the Democratic Socialists which have been found necessary. Such a coalition also exists, however, at the mercy of the Right wing of the Christian Democratic party itself. That wing has been purged to some extent by

[10] See the forthcoming article by Emiliana Noether, "Political Catholicism in France and Italy", in the *Yale Review*.

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migration to the Monarchists, and it is less important in the party councils than it was before the election of 1953. But the arithmetic of the situation is so precarious that the probings to the moderate Left must be done in such a way as not to alienate these groups. And yet the effort to penetrate the Leftist following, urged by Saragat, seems wholly necessary in the interests of democratic survival. For it remains true that the only promising direction in which to broaden the base of democratic political action in Italy lies in the emergence of an expanding British-type socialist party loyal to constitutional democracy. The bulk of the recruits for such a party would have to come from the PSI. How this can be done, or even whether it can be done, is a key problem.

In general, then, the short-run prospect is for a period of political instability, of governments dominated by the Christian Democrats, of efforts to construct moderately leftward-looking economic programs, of virtually no room for maneuvering within the democratic forces. During such a period, paralysis is a greater threat than communism.

It is not possible to discuss Italy's longer-run prospects in terms of Italy alone. In a peaceful Europe, moving toward ever greater economic integration and free exchange of goods and persons, with gradually improving economic relationships with the rest of the world and particularly with the United States, the prospects for Italian democracy would be very good. Viewed strictly in terms of its own assets and liabilities, and making no such assumptions on the European context, the prospects can hardly be anything but doubtful. It is this extreme interdependence of Italy with the other countries of Europe and with the United States, as well as its test-tube character with respect to economic factors in the internal spread of communism, which makes it a touchstone of the success of United States policy.

The long-run prospects are said to be doubtful primarily on the basis of the conclusion that Italy, of its own resources alone, will not find it possible to solve its pressing economic problems. The deterioration in the political situation which is already taking place could, in the absence of further economic improvement, be expected to continue. This does not necessarily mean

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that Italy would go Communist. There is considerable reason to believe that over the long period a solution might be sought on the Right. Successful democratic policy in Italy in the near future will almost certainly be based on a movement substantially to the left of the position taken by the previous governments. If that policy proves unable, over the longer period, to stem the rise of strength on the far Left, the result may then well be a fusing of the Center and the Right. A return of Fascism under these circumstances, while possible, does not seem likely. What seems more likely is the gradual emergence of a clerical, moderate, but essentially authoritarian régime of the Portuguese type. This has come to be known in the trade as the "Salazar solution". How moderate it would be would, of course, depend on the extent and intensity of Communist response. In any case, whether severely repressive or not, it would represent the end of the Italian post-war experiment in democracy.

The long-run survival and strengthening of Italian democracy will depend on a number of economic and political prerequisites. Among the economic prerequisites I would put the following: an internal economy expanding steadily at a rate as high as politically possible within limits imposed by emergence of real inflationary pressures; increased exports through improved industrial and agricultural productivity and more effective government credit and promotion measures, as well as further trade liberalization among Western trading partners; redoubled unemployment measures, including a further acceleration of "make-work" investments; greater flow of emigration, especially for the next ten or twelve years; tax reform, especially with respect to distribution of the tax load and the efficiency of enforcement; continued and increased emphasis on land reform and agricultural reform, including better farm credit, aid to coöperatives, technical assistance to farmers.

Among the political prerequisites would be increased evidence of respect for the democratic government of Italy by her allies; the emergence of more effectively organized and better-financed democratic parties; bureaucratic reform to increase efficiency and, perhaps even more important, to provide the basis for a restored public confidence; and, generally, a strengthening of

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the democratic tradition. I would regard the first three or four of the so-called economic prerequisites as quite literally conditions precedent to the survival of democracy; the other points (both economic and political), important though they are, would be of small consequence in the absence of these three or four. And unfortunately it is precisely on these points that the present situation and recent trends give least cause for optimism. Continued economic growth, expansion of exports, sharp reduction of unemployment, increase of emigration —these are the very areas in which the political instability in Italy, together with the realistic probabilities of United States foreign economic policy, leaves relatively little hope for rapid progress.

Implications for United States Policy

It has been suggested that the future of democratic institutions in Italy depends in large part on developments beyond the control of the Italians themselves. This is not to obscure the fact that it is Italians who must make democracy work and who must come to have a deep loyalty to its institutions—and who must see to it that those institutions have earned the loyalty. It is only to repeat the obvious to say that Italy's political future is inseparable from political and economic developments in Europe as a whole. And in the world of today, these things are in turn inevitably tied up with what happens in the United States, and with the ways in which the United States chooses to use its political, economic and military predominance in the Western world. Hence, the political outlook in Italy is intimately related to the future shape of United States policy in Europe, and will be to a large extent a consequence, consciously willed or not, of United States action and inaction in this sphere.

Perhaps the first question to ask is whether the United States really wants or needs the success of democracy in Italy. This is not just a rhetorical question, with "yes" the only possible answer. Indeed, it is probably the key question about United States attitudes and their reflection in future policy toward Italy. Because even if it is clear that the United States needs Italy in the cold war—or in any event cannot afford to lose

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Italy to the potential enemy—it does not follow that the United States is equally committed to the survival of democracy in Italy. It is possible that the end of democracy in Italy through the emergence of a relatively moderate but authoritarian Right-Center régime would leave Italy quite as actively in the United States camp in the cold war as is now the case. Even a more violent swing to the right, with or without civil war, would probably wind up with Italy on "our side" so far as the cold war is concerned. If we were preoccupied only with the balance of power in the military struggle with world communism, this should occasion little more concern than the presence of Spain, Jugoslavia, and other allies in the Western camp. But even though it is muddied by the imperatives of international power politics, this is still an ideological struggle as well, and one in which the West cannot willingly see the collapse of democracy in any of its present strongholds. Too many peoples and nations, not yet wholly enlisted, are watching. Too much is at stake for democracy on all the interrelated battle fronts of the struggle with authoritarianism.

If we really mean that we need a democratic Italy—not just a euphemism for an anti-Communist Italy—the present political situation and prospects in that country have strong implications for the future of United States policy. The relationship might be viewed from the perspective of three time phases. In the first of these, that is, for the immediate future, there is little likelihood of the sudden collapse of Italian democracy and therefore no justification for hasty, ill-considered, and panic-generated measures of United States policy toward Italy. United States pressure for extreme repressive steps against the Communists and Socialists unaccompanied by a positive program of action on many other fronts would be an example of such mistaken policy. In the second phase, over the next ten years or so, it is proper to speak of a crisis for Italian democracy and to think in terms of an emergency program to surmount that crisis. A carefully planned, well-integrated emergency program for that period would involve United States and Italian action, primarily on the economic front, to reduce unemployment, raise living standards, and increase emigration. The period would come to a close after ten or twelve years because (a)

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that much relatively successful experience would strengthen the hold of democratic political institutions, and (b) the end of population growth in Italy would probably have been reached, thus simplifying the single most important economic problem facing the country. The third phase should therefore see a return to more normal relationships, with an experienced and strengthened democracy able to cope with economic problems of less staggering proportions.

On the United States side, such a ten-year program would probably include temporarily increased immigration quotas; liberalization of tariff barriers; continuation of technical assistance; extension of economic assistance through loans or grants (particularly in connection with southern development); encouragement of United States private investment through tax incentives and otherwise; special aid for resource exploration and exploitation; and coöperation with international economic and financial agencies working on the Italian problem. Needless to say, this could only be part of a joint program in which the Italian government would undertake complementary obligations consistent with the agreed objectives. The mere listing of the kinds of things the United States would need to do to make possible such a program is sufficient to indicate the degree of likelihood that it could in fact be put into operation. A few of these steps are possible; others seem virtually impossible in the present climate of opinion in America. To be sure, the Italian problem is only one aspect of America's global perplexities in dealing with the Communist challenge. Any such elements of a program for Italy would have to be undertaken within the limits of our capabilities and in the perspective of competing international claims. But unless most of them can be incorporated in United States policy toward Italy over the next several years, it seems likely that Italian democracy will remain in crisis or disappear. And if the policy of "competitive coexistence" through the use of economic tools cannot save existing pro-Western democratic institutions in Italy, the prospects are poor that it can build decisive new strength in the uncommitted areas of the world.

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UNCONDITIONAL SURRENDER RECONSIDERED

OF all American policies during the period of World War II, that of unconditional surrender toward the Axis Powers appears to have given rise to the most controversy and adverse comment. Secretary Hull has revealed that he opposed it, the psychological warfare specialists obviously had difficulties with it, and even Mr. Churchill has commented on it at least twice—and with somewhat confusing effect.[1] In the United States the prominent military analyst Hanson Baldwin took exception to the policy some time ago in a book,[2] and more recently he has returned to the attack in an article aimed at a wider audience.[3] Plainly, the issues involved are by no means dead, and perhaps cannot even be laid to rest easily.

In spite of the frequency of previous discussions of the subject, there is in them something not entirely satisfactory from the scholarly point of view. In the first place, much of the adverse comment has been made in the heat of the immediate post-war period, and seems to be related directly to the authors' satisfaction or indignation with post-war American policy in Germany.[4] Secondly, the dispute over the consequences has left one really important aspect of the problem untouched—namely, the way in which it grew out of the actual historical context of the times, and especially President Roosevelt's reasons for endorsing it. Thus little attention has been given to the problem of understanding a major problem in American foreign policy as an American decision. Finally, a good deal

[1] Secretary Hull's comments may be found in his *Memoirs* (New York, 1948), pp. 1570 *et seq.*; James Warburg's views seem to represent those of some of the psychological warfare specialists, as in his *Germany—Bridge or Battleground* (New York, 1946), Appendix II, pp. 259–265; Mr. Churchill's statements will be cited in detail later.

[2] *Great Mistakes of the War* (New York, 1949), pp. 14–25.

[3] "Churchill Was Right", *The Atlantic*, vol. 194, No. 1 (July 1954).

[4] This view is naturally strongest among the Germans themselves. See Baldwin, *Great Mistakes*, pp. 22–23.

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has been published recently on the war period, and some of this new material is relevant to the problem involved. For all of these reasons, it is thought worth while to reconsider the policy.

I. *The Origins of "Unconditional Surrender"*

In his *Atlantic* article Mr. Baldwin repeats, with some new material, the earliest recollection of Mr. Churchill that he first heard the term "unconditional surrender" from the lips of the President at the joint press conference held by the two leaders at Casablanca. Relying also on the study by Matloff and Snell,[5] Mr. Baldwin declares that "unconditional surrender was laid down as a *diktat*—a one-man decision—without any study of its political or military implications and was announced publicly and unilaterally at a press conference to the surprise of the nation's chief ally, Great Britain." [6]

As Mr. Churchill subsequently acknowledged, his first recollection of the episode proved somewhat inaccurate. Elliott Roosevelt, who was present at the conference as an aide to his father, first challenged the "surprise" nature of the announcement when he wrote that at a luncheon *prior* to the press conference, the President tried out the slogan on the Prime Minister. He stated that

> . . .it was at that lunch table that the phrase "unconditional surrender" was born. For what it was worth, it can be recorded that it was Father's phrase, that Harry Hopkins took an immediate and strong liking to it, and that Churchill, while he slowly munched a mouthful of food, thought, frowned, thought, finally grinned, and at length announced, "Perfect! And I can just see how Goebbels and the rest of 'em 'll squeal."[7]

Mr. Churchill subsequently took note of this variant account, and stated that later research in his own files confirmed Elliott's impression that the whole matter had been discussed previously. Apparently it was even earlier than Elliott believed, however, for

[5] Maurice Matloff and Edwin M. Snell, *United States Army in World War II. The War Department: Strategic Planning for Coalition Warfare, 1941–1942* (Washington, 1953).

[6] Baldwin, "Churchill Was Right", p. 27.

[7] Elliott Roosevelt, *As He Saw It* (New York, 1946), p. 117.

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Mr. Churchill prints a report of his to the Deputy Prime Minister and War Cabinet, dated January 20, 1943, in which he stated:

> I would like to know what the War Cabinet would think of our including in this statement to the press a declaration of the firm intention of the United States and the British Empire to continue the war relentlessly until we have brought about the "unconditional surrender" of Germany and Japan. The omission of Italy would be to encourage a break-up there. The President liked this idea, and it would stimulate our friends in every country.[8]

Mr. Churchill adds that, in the Cabinet discussion which followed receipt of his message, it was not the principle itself which was questioned, but the possibility of making the exception in favor of Italy. The Cabinet definitely opposed any such exception. Mr. Churchill continues that he had neither record nor recollection of any conversation with the President on the matter subsequent to his receiving the views of the War Cabinet. He makes it clear that both he and the President approved the official communiqué, which had been prepared by the various staffs, and which contained no reference to unconditional surrender, and that the War Cabinet had also approved this.[9]

Mr. Churchill confesses his surprise at hearing the President use the phrase at the press conference. He says that "It was natural to suppose that the agreed communiqué had superseded anything said in conversation," and that General Ismay, who was well acquainted with his thoughts, was also surprised.[10] But he quotes the President's own explanation, as given by Robert Sherwood, as finally disposing of the matter:

> Roosevelt himself absolved Churchill from all responsibility for the statement. Indeed, he suggested that it was an unpremeditated one on his own part. "We had so much trouble getting those two French generals [DeGaulle and Giraud] together that I thought to myself that this was as difficult as arranging the meeting of Grant and Lee—and then suddenly the press conference was on, and

[8] Winston S. Churchill, *The Second World War: The Hinge of Fate* (Boston, 1950), p. 684.

[9] *Ibid.*, pp. 685–686.

[10] *Ibid.*, pp. 686–687.

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> Winston and I had had no time to prepare for it, and the thought popped into my mind that they had called Grant 'Old Unconditional Surrender' and the next thing I knew I had said it." [11]

Sherwood comments that for some reason or other the President liked to cultivate the impression of himself as "a rather frivolous fellow who did not give sufficient attention to the consequences of chance remarks." [12] As applied to this particular case, however, two well-known facts have to be weighed against the accuracy of any such characterization. One is the fact that the President spoke from notes, and these—which were not allowed to be quoted—contained the following statement:

> The President and the Prime Minister. . .are more than ever determined that peace can come to the world only by a total elimination of German and Japanese war power. This involves the simple formula of placing the objective of this war in terms of an unconditional surrender by Germany, Italy, and Japan. Unconditional surrender by them means a reasonable assurance of world peace, for generations. Unconditional surrender means not the destruction of the German populace, nor of the Italian or Japanese populace, but does mean the destruction of a philosophy in Germany, Italy and Japan which is based on the conquest and subjugation of other peoples.[13]

It might be suggested that the President's notes also may have been composed only a few minutes prior to the press conference, so that their existence does not disprove the unpremeditated nature of the phrase. As against this, however, we have the evidence of Churchill's own memorandum to the War Cabinet, dated January 20, and including the vital phrase, while the press conference did not occur until four days later.[14] The evidence

[11] Quoted in part by Churchill, *ibid.*, p. 687. and in Robert Sherwood, *Roosevelt and Hopkins: An Intimate History* (New York, 1948), p. 696. It is somewhat strange that in his book Hanson Baldwin recognizes the error in Churchill's first recollection and the correctness of Elliott Roosevelt's account, while in his article he does not. The point would seem to be important enough to emphasize, even in a popular account.

[12] Sherwood, *op. cit.*, p. 696.

[13] *Ibid.*, pp. 696–697.

[14] Elliott Roosevelt, *op. cit.*, pp. 117–121.

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seems incontrovertible, therefore, that the President had been thinking about the phrase for at least several days before the public announcement.

A second reason mentioned by Sherwood for believing the President's selection of the phrase to have been a carefully considered one is his determined resistance to any modification of it. Objection to it came from many sources: from Secretary Hull, from some of the American psychological warfare specialists, from the War Department, from the British Foreign Office, and even, after the Teheran Conference, from the Soviet government.[15] Despite all the pressure, however, the President clung determinedly to his position, and would not consent to any modification of the principle. Plainly, then, as Sherwood says, the announcement was no casual slip of the tongue, but "very deeply deliberated", and "a true statement of Roosevelt's considered policy." [16] Further, "One thing about Roosevelt's statement is certain. . .—he had his eyes wide open when he made it." [17]

Since the President insisted on retention of the policy over so much opposition, it seems clear that in his own mind it must have served some very basic function, or have entailed some very definite advantages. Careful analysis of the available records indicates that the slogan did, in fact, have such a basic function in the over-all development of American policy, and there were very considerable advantages in it from the President's point of view. The main function, briefly stated, was to impose a damper on premature discussion of the post-war settlement, and the advantages related to three areas, the existing German government and the German people, the policy of the Soviet government, and the attitude of the American people toward the winning of the war. In the following sections the relevance of the policy to each of these subjects is examined in greater detail.

[15] Hull makes his own lack of agreement clear, and also mentions other examples of opposition to the phrase in his discussion, *op. cit.*, pp. 1570 *et seq.*

[16] Sherwood, *op. cit.*, p. 696.

[17] *Ibid.*, p. 697.

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II. *Unconditional Surrender and the German Government*

The most immediate and obvious bearing of the unconditional surrender policy was its relation to Germany and the ending of the war. Sherwood has stated the President's view on this point as follows:

> What Roosevelt was saying was that there would be no negotiated peace, no compromise with Nazism and Fascism, no "escape clauses" provided by another Fourteen Points which could lead to another Hitler. (The ghost of Woodrow Wilson was again at his shoulder.) Roosevelt wanted this uncompromising purpose brought home to the American people and the Russians and the Chinese, and to the people of France and other occupied nations, and he wanted it brought home to the Germans—that neither by continuance of force nor by contrivance of a new spirit of sweet reasonableness could their present leaders gain for them a soft peace. He wanted to ensure that when the war was won it would stay won.[18]

Sherwood goes on to explain that it was particularly important for the President to stress the uncompromising nature of American policy toward the Nazis at this time because of the "uproar over Darlan and Peyrouton", and the fears of the enemies of Fascism everywhere that this might indicate an American willingness to compromise and to accept less than the total defeat of the enemy.[19] This interpretation of the policy stresses primarily its importance as a statement of the attitude: No negotiated peace with existing enemy governments!

An additional, complementary interpretation of the policy, also bearing on Germany, has been suggested by Wallace Carroll, formerly Deputy Director of the Overseas Branch of the Office of War Information. He quotes an anonymous source—a person present at the Casablanca Conference, as having been told by the President that

> . . .he wanted to rule out any pledge or offer like the Fourteen Points and still convey to the enemy peoples the idea that they would be treated generously by the Allies. He thought that the

[18] *Ibid.* Sherwood's interpretation is borne out by the President's remarks on two subsequent occasions. See Samuel I. Rosenmann, *Public Papers and Addresses of Franklin D. Roosevelt* (New York, 1948), 1943 volume, Item 10, pp. 59–60; and 1944–45 volume, Item 55, p. 210.

[19] Sherwood, *op. cit.*, p. 697.

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> story of Grant and Lee at Appamatox would convey this idea. . . . what he especially wanted to bring out was Grant's gesture in letting the Confederates keep their horses. The President felt that this incident from American history would help the enemy peoples to realize that they were facing chivalrous foes who did not desire to impoverish them or humiliate them, but who would treat them with magnanimity. *That is, he meant to reassure the peoples of enemy countries about Allied intentions, not to terrorize them.*[20]

To those who have associated the President with the Morgenthau Plan, this hypothesis will seem both novel and improbable. Nevertheless, it is borne out by a number of the President's later statements, of which the following is typical: "In our uncompromising policy we mean no harm to the common people of the Axis nations. But we do mean to impose punishment and retribution in full upon their guilty, barbaric leaders." [21]

The foregoing statement was made in February 1943. Late in August of the same year, in what seemed a clear reference to the Atlantic Charter, the President declared:

> Except for the responsible fascist leaders, the people of the Axis need not fear unconditional surrender to the United Nations. . . . The people of the Axis-controlled areas may be assured that when they agree to unconditional surrender they will not be trading Axis despotism for ruin under the United Nations. The goal of the United Nations is to permit liberated peoples to create a free political life of their own choosing and to attain economic security.[22]

That the policy did not exclude the probability of generous Allied action was also emphasized by the President in his exchanges with Hull. On two occasions the President said that the best definition of the policy was exemplified by Lee's surrender to Grant. Lee had relied upon Grant's fairness, and Grant had responded with a generous gesture. On one occasion the President added that "both the German people and Russia" should be told what this "best definition" meant.[23] On the

[20] Wallace Carroll, *Persuade or Perish* (Boston, 1948), p. 309. Italics mine.

[21] Hull, *op. cit.*, p. 1571.

[22] *Ibid.*

[23] *Ibid.*, p. 1574. The President repeated the illustration at considerable length in a press conference late in July 1944. *Cf.* Rosenmann, *op. cit.*, 1944–45 volume, Item 55, pp. 209–211.

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other, the President added the apparently contradictory thought: "That is the spirit I should like to see abroad—but it does not apply to Germany. Germany understands only one kind of language." [24]

But, taken in its context, the latter statement makes clear that what the President meant was that the Germans would misconstrue as a sign of weakness any magnanimous gesture *in advance* of unconditional surrender. Is it possible to disagree with him in this?

The similarity between the President's view and that of the Prime Minister on this point should be clear from the following explanation by Mr. Churchill:

> The term "unconditional surrender" does not mean that the German people will be enslaved or destroyed. It means however that the Allies will not be bound to them at the moment of surrender by any pact or obligation. There will be, for instance, no question of the Atlantic Charter applying to Germany as a matter of right and barring territorial transferences or adjustments in enemy countries. . . .If we are bound, we are bound by our own consciences to civilization. We are not bound to the Germans as the result of a bargain struck. That is the meaning of "unconditional surrender."[25]

It only remains to point out that, so far as the example of Lee's surrender to Grant was concerned, the example did nothing to clarify the President's intention. One reason is that the President's recollection was, unfortunately, somewhat erroneous. As Carroll has explained,

> . . .the President bungled the announcement of the decision. The correspondents at Casablanca were not permitted to quote his words directly and it is therefore impossible to ascertain exactly what he said. From the newspaper accounts it appears that he may have mentioned Grant, but he forgot to mention Lee and the horses. Those American correspondents and newspapers which sought to explain what he had in mind assumed that he referred to Grant's letter to General Buckner. . . .Grant's demand for unconditional surrender at that time had not been tempered by an act of magnanimity. Consequently, Allied propagandists, who received all their

[24] Hull, *op. cit.*, p. 1576.

[25] Churchill, *Hinge of Fate*, pp. 690–691.

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> news of the Conference from the press, never got the point of the generous gesture to the defeated foe.[26]

Carroll adds that when the President again used the example in his exchanges with Hull, "Secretary Hull forgot to pass it on to the Office of War Information." [27]

It seems clear, then, that so far as Germany was concerned the unconditional surrender policy was intended to inform the world—Germans, Americans, and everyone else—that the Allies would accept nothing less than the complete defeat of existing enemy governments, and would not bargain or compromise with them. Both the President and Mr. Churchill agreed on this, and both went out of their way to explain that this did *not* mean a policy of unnecessary harshness or vindictiveness toward the common people of the Axis nations.

So much, then, for the President's purpose where Germany was concerned. The question has often been raised as to the effect of the policy in Germany, and the allegation has been made that the policy unnecessarily prolonged the war.[28] This question is probably too large to be discussed in detail here, but a few pertinent considerations may be mentioned. The first and most obvious point is that there is no necessary connection between the unconditional surrender formula and the "Morgenthau Plan", which in point of time came almost two years later. Either one could have been adopted without the other, although most of the critics treat them as identical.[29] But it seems evident that one could accept unconditional surrender without accepting Mr. Morgenthau's ideas—as in fact Secretary Stimson appears to have done.

[26] Carroll, *op. cit.*, pp. 310–311. A transcript of the press conference, corroborating Carroll's observation, is printed by Rosenmann, *op. cit.*, 1943 volume, Item 6, pp. 37 *et seq.*

[27] Carroll, *op. cit.*, p. 317.

[28] This is Hanson Baldwin's view, in both his book and later article.

[29] Baldwin states that "The Casablanca policy came to logical fruition in the Morgenthau 'pastoral Germany' policy at Quebec. . . ." *Great Mistakes*, p. 24. For a fuller discussion of the Morgenthau Plan and the Quebec conference, see the author's "The Development of the Morgenthau Plan through the Quebec Conference", *Journal of Politics*, vol. 16, No. 2 (May 1954).

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A second point is also worth consideration. Many of the critics of the policy appear to place overly great emphasis on the effect of mere propaganda alone, divorcing stated aims of policy from the effects of actual wartime conditions. Allen Dulles, however, in commenting upon American policy in Germany, couples the two significantly when he says:

> Our propaganda consisted of the slogan "unconditional surrender," and was coupled with the bombing of German cities, high civilian casualties and the destruction of thousands of workers' dwellings. That this type of bombing came only from the west made a deep impression on the German masses who ascribed it to a deliberate difference in policy between East and West. They overlooked the fact that Russian aviation was not adapted to that type of bombing. . . .[30]

Dulles' point is, it seems to me, well taken. The critics decry unconditional surrender, but do not suggest that our strategy with respect to bombing should have been different. The implication is that a mere difference in words would have been greatly to the American advantage. It seems hard to believe that Goebbels would have had any greater difficulty countering such a policy than he had with the actually existing one. The argument strains credulity a bit too far.

It is interesting to note Churchill's response to this kind of criticism. "It is false to suggest", he wrote, "that it [i.e., unconditional surrender] prolonged the war. Negotiation with Hitler was impossible. He was a maniac with supreme power to play his hand out to the end, which he did; and so did we." [31]

Finally, admitting that the present discussion is not conclusive, Sherwood's comment is pertinent that

> It is a matter of record that the Italians and the Japanese were ready to accept unconditional surrender as soon as effective force was applied to their homelands. Whether they might have done so sooner, or whether the Germans might ever have done so, under any circumstances whatsoever, are matters for eternal speculation.[32]

[30] Allen W. Dulles, *Germany's Underground* (New York, 1947), p. 168.

[31] Sherwood, *op. cit.*, p. 696.

[32] *Ibid.*, p. 697.

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III. *Unconditional Surrender and the Soviet Government*

So important an aim as unconditional surrender must also, obviously, have been considered for its bearing on other Allies, and particularly the Soviet government. In this connection it should be recalled that only six months prior to the Casablanca Conference the United States had intervened forcibly in the Anglo-Soviet treaty negotiations. At the outset of these negotiations, Churchill had been willing to pledge British support for a guaranty of Soviet territorial acquisitions made during the period of the Nazi-Soviet pact. But the President, with Woodrow Wilson and the secret treaties of World War I clearly in mind, had intervened to prevent any discussion of commitments with regard to territorial issues in post-war Europe.[33] Nevertheless the question, so long as it was not finally disposed of, was bound to hang heavily over the future, and to exert an unsettling effect on the policies of all the Allies. One of the major consequences of the unconditional surrender policy was to reinforce the ban on any such premature discussion, and to forestall any further demand to reach a territorial settlement, which the United States could not support, before the ending of the war.

The policy also had another important bearing on the relations of the two Western Powers to Russia. It may be recalled that in May of 1942 the United States and Britain had made a rather tenuous promise to the Soviets to open a second front in Western Europe in 1942.[34] Subsequently, some misunderstanding developed over the implementation of this commitment. In August 1942, Mr. Churchill felt it necessary to make a special trip to Moscow to explain to Stalin why the front could not be created that year.[35] Following his visit, and in part as the result of a curtailment of western supplies to Russia made necessary by the planned invasion of Africa, the Soviets became very uncommunicative. In October there were indications, according to Mr. Churchill, that the Russians feared a British attempt to negotiate a separate peace with Germany. In November, a

[33] *Ibid.*, pp. 401 *et seq.*; Churchill, *The Second World War: The Grand Alliance* (Boston, 1950), pp. 528 *et seq.*; and Hull, *op. cit.*, pp. 1165 *et seq.*

[34] See Sherwood, *op. cit.*, p. 577, and Churchill, *Hinge of Fate*, pp. 341–342.

[35] Churchill, *Hinge of Fate*, pp. 472–502.

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combination of rain and German reinforcements caused the western campaign in North Africa to bog down.[36]

In the light of these developments, and accompanying Russian suspicion, it was perhaps not surprising that Stalin found it impossible to leave Moscow to participate in the Casablanca Conference. His reply to the urgings of Roosevelt and Churchill made it clear that he still felt that the next western move should be ". . .a second front in Europe. . .by the joint forces of Great Britain and the United States of America in the spring of the next year." [37]

At the Casablanca Conference itself, western strategy for the rest of 1943 was agreed upon by the combined staffs and political leaders. General Marshall and Harry Hopkins wanted the main objective to be the invasion of northern France, but they were overruled.[38] Instead, it was agreed to advance on Sicily next, and to secure the Mediterranean lines of communication and air bases. It did not require a very careful reading between the lines of the Combined Chiefs' report on "The Conduct of the War in 1943" to perceive that the invasion of Western Europe had again come off second- or even third-best.[39]

In view of this background, one can better appreciate the force of Wallace Carroll's argument that the policy of unconditional surrender was designed to take the sting out of the further postponement of the European front. In his opinion,

> The Russians had been displeased by the failure of the British and Americans to open a "second front" in Western Europe in 1942, and it seemed likely at Casablanca that they would be still more displeased when they learned that the decision had been taken to invade Italy, ruling out the possibility of a western front in 1943. The announcement of a policy of no compromise and no bargaining by the western Allies would therefore help to counter Russian suspicions.[40]

[36] *Ibid.*, pp. 569, 575, 577 and 660–667.

[37] *Ibid.*, pp. 662 *et seq.* and 667.

[38] Sherwood, *op. cit.*, pp. 674–675.

[39] The official agreement of the Combined Chiefs is given by Churchill, *Hinge of Fate*, pp. 692–693.

[40] Carroll, *op. cit.*, p. 312.

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Carroll goes on to argue that the Russians agreed to unconditional surrender as "basic policy", and wanted to modify it later only because they considered it "bad tactics" to insist on it "in public".[41] Without it, Soviet suspicions of treachery and double-dealing could not have been allayed; "with it, they [i.e., the Western Allies] exposed themselves to a few gentle complaints that they were being unnecessarily stern in their propaganda." [42]

Carroll's interpretation is borne out in all respects not only by the facts already cited, but also by two remarks of the President as reported by his son Elliott, who was present at the time. The first occurred at the previously mentioned luncheon with Mr. Churchill:

> Father, once his phrase had been approved by the others, speculated about its effect in another direction.
>
> "Of course, it's just the thing for the Russians. Unconditional surrender," he repeated. . . ., "Uncle Joe might have made it up himself." [43]

The second was a conversation between the President and his son, in which Mr. Roosevelt discoursed philosophically about the disagreements on invasion strategy between the American and British chiefs, and the nature of the agreement reached:

> . . . Father was to tell me about the rocky path the Combined Chiefs had travelled to reach the plan for the invasion of Sicily; he was to complain, but philosophically, about the continuing British insistence on striking Europe from the south rather than from the west; he was to note his misgivings as to Stalin's attitude when the news arrived of a further postponement of the invasion cross-channel; he was to comment that "Wars are uncertain affairs. To win this one, we must maintain a difficult unity with one ally by apparently letting another down. To win this war, we have been forced into a strategic compromise which will most certainly offend the Russians, so that later we will be able in turn to force a compromise which will most certainly offend the British. The compelling needs of war dictate a difficult course." [44]

[41] *Ibid.*, p. 333.

[42] *Ibid.*, p. 334.

[43] Elliott Roosevelt, *op. cit.*, p. 117.

[44] *Ibid.*, p. 109.

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Finally, one might note that the official communiqué of the conference made a great point of Stalin's having been invited to join the other two leaders. It added that

> The President and Prime Minister realized up to the full the enormous weight of the war which Russia is successfully bearing along her whole land front, and their prime object has been to draw as much weight as possible off the Russian armies by engaging the enemy as heavily as possible at the best selected points.
>
> Premier Stalin has been fully informed of the military proposals.[45]

The evidence on this aspect of the policy now seems conclusive. Unconditional surrender served the important function not only of reinforcing the ban on premature discussion of post-war territorial issues, but also of reassuring the Russians that, in spite of necessary delays over the opening of the second front, it was still the Western determination to press on unremittingly to victory, in fulfillment of Allied commitments, as soon as the physical forces could be assembled to do the job.[46]

It only remains to point out that from the standpoint of satisfying the Russians the policy was not, and indeed could not be, completely satisfactory. Nothing short of the second front itself could have been. Stalin's reply to the conference message of Roosevelt and Churchill made this crystal-clear. He said: "It is my understanding that by the decisions you have taken you have set yourselves the task of crushing Germany by the opening of a Second Front in Europe in 1943 and I should be very obliged for information concerning the actual operations planned for this purpose. . . ." [47]

But it seems evident that the policy did convince the Russians of the Western determination to get on with the war as fast as

[45] Rosenmann, *Public Papers*, 1943 volume, Item 7, p. 50.

[46] Professor William L. Langer has expressed essentially the same view as follows: ". . . the Soviet leaders were quite as suspicious of their Allies as we were of them. Whether sincerely or otherwise, they took the line that refusal to open a second front was an indication of unwillingness to crush the Nazi power or permit Communist Russia an unqualified victory. It was this mutual suspicion and constant recrimination more than anything else that lay behind the demand for unconditional surrender. . . ." "Turning Points of the War: Political Problems of a Coalition", *Foreign Affairs*, vol. 26, No. 1 (October 1947), p. 84.

[47] Sherwood, *op. cit.*, p. 701.

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possible, and in this respect the policy, as President Roosevelt hoped, averted a threat to Allied unity at a crucial moment.[48]

The subsequent record of Soviet pronouncements with regard to unconditional surrender bears out this interpretation. Stalin endorsed the policy in his Order of the Day of May 1, 1943.[49] Soviet objections to it were not voiced until the Teheran Conference. By that time, however, the Western Allies were fully committed to the opening of the western front, so that the Russians may well have figured that the policy had served its main immediate purpose. It is a notable fact that even at Teheran the Russian objections were based upon tactical considerations, and that their situation was in this respect less happy than that of the Western Allies, whose tactical problem was to convince the Germans of their deadly seriousness, not of their humaneness.[50] On the whole it can be said that at the time it was announced, and until the tactical, propaganda argument could seem more important, the Soviets accepted unconditional surrender as the President apparently hoped and felt they would. In this respect the policy was clearly successful, and achieved what it was designed to do.

IV. *Unconditional Surrender and American Public Opinion*

The final advantage of the policy in the President's mind undoubtedly lay in the fact that it helped to preserve American unity of feeling, both within itself and in relation to our major Allies. This emerges clearly not only from the President's own remarks, but also from those of persons close to him. So far as the President's own thoughts are concerned, his clearest explanation of the policy was in his address to the White House Correspondents' Association, two and a half weeks after the Casablance Conference.

In that speech the President referred to his talks with Ameri-

[48] Hans Speier takes the same view as Langer, but adds that the policy may also have served as a warning to the Russians to stop flirting with the National Committee "Free Germany" and the Union of German Officers. "War Aims in Political Warfare", *Social Research: An International Quarterly of Political and Social Science*, vol. 12, No. 2 (May 1945), pp. 157–180.

[49] Embassy of the U.S.S.R., *Information Bulletin*, No. 47, May 4, 1943, p. 1.

[50] Carroll, *op. cit.*, pp. 314–315.

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can servicemen abroad, and to their concern "about the state of the home front." Diplomatically the President suggested that the reports of grumbling over petty discomforts, the self-seeking and the profiteering were "gross exaggerations", and that "the people as a whole in the United States are in this war to see it through with heart and body and soul." The President felt that the faultfinders and "pettifoggers" could not obscure the fact that "one of the major battles of the war" was impending in North Africa, and that this fact revealed "not merely cooperation but active collaboration between the United Nations." He mentioned the likelihood of heavy casualties, and the necessity for facing this prospect with the same courage as that of the men on the battlefield.[51]

Turning to the Axis propagandists, the President ridiculed their efforts to divide the United Nations by trying "to create the idea that if we win the war, Russia, and England, and China, and the United States are going to get into a cat-and-dog fight." [52] This, said the President,

> . . .is their final effort to turn one Nation against another, in the vain hope that they may settle with one or two at a time—that any of us may be so gullible and so forgetful as to be duped into making "deals" at the expense of the allies.
>
> To these panicky attempts. . . we say—all the United Nations say—that the only terms on which we shall deal with any Axis Government. . .are the terms proclaimed at Casablanca: "unconditional surrender". . . .
>
> The Nazis must be frantic. . .if they believe that they can devise any propaganda that would turn the British and the American and the Chinese Governments and peoples against Russia—or Russia against the rest of us.[53]

Finally, the President said that the "tragedy of the war has sharpened the vision and leadership" of all the United Nations, and from this there resulted the conviction of "the utter necessity of our standing together after the war to secure a peace based on principles of permanence." [54]

[51] Rosenmann, *Public Papers*, 1943 volume, Item 16, pp. 74–77.

[52] *Ibid.*, p. 79.

[53] *Ibid.*, pp. 79–80.

[54] *Ibid.*, p. 80.

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It would be difficult to find a clearer example of the crucial rôle played by unconditional surrender in the President's grand strategy of the war. In the President's mind, unquestionably, preservation of American unity of opinion was an indispensable condition both of victory and of success in the peace to follow. The two major threats to this unity, as the President saw it, were: domestic indifference, arising from a failure to grasp the nature of the issues in this total war; and international resentment and hostility arising from a conflict of aims between the United States and, above all other Allies, the Soviet Union. In his address the President tried to deal with both these threats, explicitly and directly. He emphasized "our determination to fight this war through to the finish," [55] and he stressed the preservation of unity between all the Allies as the indispensable condition of victory. Of course the two objectives were intimately related. Any relaxation of effort short of victory, on the home front, would result in disunity between the Allies; and any evidence of disunity—such as might arise from putting forward conflicting post-war aims—might well produce a relaxation of effort short of victory.

In this connection it seems somewhat strange to this writer that no mention has been made—by either Sherwood, Churchill or Baldwin—of the controversial rôle played by "unconditional surrender" in World War I, and especially in the anti-Wilson speeches of Theodore Roosevelt. But the President's own memory was apparently not so short and, as Sherwood observes, the ghost of Woodrow Wilson was often at his shoulder. Indeed, in retrospect it may well be asked, what better device could be imagined to serve the President's purpose than the very slogan popularized by the "bitter-enders" in the previous war? Surely the President's political genius never burned more brightly than when he rescued this phrase from oblivion, and made it serve American purposes.[56]

Additional evidence of the President's views may be gathered

[55] This was the thought which, the President said at the beginning of his speech, was "uppermost in our minds." *Ibid.*, p. 72.

[56] For an excellent study of the earlier controversy, see Earl S. Pomeroy, "Sentiment for a Strong Peace, 1917–1919", *The South Atlantic Quarterly*, vol. XLIII, No. 4 (October 1944), pp. 325–337.

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from the remarks of some of the President's associates. Wallace Carroll mentions the President's well-known aversion to stating positively any war aims at all, and the fact that the President gave the war the uninspiring name, "The Survival War". According to Carroll the President believed that "if he attempted to give the war a social purpose, he would arouse the hostility of the same groups which had opposed his domestic policies." [57]

Similarly, Sumner Welles has written that the President

> . . .believed his primary obligation was to concentrate the attention of public opinion upon the winning of the war. He was convinced that if he spoke to the American people. . .of postwar problems, they might be distracted from the cardinal objective of victory, and controversies might develop which would jeopardize national unity.[58]

* * * * *

The relevance of unconditional surrender to these purposes should be evident. It was in fact the inescapable product both of the conflicting streams of American public opinion about the war, and of the divergent aims and purposes of the principal members of the Great Coalition. In both cases it served to bridge important differences and to make concerted action possible.

Brief reference may be made here to the President's unrelenting opposition to any modification of the policy. At Teheran a joint declaration to the Germans on the basis of unconditional surrender was considered by the three leaders. According to a British account, "Marshal Stalin. . .informed President Roosevelt on November 29 that he thought this [i.e., unconditional surrender] would be bad tactics toward Germany and suggested instead that the Allied Governments concerned should work out terms together and make them generally known to the German people." [59]

The President, however, was so unalterably opposed to any modification that he later denied any knowledge of the occur-

[57] Carroll, *op. cit.*, p. 308.

[58] Sumner Welles, *Where Are We Heading?* (New York, 1946), pp. 18–19.

[59] Hull, *op. cit.*, p. 1572.

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rence. This prompted Carroll to remark that the President may have "followed the example of Lord Nelson, who raised a telescope to his blind eye when he did not want to see, and turned a selective ear to Stalin when he chose not to hear." [60]

Russian opposition to the policy did not stop at Teheran. In December 1943, Molotov inquired of Harriman whether the policy could be modified. The President's instruction to Hull stated that the three major Powers had "agreed not to make any peace without consultation with each other," and that "each case should stand on its own merits in that way." [61] Again in February 1944, the Russians began negotiations with the Finns, but not on the basis of unconditional surrender. The British made this the occasion for a proposal to drop the formula, at least toward the satellites, and the Soviets stated their agreement with the British view. Still the President persisted, however, stating that "from time to time there will have to be exceptions not to the surrender principle but to the application of it in specific cases. That is a very different thing from changing the principle." [62]

The net result from this and further requests for modification was the final consent of the President to omit mention of the formula, for propaganda purposes only, to the satellite states alone.[63] It was never explicitly renounced, and in the case of Germany was not even implicitly qualified. According to Robert Sherwood, even at Yalta Roosevelt was "adhering to the basic formula of unconditional surrender; beyond that, he demanded only. . .'freedom of action.'" [64]

The record of Soviet opposition to the policy indicates that from their point of view it had probably served its usefulness after the United States had become irrevocably committed to

[60] Carroll, *op. cit.*, p. 316.

[61] Hull, *op. cit.*, pp. 1573 *et seq.*

[62] *Ibid.*, p. 1577.

[63] No mention was made of unconditional surrender in the Joint Declaration to the Four Axis Satellites, May 12, 1944. See *Documents on American Foreign Relations*, edited by L. M. Goodrich and M. J. Carroll (Boston, 1944), vol. V, p. 189.

[64] Sherwood, *op. cit.*, p. 862.

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opening the second front in Western Europe. It has already been suggested that one of the President's purposes in adopting the policy was to take the sting out of the Allied postponement of the promised second front. The fact that the Russians suggested modifying the policy only after the West was so committed indicates, therefore, that the President's immediate tactical purpose was well served by the policy.

Had this been his only purpose, however, no reason would have existed for retaining the policy once the United States was fully committed to the Western European invasion. Hence the President's continued opposition, after this point had been reached, must be understood as indicating his belief that there were still advantages to be gained from it, in spite of its tactical disadvantages which, incidentally, the President never denied the existence of. The question then is, what were these continuing advantages?

Sherwood's observation that the President wanted "freedom of action" probably provides the best clue to the answer. How could the President enjoy such freedom with respect to Germany (or any other post-war problem) unless he was in fact free to commit the United States fully and completely, or only partially, to whatever degree he saw fit? The President was well aware, as Sherwood makes clear, of the danger that the United States might return to a policy of isolationism after the war. He was also well aware of the vital importance attached by the Soviet government to a solution of the German problem; and of the necessity for ending the threat to the United States of recurring European wars caused by Germany. The danger of a return to isolationism could be averted, and the basis for Allied coöperation in Germany could be laid, only if the United States were fully committed not only to immediate victory but also to whatever measures of intervention in Germany were necessary after the war to keep the peace.

The President's determined adherence to the policy may therefore be taken as evidence of his determination to win the larger objectives, and of his judgment that the policy of unconditional surrender furthered these ends. Any just assessment of the policy must take these points into consideration,

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along with the tactical propaganda arguments so frequently mentioned.[65]

One final aspect of the policy may be mentioned here. Secretary Hull objected to the policy not only on tactical grounds but also because he felt that it "logically required the victor nations to be ready to take over every phase of the national and local Governments of the conquered countries, and to operate all governmental activities and properties. We and our Allies were in no way prepared to undertake this vast obligation." [66]

In simpler terms Hull's objection seems to be that unconditional surrender is an assertion of unlimited power, and therefore of an unlimited obligation. This would seem to be additional confirmation of the point that unconditional surrender preserved the President's freedom to commit the United States in Germany after the war to any degree he desired. At the same time it should be noted that the nature of the Allied commitment, lacking any other statement, had been given a specific form in the Atlantic Charter. It does seem, therefore, that although the President successfully avoided the Wilsonian error (as the President and Mr. Churchill considered it) of giving the Germans a semi-legal basis for asserting their rights, he nevertheless involved the Allies, and particularly the United States, in a moral obligation of a very far-reaching extent. This was, at any rate, the feeling of some, and was to be voiced later by some critics of the policy.[67]

In conclusion it may be stated that the unconditional surrender policy served both tactical and strategic purposes. For the short run it prevented Russian recrimination in spite of the further postponement of the promised second front. At the same time it served notice on Germans, Russians and Americans

[65] James Warburg discusses these at length in *Germany—Bridge or Battleground*, pp. 259–265; for the German reaction see also Allen W. Dulles, *Germany's Underground*, pp. 132 *et seq.*; B. H. Liddell Hart, *The German Generals Talk* (New York, 1948), pp. 292 *et seq.*; Hans Rothfels, *The German Opposition to Hitler* (Hinsdale, 1948), *passim;* H. R. Trevor-Roper, *The Last Days of Hitler* (New York, 1947), pp. 237–238; and Churchill, *Hinge of Fate*, pp. 685 and 688–691.

[66] Hull, *op. cit.*, p. 1570.

[67] This criticism was made, for example, by Ernest Bevin of Great Britain in the Commons, as reported in *The New York Times*, July 22, 1949.

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alike that there would be no compromises or deals with the Axis governments by any of the Allies. Its longer-term advantages lay in the fact that it reinforced the ban on discussion of post-war territorial issues, thus preserving a measure of international harmony necessary to the effective prosecution of the war, unified American public opinion on the need for winning the war, and laid the basis for post-war coöperation between the Allies by preserving American freedom of action with regard to post-war policy in Germany. One might note in passing that there is nothing in the record to show that Mr. Churchill proposed any feasible alternative policy which would have achieved the same objectives. On all counts, and contemporary criticisms of it notwithstanding, it was one of the most effective achievements of American statemanship of the entire war period.

JOHN L. CHASE

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REVIEWS

Civilization and Foreign Policy: An Inquiry for Americans. By LOUIS J. HALLE. New York, Harper & Brothers, 1955.—xxviii, 277 pp. $3.75.

Common Sense and World Affairs. BY DOROTHY FOSDICK. New York, Harcourt, Brace and Company, 1955.—xii, 207 pp. $3.50.

If large numbers of American citizens digest one or both of these books, it would be reasonable to expect that our government will in the future more wisely plan and execute our foreign policy. Our policy-makers have been thwarted on past occasions for the very reason that Congress and the public have failed to face up to many of the simple truths which Louis Halle and Dorothy Fosdick lay before the reader. As Miss Fosdick says, "if individual Americans held attitudes consistent with the principles set forth in this book . . . a more satisfactory foreign policy would be likely and the task of American officials conducting foreign policy would be simpler."

Mr. Halle offers a philosophy and theory of American foreign policy the argument of which needs to be closely followed from beginning to end but his admirable prose, which sometimes rises to poetic heights, makes the reading a pleasure. Miss Fosdick sets out to give a wider audience "something of the feel for foreign policy, the knack for judging things," writing in a clear, forthright way about twelve principles epigrammatically phrased as chapter headings. A casual reader would be lost if he drifted into the middle of Louis Halle's book but could profitably read any chapter in Dorothy Fosdick's. Although it will repay the specialist to study her ideas, she talks to the ordinary citizen trying to grope his way through the strange forest of foreign affairs while Halle writes mainly for the more sophisticated. Dean Acheson in his introduction to Halle (an important essay in itself) stresses the inevitable preoccupation of the responsible official with episodic detail and his concurrent need for such a theoretical framework as Halle supplies.

Both authors were members of the remarkable group who served in the Policy Planning Staff of the Department of State under George Kennan and Paul Nitze when Acheson was Secretary. C. B. Marshall, who published his *The Limits of Foreign Policy* last year, was another member. There are many points on which their thinking converges.

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While the group is branded, or crowned, as tough realists, Kennan, Fosdick and Halle all stress the importance to our world position of the preservation of those essential inner qualities of the true American character which, in Kennan's words, must be "sufficiently impressive to compel the respect and confidence of the world." Both Fosdick and Halle are fond of quoting Thucydides, as indeed is Harold Nicolson. Mr. Halle reprints as an Appendix an essay on Thucydides, and the experience of ancient Greece and Rome is constantly brought to mind; historians must judge whether the parallels are always accurate. One may, for example, ask whether the coalitions of the Greek city-states were more like the American colonies under the Articles of Confederation than like NATO or the UN. It is perhaps this concentration on Greece and Rome which leads the author to an overemphasis upon Western civilization and an underemphasis upon the vast importance of Asia in the modern world. He does not seem to accept the actual and indeed the essential heterogeneity of a free-world coalition as Miss Fosdick does. Although Mr. Halle says, "The difficulty is not in choosing ends but in finding means," he, like others of his group, has a peculiar blind spot when it comes to the potentialities of international organization which in its UN or other forms is brushed aside as reflecting a sterile striving for a Utopian *objective* instead of being studied and analyzed as a *means* for attaining the ends which he advocates. Miss Fosdick has had much more practical experience with the UN and has a sound appreciation of its rôle including its limitations and potentialities. While the words "international law" occur two or three times in the Halle book, the author does not seem to be aware that when he describes his concept of "legitimacy" and the rôle of custom, he is describing, under other labels, international law in terms acceptable to most international lawyers.

In the reviewer's understanding of Mr. Halle's analysis, sound foreign policy is based on a combination of "force" in the sense of actual power which can be brought to bear, and "consent" in the sense of "the eliciting of willing consent." (Miss Fosdick briefly develops a like concept as did C. B. Marshall.) Many passages of the book discuss the interplay of these two factors and of the choice between them. For the United States, the choice, Mr. Halle thinks, must be the product of (1) the American character—the kind of people we are and the kind of world in which we want to live; (2) the means or power available to us to attain our objectives; and (3) the nature of the world around us and especially the Soviet threat. Four chapters are devoted to each of these three factors. The last four chapters pose and seek to answer the question "What should our policy be?" or, more accurately, "What kind of policy should it be?" since Mr. Halle sticks to his philosophical last and uses

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discussions of problems of the moment only as occasional test tubes. Miss Fosdick, on the other hand, refers to almost all the current issues in foreign policy and makes pithy comments on them. Among other effective passages one may mention her warning that the long-range Soviet propaganda strategy may offset American satisfaction with momentary "victories" which alienate Asian-African opinion.

The conclusion of *Civilization and Foreign Policy*, which finds support in *Common Sense and World Affairs*, is that an analysis of policies of isolation or of world empire shows that they should be rejected by the United States on both practical and what one may fairly call spiritual grounds. The choice then is a leadership of the great free-world coalition based upon "consent" but supported by adequate "force".

PHILIP C. JESSUP

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Essays in the Public Philosophy. By WALTER LIPPMANN. Boston and Toronto, Little, Brown and Company, 1955.—xiii, 189 pp. $3.50.

It seems safe to say of this slender volume that it is a reactionary book. Walter Lippmann writes, as always, with that charm of style, with that pontifical tone of authority that have served to give weight to what he has to say. At a time when the political pendulum has been swinging toward the right, his words will give comfort to many persons. But neither his literary facility nor the mood of the times can alter the fact that in this book he is looking backward, not forward.

Essentially, what Lippmann is saying is that in the twentieth century American democracy has been inadequate to its tasks. It has made grievous mistakes of policy, especially of foreign policy, retreating from victory in 1919 and 1920, hesitant and divided in 1939 and 1940, unclear as to its objectives and as to the pattern of the future in the period 1941–45. It has suffered from the transformation of its political forms; the rôle of the executive has been debilitated, and representative government has been transformed into a democracy whose legislators are the servile agents of what they deem to be public opinion, incapable of independent or courageous judgment. Jacobinism (to use (Lippmann's term) has replaced constitutionalism. It is only in a return to the wisdom of the past that a remedy can be found for the evils of our time.

It is this last sentence that justifies the remark with which I have begun this review. To look backward for a cure for current maladies is surely to be reactionary in the literal sense of the term. It is also to be unhistorical. For, while it is possible to grapple with our problems,

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it is extremely unlikely that we can do so by returning to the past. The record of mankind offers little reason to believe that great movements can be reversed, or that the development in the West of government by public sentiment can be easily checked, or pushed back.

But is the picture as gloomy as Lippmann pictures it? Errors there are aplenty, but are these errors any worse than the errors of other types of societies? It was a diplomat of the old type, Count von Berchtold, who, by his egregious miscalculations, set the train for the First World War. And did the professional diplomats of France and Great Britain do better in 1914? Democratic governments were grossly mistaken in their policies in the thirties; but were they more mistaken than the paranoiac who brought the German people to defeat or disaster? The American government failed for some time to grasp the situation created in 1945, but have its misconceptions been any more perilous than those harbored by the Kremlin? *All* governments err, totalitarian governments, popular governments, even representative constitutional régimes. Surely the record of our own government since 1945, viewed in the light of history, is a remarkable adaptation to a new situation, a remarkable departure from mere tradition, a remarkable example in many ways of national unity in facing new problems.

Nor is the American record one to view with wringing of the hands in domestic affairs since 1929. We passed through a great depression without social convulsion; we perfected agencies that have given a better economic balance to the economic system; we fought a great war on a rising standard of living; we enjoy remarkable prosperity, and a very considerable popular cultural efflorescence. Is it necessary to be gloomy about a people which has done all this, even though there are grievous errors along the way?

But however one judges the past we can say with assurance that we shall not return to it or to the "public philosophy" it represents. If we are to believe in the future, we shall have to believe, not in the wisdom of an élite, but in the transcendental and instinctive wisdom of the mass, in the political moderation, the sense of compromise, the strong empirical tendencies, the respect for special knowledge that Americans have often evinced and that, as their tasks grow and their experience widens, they may conceivably evince more and more. Perhaps none of these things will suffice; but it seems a little unwise and unbrave to come so near to despair as Lippmann does. I prefer the Lippmann I once knew at Harvard more than forty years ago; then there was in him faith and hope.

DEXTER PERKINS

CORNELL UNIVERSITY

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American Thought: A Critical Sketch. By MORRIS R. COHEN. Edited and with a Foreword by Felix S. Cohen. Glencoe, Illinois, The Free Press, 1954.—360 pp. $5.00.

One of the earliest of the literary projects that the late Professor Morris R. Cohen planned was to have been a history of thought in America. This historical study was destined never to be written; other interests and other commitments supervened. During the years in which this project was in his mind, Cohen read very widely in authors who might ultimately have found their place in his history, and, occasionally, he published an article or a review of materials that he read in background preparation. Cohen lectured, too, on American thought, and his notes and sketches for lectures at the New School for Social Research and at the University of Chicago were available at the time of his death.

His son and literary executor, Dr. Felix S. Cohen, during the last years of his own tragically brief life, labored without stint to prepare for publication the materials that his father had left behind. Difficult as was this filial duty in the case of Cohen's other posthumous works, it was a task well-nigh insuperable in the case of Cohen's projected work on American thought. It was evident that the full extent of his intention could not be realized; wisely the decision was reached to limit the scope to a "critical sketch" rather than an extended history. It is this briefer sketch that we have before us.

The range of concern in *American Thought: A Critical Sketch* is wide. Its chapters deal with the development of thought in history, science, economics, politics, law, religion, esthetics and general philosophy. In addition, there is an opening chapter on "The Background of the American Tradition" in which Cohen gave his interpretation of the ongoing civilization within which the intellectual expressions that were his primary subject arose. Considering the diversity of matters discussed, the level of competence is remarkably high. This is one of the best books on American intellectual history that we have, and it merits careful study. Not all its sections demonstrate equal skill and competence; it is an uneven book. In the chapter on legal thought, for example, a field in which both Morris and Felix Cohen were distinguished and original contributors to the development that is discussed, the observations are more penetrating and trenchant than in the chapter on religious thought where the approach is far more gingerly and evidently rests on a far scantier background and a less sympathetic understanding of what writers on themes of religious thought were trying to do. Relatively weak, too, is the chapter on esthetics. The other strong chapters are

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those on history, economic thought and general philosophy. Cohen's discussion of scientific thought is unfortunately not projected on as full a scale as the other chapters; it lacks the rounded historical orientation that enriches the treatment of legal thought. Both the chapter on scientific thought and that on political thought minimize the critical exposition of the works of individuals that makes the discussion of general philosophy in this book so useful.

In making distinctions among the various chapters in this fashion, it is not my intention to suggest that even the weakest section of this volume is, in an absolute sense, inadequate. There is no part of the book that is not shot through with sage comment and mordant criticism, often expressed in tersely aphoristic style. There is no part from which even the well-informed student of American thought cannot learn; for Cohen's acuity, which was a byword among his fellow-philosophers, is manifested throughout this work. He studied the original sources rather than the monographic literature, and his every evaluation is fresh and his own. In some cases, these evaluations seem idiosyncratic; in others, eminently just and casting a new light on their subject. It is a reflective sketch of the history of American thought that we have here, and the reflection is from the brilliant glass of Cohen's mind.

COLUMBIA UNIVERSITY JOSEPH L. BLAU

The Rise of French Liberal Thought: A Study of Political Ideas from Bayle to Condorcet. By KINGSLEY MARTIN. 2d Edition. Edited by J. P. Mayer. New York, New York University Press, 1954.—xviii, 316 pp. $3.75.

The book under review is a reprint of that published in 1929 as *French Liberal Thought in the Eighteenth Century*, with the addition of a new bibliography by the editor, J. P. Mayer. When it first appeared the book was acclaimed as the best single volume, in English, in its field of study. It still merits this acclaim. Mr. Martin tells his twice-told tale of French liberal thought with the knowledge, clarity and verve worthy of the subject.

Much of the vitality of the book comes from its emphasis on the relation of the ideas of the period to social conditions and political events. As a British Labor party intellectual Mr. Martin believes that ideas are not bloodless abstractions existing in a vacuum but are the life force in history. He explains how the structure and policies of the Old Regime in France created a revolutionary class ready for subversive doctrines. This class was the bourgeoisie, which had "economic power as well as grievances". And the group of thinkers who formulated these doctrines

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was the philosophes, a literary group that placed social and political problems in the very forefront of man's intellectual life. The philosophes may be considered as the pioneers of the "intelligentsia".

Much of the book covers well-known ground, but does so from the vantage point of the twentieth century. Mr. Martin takes great pains to show that the eighteenth-century intellectual movement was not all of one pattern. As the Enlightenment progressed it became more enlightened concerning the welfare of the masses in the new schemes for a better order. The moderate Voltaire and the cautious Montesquieu of the first half of the century were followed in the second half by the more progressive Rousseau and Condorcet and by the socialist school of writers. In his analysis of the ideas of the philosophes the author takes into account the various influences that helped to formulate their views. But he makes only fragmentary references to America, which exercised considerable influence on French liberal thought, especially after 1776.

In general Mr. Martin analyzes the ideas of the philosophes in a spirit of sympathetic detachment. But his sympathies grow warmer when he turns his attention to the more radical of the philosophes. Rousseau he considers the most creative thinker of the eighteenth century. As the originator of the doctrine of popular sovereignty Rousseau, in the view of Mr. Martin, popularized the democratic idea that political authority "was legitimate only when founded on rational consent." However, his statement that Jeffersonian democracy was "directly inspired by Rousseau" (p. 218) is misleading. Locke, not Rousseau, was Jefferson's inspiration. Condorcet is aptly characterized as "a somewhat advanced twentieth-century liberal" (p. 293) because of his radical views concerning social reform and popular education. Considerable space is devoted to the views of Mably and Morelly, whose socialism, in the view of the author, was primarily a Puritan attack on idleness and luxury, and only incidentally on the economic system.

Mr. Martin's book succeeds in giving the reader a clear view of what was permanent and what was transitory in eighteenth-century libertarianism. It is a contribution much needed at the present time.

J. SALWYN SCHAPIRO

NEW YORK, N. Y.

Henry George. By CHARLES ALBRO BARKER. New York, Oxford University Press, 1955.—xvii, 696 pp. $9.50.

Publication of this satisfying book is an event. Henry George has waited for a biographer at once scholarly and sympathetic. His career has been set forth several times with filial fidelity and apostles' apprecia-

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tion. His movement, as distinguished from the man, has had more searching treatment, both in antecedent thought and in practical application. Now Professor Barker gives us a comprehensive study, balanced, original in much new material, and illuminating in all its parts.

The author, through patient years, has explored every quarter. He himself transferred from West coast to East, pursuing his inquiry. He has incorporated particularly the first careful examination of George's early newspaper work for the evidence of his developing ideas. Such a thorough review serves to rob George's story of certain of the surprises which are remembered from briefer accounts. He had no sudden conversion to his faith, as on the road to Damascus. Instead, his thought grew, in the beginning tentatively, under many promptings, personal, local, national, political and economic. We have the proof of an alert mind and courageous spirit receiving impressions which he had the wit and purpose to focus to a point. Every experience in his varied and hard school was linked to every other.

Of course, there was the quality of genius which may not be documented, of moral fervor and exaltation of written and spoken word more readily admired than explained. In his eager acknowledgment of these virtues, Professor Barker does not surrender informed appraisal. In picturing Henry George this is a feat; for, as philosopher and propagandist, George raised up either devotees or detractors. The time of appearance of this full-scale biography has helped. Associates of the great reformer are still on the scene to vivify the perspective of more than half a century since his death. In the interval the socialist movement, partly supplementing, more largely supplanting, George's doctrine, has achieved new definition, and presents unmistakable contrast.

Was *Progress and Poverty* a cry of alarm that free land was—prematurely through monopolization—disappearing? Was the analysis inspired principally by the depression following 1873? How far was Henry George himself a single-taxer? Did Woodrow Wilson assist a late rally of Georgists? What has been the extent of fiscal reform attributable to George's teachings? If George was mistaken in his specific, just how was that? These and many more questions are discussed with knowledge and point. As always in such a volume, the list of sources (in this case grouped and annotated) is a diary of the author's industry and legwork. The reader who wants to take off for explorations of his own will find springboards.

It so happens that a new edition of *Progress and Poverty* has appeared at the same time with Barker's biography, seventy-five years after its original publication and discouraging reception. How explain the persistent popularity of a treatise at first dubbed forbidding and distorted?

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Barker gives many reasons in economic history in this and other countries. He justly values the persuasiveness and charm of the language. But principally he dwells on the moral force of the reformer. No economic remedy is universal and permanent, but the intelligent intention to benefit society has its immortality. As we recede from Henry George's day his merit, in this sense, increases. In the end he gave his life, deliberately, for his principles. This record of his career is not a rehearsal of a past epoch, but a pertinent chapter in an unending and noble effort to fit institutions to ideals.

It may not be out of place to venture that such a portrayal of a social prophet is best executed by the historian. The philosophy, as such, may be acquired. The economics and politics may be grasped without difficulty. But all must be woven on the broad loom which the historian commands. It will be a long while before another will find profit in returning to the assignment which this author has so amply discharged.

BROADUS MITCHELL

RUTGERS UNIVERSITY

The Theory of the Mixed Constitution in Antiquity: A Critical Analysis of Polybius' Political Ideas. By KURT VON FRITZ. New York, Columbia University Press, 1954.—xii, 490 pp. $7.50.

The theory of the mixed constitution, as it was formulated by the Greek historian Polybius (200–120? B.C.), has in recent years increasingly attracted the attention of historians interested in its impact on modern constitutional thought. This influence was so great, particularly in England, that a history of this classical theory in the modern world will eventually have to be written. The starting point has been provided by Kurt von Fritz, Professor of Greek and Latin in Columbia University, in the book under review. Just as the celebrated description of Rome's mixed constitution occupies a central place in Polybius' *History*, it similarly supplies the main theme of this volume, in which Von Fritz has tested the historical validity of Polybius' constitutional analysis against the findings of modern scholarship.

In his *History*, covering essentially the years from 200 B.C. to 146 B.C., Polybius set out to explain why the Roman republic was able to rise after the disaster of Cannae to mastery of the known world. He found his explanation in the stability of Rome's mixed constitution by which political power was divided equally among consuls (the monarchic element), senate (the aristocratic element), and assemblies (the democratic

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element). These elements balanced one another so perfectly that the perverse forms of simple governments, i.e., tyranny, oligarchy, and mob rule, could not enter, and Rome was spared the revolutions endemic in the cycle of simple constitutions. In a thoughtfully written critique, Von Fritz agrees that in the late third century B.C. the Roman constitution had aspects of mixture and balance. Its most distinctive characteristic, however, was the excess of negative powers that had developed during the struggle between patricians and plebeians. He traces important deficiencies in the *History* to the use of the theory of the mixed constitution, without proper adaptation, as an "instrument of historical analysis". One such deficiency is the failure, despite Plato's example, to go beyond power relations to the social, economic and psychological factors that affect the substance of institutions without necessarily altering their forms. Thus Polybius equated the consuls, drawn from the aristocracy, with the monarchic element, and he failed to perceive that the tribunes were actually members of the senatorial aristocracy and capable of using their veto unconstitutionally. This same preoccupation with constitutional forms led him to ignore the major reasons for the downfall of the republic.

Von Fritz is equally critical of the concept of the mixed constitution expressed in the *History*. Where Polybius admired the perfect balance in the Roman constitution and the need for concurrence among consuls, senate and assemblies before taking action, Von Fritz suggests that the strength of the Roman constitution lay in the flexibility of its system of checks and balances that permitted enormous shifts of power to take place.

In his last chapter, Von Fritz leaves the ancient world, with which admittedly he is most familiar, to examine as an alternative to the mixed constitution the theory of sovereignty in Thomas Hobbes's *Leviathan* (1651). Here he might have noticed that Polybius' political ideas had won a resounding victory in seventeenth-century England. For when Hobbes attributed the coming of the English civil war to a widespread belief that the powers of king, lords and commons were equal, he paid an indirect tribute to the Answer to the Nineteen Propositions issued by Charles I. In this declaration of June 1642, that monarch, as Francis Wormuth has pointed out in his *Origins of Modern Constitutionalism* (1949), adapted the political ideas of Polybius to the English government and gave the mixed constitution a new notoriety in the modern world.

CORINNE COMSTOCK WESTON

UNIVERSITY OF HOUSTON

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The Process and Effects of Mass Communication. Edited by Wilbur Schramm. Urbana, University of Illinois Press, 1954.—x, 586 pp. $6.00.

Study of mass communications as an aspect of behavioristic science is a recent development, receiving its greatest impetus from the requirements of psychological warfare during World War II and the government program of overseas informational services in the following period. As in any new field of research there have inevitably been many false starts, a good deal of esoteric material and an apparent inordinate emphasis on methodology. Almost the only certainty in this formative phase of a new subdivision of advanced study is that a great proportion of what is produced is bound to be abandoned as experience in the field enlarges.

The Institute for Communications Research at the University of Illinois is one of the pioneers—together with Columbia and Princeton Universities—whose aim has been to make soundings for a channel into these unknown waters. Their responsibility has been to make sure, among other things, that the technical jargon devised for this new area of study does not deteriorate into "gobbledygook"—in other words, to see that the mass of data dredged up does not cover up the relatively small amount of significant new facts which will eventually be all that is worth retaining from the early period.

Provided with these several *caveats*, the reader will find in Professor Schramm's newest collection some of the most reliable commentary to date on the phenomena of mass communications. The volume outlines the several phases of the subject as seen from this introductory period—the elements of interest and attention on the part of the audience for mass communications; the psychological factors of meaning and attitude, and the processes of modifying attitudes; and finally the effects of communications upon groups and upon the international community. Among contributors to the collected papers are many whose names are well recognized among the pioneers in this subject—Leonard Doob on propaganda, Allport on rumor, Cantril and Lasswell on public opinion, and others.

This volume complements two earlier collections of material on mass communications edited by Professor Schramm. It is the outgrowth of the need of the United States Information Agency for a background book to use in the training of new employees; consequently, its primary emphasis is upon international communications, but it is the editor's hope that the study of communications between nations will prove a proper perspective for the general study of social interchange. This hope may be realized if the editor and contributors have shown that they heeded the admonition

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of the Luce-Hutchins Commission on Freedom of the Press of several years ago, to the effect that "international communication is something more than domestic communication writ large." A comparison of the contents of the preceding volumes with the present one considerably tempers this hope—the present work is pretty largely an updating of what has gone before.

Still, it is useful to have brought together the selections from significant works of recent years on social communications, whether local or world-wide. Four of the readings deal with the problem entitled "Communicating to Another Culture", and cover such topics as psychological warfare, international propaganda, and national stereotypes. The closing section of the book, too, concerns the special considerations of international communications and reviews the information techniques and policies of both sides in World War II, the current activities of the Soviet Union and of international communism, and general prospects for the future. There is a list of "100 titles" for further reading appended to the volume.

UNIVERSITY OF NEBRASKA WILLIAM F. SWINDLER

Taxation in the United States. By RANDOLPH E. PAUL. Boston, Little, Brown and Company, 1954.—xii, 830 pp. $15.00.

Taxation has, over the last quarter-century become an immensely more important and immensely more elaborate part of the economic life of the country, and a detailed discussion of how our tax structure came to be what it is is no small task. Mr. Paul brings to this task a wealth of experience as a tax lawyer both in and out of government, a keen appreciation of the political crosscurrents that have influenced tax developments, and considerable insight into the economic impact of tax policies. The result is hardly light reading: a good deal of it, in fact, will be tedious to all but the inveterate student of fiscal history. Nor is it quite the quick reference for those who might wish to trace the development of a particular phase of the law. But for the person with the perseverance to read through it, it will give many new insights into the forces that have shaped our tax laws, the rôle of these measures in the economic history of the country, and perhaps some shrewd hints as to the direction that new tax developments may be expected to take.

While Paul gives an adequate presentation of the various sides of controversial issues, he makes no pretense of an objective approach. His is frankly and openly the point of view of the realistic liberal, interested in promoting genuinely progressive taxation, and at the same time aware of the imperfections that necessarily cling to any tax system and of the sometimes sordid political conflict out of which tax measures emerge.

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Interspersed with the story of tax development are capsule summaries of the broader historical trends of the times which serve to help place the tax changes in the context of the circumstances and dominant sentiments of the periods in which they took place, a factor that is too often overlooked. For the more casual reader, the last three chapters are to be recommended as covering the essential flavor of the book: we have a history of progressive taxation, a summary of some of the points at which Paul feels further change is needed, and finally a telling essay on the importance of history to an understanding of our tax structure and the possibilities for its further development, and on the duty of tax practitioners to promote actively the reform of taxation in the public interest. Paul claims, and his own career is good evidence in support of his claim, that vigorous activity in the public interest and effective counseling of private clients need not clash, but can each be made to contribute to the effectiveness of the other.

Some of the technical details of the book are a bit disappointing. Although there is a very detailed index running to over 50 pages, there are no references given for the numerous quotations, except for citations from court cases, where the habits of the law impose themselves. Several misprints of a nature to suggest unintended meanings remain to bring the reader up short.

Naturally enough, the bulk of the book deals with the more recent tax developments, over half of it being devoted to developments since 1939. Not only have the complexities and importance of taxation bulked much larger in this period than previously, but this corresponds also to the period of which the author can write in large part as one in close contemporary touch with developments. The many quotations, though they sometimes appear to be picked rather at random, do give an impression obtainable in few other ways of the personalities involved, the considerations that influence the development of tax laws, and the obstacles and pitfalls that lie in wait for any new proposals for tax reform. Taxation is, indeed, politics at its most practical.

WILLIAM VICKREY

COLUMBIA UNIVERSITY

The Arbitration of Wages. By IRVING BERNSTEIN. Berkeley and Los Angeles, University of California Press, 1954.—xiii, 125 pp. $3.50.

That wage arbitration enjoys a secondary position in the American system of collective bargaining is well known. Dr. Bernstein, in this study, has provided an empirical support to this near truism by analyzing the awards published in over 200 wage arbitrations conducted between 1945 and 1950. What emerges from this monograph is a clear statement

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of the essentially "conservative" character and implications of wage arbitration in the United States.

Wage arbitration has had a checkered career in this country. Its vogue has increased during periods of rapid changes in price levels, but even then it has been the exception. Although more generally part of collective bargaining in urban transit, and some other local public utilities, wage arbitration has also been utilized in retail trade, printing, garments, shoes and railroads on some occasions.

The rôle of the arbitrator is a conservative one under a system in which the vast majority of wage bargains are the product of direct negotiations between the parties. While insuring that he is an effective substitute for the work stoppage which arbitration is intended to prevent, his decision is expected merely to conform to that which the parties would normally have reached themselves. These requirements impose severe limitations on his sphere of judgment.

In analyzing the criteria applied by arbitrators in carrying out their responsibilities, the author has found that there is a three-way divergence among the parties and the arbitrators on the emphasis to be placed upon the various criteria. Unions tend to emphasize inter-industry comparisons, while employers emphasize cost of living and the financial condition of the firm. The basically "conservative" rôle of the arbitrators is reflected in their emphasis upon intra-industry comparisons, with cost-of-living factors running second. All of the remaining criteria play a negligible rôle.

The preëminence of the comparative criteria in arbitration produces a conformity to existing wage patterns and levels which, as the author sees it, precludes such arbitration as a device for resolving the problems of wage leadership in times of economic stress. To alter this orientation would require a substantial change in the ideology of collective bargaining, as well as in the mind-set of arbitrators. The alternative, therefore, in such stalemated situations, although the author does not state it, is governmental intervention.

Conformance to established patterns, however, is no mean task—for the patterns are myriad and imprecise, varying by industry and region. The evidence in the 200 cases demonstrates that the wage award is no mere "splitting of the difference" between union demand and employer offer. Although the majority of the awards fell within the range of these limits, over one quarter of the awards coincided with the extremes of either the union demand or the employer position. The within-range predominance is given much emphasis in the author's conclusions; the frequent incidence of awards at the extremes is merely mentioned.

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Dr. Bernstein proposes to alter the spirit of the submission agreement to arbitrate; instead of obtaining agreement on the criteria to be applied by the arbitrator, he proposes that the parties agree on the money limits of the award. The suggested device appears unrealistic for most situations—for tactical reasons, the parties are generally as unwilling to agree on the outer limits as they are on the specific adjustment.

Although the precepts and conclusions of this monograph are pointed and suggestive, several interesting institutional aspects of wage arbitration are barely mentioned. Thus, extension of arbitration in the post-war period tends to receive a unilateral view in terms of union motivation —the rôle of the employer in seeking to regularize production conditions in the face of rapidly changing costs is barely mentioned. The rôle of employer motivation is also overlooked in the unanswered questions raised by the author regarding the failure for arbitrations to increase during the periods of economic recession.

JOSEPH P. GOLDBERG

WASHINGTON, D. C.

Politics in Post-War France: Parties and the Constitution in the Fourth Republic. By PHILIP WILLIAMS. London, New York, Longmans, Green and Co., 1954.—xiv, 500 pp. 35*s.*; $7.00.

The Death of the Fourth Republic. By RONALD MATTHEWS. New York, Frederick A. Praeger, 1954.—318 pp. $5.00.

The course of French affairs, especially of late, has often been a puzzle and a trial, not least to France's friends. Analyses of the French situation, or "problem", have been many; here are two further contributions to the subject.

Mr. Williams' book reveals much labor, sound scholarship, wide knowledge, deep understanding and balanced judgment. If the mass of detail with which it is replete is assembled in somewhat indigestible fashion, that does not detract from the value of his study as a major contribution to our understanding of the present quandary of France. His purpose and conclusions are best expressed in his own words: "It is the fundamental argument of this work that the difficulties of French government are due to historical and social, rather than to constitutional or temperamental factors" (p. 396).

The basic difficulty of France lies in the fact that, by contrast with Britain and America, the fundamental issue of the form of the state has not been settled. If it is true that a dependable majority of the French people are dedicated to the democratic idea, too large a core remains devoted to the authoritarian tradition. Bonapartism, with its ability to exploit through the plebiscite the outward forms of demo-

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cratic practice, has been the recent form of the danger, and this authoritarian legacy has in turn given rise to the reaction—by this time also a tradition—of opposition to and dislike of strong authority in any form. The good French democrat has thus become wedded to a weak state and the bane of *incivisme* raised to the status of virtue.

So long as there is no overwhelming agreement among Frenchmen on the question of the form of the state, the condition is lacking for the operation of the English-speaking device of the two-party system. On the central issue of the relationship between executive and legislature, "a democratic constitution in France must therefore be parliamentary and not presidential" (p. 403); those who advocate the latter "could succeed only by exploiting the authoritarian strain in the French political tradition" (*ibid.*). Constitutional reform, however attractive, is not the simple cure-all that it is sometimes represented to be.

This unresolved cleavage of French politics has another aspect. By contrast with Britain again, the impact of industry came to France before the political issue of the form of the state was resolved, with the consequence that "two distinct types of politics came to operate side by side; the modern politics of class struggle in the progressive industrial areas, the traditional politics of ideological conflict in the economically backward regions" (p. 397). The Fourth Republic, which issued from the coöperation of the disparate forces that joined in the Resistance, endeavored to set the French house of politics in order. For a while the scene was dominated by the three organized and disciplined mass parties, Communists, Socialists and M.R.P., which benefited in addition from the wartime discredit of others. But the Resistance was essentially revolutionary in its implications and it was not long before it proved impossible to retain the Communists in the governing coalition. In the end, "the makers of the Fourth Republic succeeded, without violence, in that proverbially difficult feat of stopping a revolution in mid-career" (p. 342); Paris was not to go the way of Prague. This was a great achievement indeed, but a negative one, which did little to solve the many urgent problems of France, economic and social. De Gaulle, unwilling to seize power himself when he might have done so, unable to capture it later on through his R.P.F., merely introduced an additional, if temporary, element of confusion.

In minute and painstaking fashion Mr. Williams traces the course of the Fourth Republic. A set of useful tables, statistics and charts adds to the value of his study as a work of reference.

Some of the same aspects of the story are dealt with in Mr. Matthews' book which, though edited with inexcusable carelessness, makes for generally easier reading. Rather than a detailed and elaborate analysis

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of the organization and operation of constitution, politics and parties, Mr. Matthews tells a consecutive story of events. By contrast with Mr. Williams' pedestrian and dispassionate treatment, he introduces color and drama, rising at times to passages of moving quality (e.g., the description of the liberation).

The title of the book itself is indication of its dominant theme, which is disillusion. Understandable though it may be when analyzed in detail, the record of France, especially during the thirties, is definitely less than inspiring. Once the stunning shock of 1940 had been absorbed and the meanness of Pétain's rule revealed, the Resistance became the focus and the bearer of the hopes of reformation and rebirth. These hopes were high and reached their peak during and immediately after liberation, when for a time even such natural enemies as Catholics and Communists could find common ground in the task of social reconstruction.

But the dawn of hope was soon clouded and the record becomes one of frustration and missed opportunities. For the Socialists to take over from the temporarily discredited Radicals the old issue of *laïcité* was evidence of doctrinaire narrowness rather than of staunch republican conviction. To be sure, the Resistance coalition was an impossible one, for the most important single component of it, the Communists, was basically alien to the French, as for that matter to any national, milieu.

The Communists bear a large share of responsibility for the failure of the Fourth Republic which was already registered in the difficulties of enacting a new constitution; the resulting solution was neither inspired nor inspiring, and "the Fourth Republic was doomed now, not to advance on the path to the future, but to stamp on a weary treadmill" (p. 199). The "Communist confidence trick" failed of its essential purpose, but the damage resulting from the attempt, in the form of a mere return to the ways of the Third Republic, was great.

The book is fair in its appraisals, though perhaps it does less than justice to the significance of the achievement of saving without resort to violence the fundamental democratic institutions. Yet in the end the fact remains that this was a negative achievement and the strong sense of disillusion is therefore justified. France, to be sure, does not consist of politics alone, but in the circumstances of the present, for her as for others, politics has become a larger part of life; mere return to the old will no longer suffice. Because of the peculiar record of her history, France in some ways continues the central battleground of the old and the new; her course retains therefore the importance as well as the fascination of high drama, to the understanding of which these two books are highly valuable contributions.

BARNARD COLLEGE RENÉ ALBRECHT-CARRIÉ

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Gladstone: A Biography. By PHILIP MAGNUS. New York, E. P. Dutton & Company, Inc., 1954.—xiv, 482 pp. $6.75.

It is a not inconsiderable merit of Sir Philip Magnus' biography that he is able to view the Victorian scene with a measure of detachment. Of Gladstone himself he can write without the reverent awe of G.O.M.'s immediate disciples or the patronizing superiority of a later generation. He has quarried to good purpose in the mass of Gladstone Papers in the British Museum and in the fifty thousand personal manuscripts still at Hawarden. His researches in these materials, presented as they are without the reticences that inhibited Morley and other biographers, offer new insights into the character of Gladstone the man and thus into the achievement of Gladstone the statesman.

Although in fundamentals Sir Philip Magnus is perhaps even more sympathetic with Gladstone than was Morley, he is wholly aware of the great Liberal's shortcomings as a political leader. He emphasizes, for example, the disastrous ineptness with which Gladstone handled some of his cabinet colleagues, notably Rosebery and Chamberlain. The latter's secession in 1886, he suspects, might have been prevented by a chief of "half Gladstone's moral earnestness and twice his knowledge of human nature." There is, in fact, a good deal of evidence to support Sir Philip's judgment that the prime-ministership was not an office for which Gladstone was fitted by temperament. His difficulties with Victoria were less his fault than hers, but relations would have been smoother had he been capable of following Mrs. Gladstone's shrewdly feminine advice to "*pet* the Queen". The capacity for self-deception which he often revealed, the amazing casuistry by which he could justify his own prepossessions (as when he convinced himself that his Roman Catholic sister ought to be buried according to the rites of the Church of England)—such qualities can be dangerous in public as in private life. He was notoriously inhospitable to demands for social reform through the agency of the state. This was "construction", an amalgam of socialism and social reform, and, to the G.O.M., "construction" was an unqualified evil. As far as practical policies were concerned, Gladstone never moved far from Manchester School teaching. In short, one must look beyond policies and programs for the sources of his extraordinary ascendancy.

To judge Gladstone fairly almost requires special categories and criteria, for he was not the standard Victorian statesman nor, in his essential thinking, the typical Victorian liberal. His major concern was not with politics but with religion, and his liberalism was a reflection of his religion. To him the political process was a channel for making effective great moral ideas, and the party an association of enlightened individuals

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bound together to serve a series of high moral causes. The condition of Gladstone's remaining in politics was the discovery of a succession of moral challenges to which he could respond with an energy so inexhaustible that it almost approached the pathological.

Fortunately such causes were rarely lacking, and they carried him along the path from high Toryism to a democratic Liberalism, most of the time against his own instinctive resistance. "I am", he admitted to Ruskin in the late 1870's, "an out-and-out *inegalitarian*", a champion of "the aristocratic principle—the rule of the best." It was nearly as much the result of accident as of conviction that in the late 1850's, when he finally left his Peelite isolation, he moved toward the Whig-Liberals rather than back to the Tories. Not until the middle 1860's did he begin to sense the grandeur of popular democracy as an idea, the democracy which he had dismissed as dull and commonplace but which Lincoln's Gettysburg address had invested with a new and unexpected majesty. Here was the kind of challenge that had always captured his imagination and from which he could never withhold himself. As he became increasingly ill at ease among his regular political associates and, indeed, in his own social world, he began to depend on the masses for the kind of response that his nature demanded. In his new rôle of political schoolmaster to these masses he would appeal not to their self-interest but to their self-respect.

In sum, Sir Philip Magnus further documents the conclusion implied by J. L. Hammond (*Gladstone and the Irish Nation*) that what Gladstone was transcends what he did. As a political leader, his vision was full of blind spots, but the moral authority which he enjoyed with ordinary Englishmen is almost unique in modern times. Often he was able to lift them above themselves, to persuade them to make choices contrary to their immediate self-interest. In a special sense, he was the Christian liberal, who was fully convinced that the Christian ethic was applicable to men and nations and who, Sir Philip Magnus insists, "did more than any statesman since the Reformation to give effect to that ideal."

HARVARD UNIVERSITY DAVID OWEN

The Origin of Russia. By HENRYK PASZKIEWICZ. New York, Philosophical Library, 1954.—xii, 556 pp. $10.00.

Professor Paszkiewicz has written an extraordinary book. In 330 pages of very heavily documented text supported by 13 appendixes, supplementary notes, bibliography, maps and charts, he examines in great detail the history of *Rus'* or Russia, both as a people and as a state, from the ninth to the fourteenth century.

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In the light of what he feels to be new evidence, he rewrites the history of medieval Russia, primarily by redefining the meaning of the term *Rus'* in the ninth and tenth centuries, in the eleventh to thirteenth centuries, in Lithuania and Eastern Europe generally, and finally in the early Moscovite state. Through this process he comes to some conclusions: First, entering the perennial controversy on the origins of the Russian state, Paszkiewicz aligns himself with the Normanists. For him, in the ninth and tenth centuries, *Rus'* was both an ethnic concept designating a tribe of Scandinavian conquerors settled in Russia, and a political concept designating a Varangian state centered first in Novgorod and, from the second half of the tenth century, in Kiev. In support of this thesis the author summons up all the available evidence, beginning with the *Annales Bertiniani*, and, I am afraid, comes no closer to resolving the argument than have all the other historians, past and present, who have engaged in it. A more important conclusion is that, beginning with the eleventh century, the word *Rus'* not only meant a state but was synonymous, in Eastern Europe, with the Slavonic rite of the Greek Orthodox Church; *Rus'* or Russia thus embraced the Varangians, the Slavs and the non-Slavic tribes of that persuasion.

Space does not permit a detailed examination of the argument of Paszkiewicz based on a semantic examination of the *Primary Chronicle* (which he quotes from both the Russian edition and the English translation by S. H. Cross). While he exposes the fallacies in the reasoning of other historians, he commits every possible logical fallacy himself; interpreting, for instance, the word *iazyk* (language), he claims that it is synonymous with faith, and in support of this contention quotes the Russian references to the Latin *iazyks* (languages) (pp. 13 *et seq.*). As there was only one Latin language, this usage proves, according to the author, that *iazyk* meant faith; one can only wonder how many Latin faiths he envisages in thirteenth-century Western Europe. For the Russians, clearly, *Latin* in this case meant Western European, and the word *Latin* was used frequently in this sense. Because the great Russian epic of the twelfth century, *The Lay of Igor'*, contradicts deductions of Paszkiewicz, he accepts Mazon's view that the epic is a late forgery.

He denies any Slavic or national connotations of the term *Rus'* even though, for the same period, he sees the word *Liakhs* (Poles) as an expression of a national concept (p. 38); but he goes much further than this, for he is also able to see in fourteenth-century Lithuania a clear national consciousness, which is preserved against the "eastern Slavs" by the decision of Grand Prince Iagaillo to join the Roman Catholic Church (pp. 250 *et seq.*). Yet it is Lithuania that is the political society of the eastern Slavs who are conquered by the pagan Lithuanians. Here

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we come to the very center of the author's thesis; for the state which evolves in the Rostov-Suzdal' area of the Northeast, and whose center shifts to Moscow in the early fourteenth century, is made up of a *Rus'*-Varangian ruling class over a population of Finnish tribes. For him then, *Rus'* or Russia begins to mean and continues to mean, not a nation of Slavs, but a nation of Christianized Finns who for some reason adopt the Slavic language and are ruled by Scandinavian princes and nobility (ch. xi). The tragedy of the eastern Slavs lay in their religious affiliation with Moscow contradicted by their complete ethnic difference from Moscovite Russia—a tragedy which, in the eyes of Paszkiewicz, has apparently persisted to the present day. The arguments in favor of this thesis are so specious that concerning them, as concerning the whole work, one can only regret that so much scholarship has gone into supporting the outworn myth of an Asiatic Muscovy, past and present.

Michael Cherniavsky

Wesleyan University

The Negro in American Life and Thought: The Nadir, 1877–1901. By Rayford W. Logan. New York, The Dial Press, Inc., 1954.—x, 380 pp. $5.00.

The Negro is such a central character in so much of nineteenth-century American history that most writers have been relieved to drop him from their pages with "the final restoration of home rule at the South in 1877." There has been a sort of fairy-tale assumption that "they all lived happily ever afterward." In *The Negro in American Life and Thought: The Nadir, 1877–1901*, Professor Rayford W. Logan of Howard University demonstrates that this neglected period was of crucial importance in shaping the pattern of American race relations.

When federal troops were withdrawn, Southern whites announced that "No simian-souled, sooty-skinned, kink-curled, blubber-lipped, prehensile-heeled, Ethiopian gorilla shall pollute the ballot box with his leprous vote." First by force and then by subtler tactics of literacy amendments, "Grandfather clauses", and white primaries, they relegated the colored man to second-class citizenship. Then Henry W. Grady, spokesman for the New South, asserted that the fate of the Negro "should be left to those among whom his lot is cast."

The North agreed. Wartime idealism was dead, and the racist theories of Social Darwinism reinforced political expediency to convince such Northerners as President Hayes that "'the let alone policy' seems now to be the true course." Northern newspapers and magazines consistently referred to the Negro as "nigger, niggah, darkey, coon, pickaninny, mammy, aunt, uncle, buck, light-complected-yaller man, yaller hussy."

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The Supreme Court of the United States ruled that "The distinction between the two races . . . must always exist so long as white men are distinct from the other color," and bade the Negro be content with "separate but equal accommodations." Party platforms were "frankly hypocritical on the constitutional rights of Negroes," and when abortive attempts were made to pass H. C. Lodge's "Force" bill, "the plight of the Negro worsened precisely because of the efforts made to improve it." "It made", Professor Logan concludes, "little difference whether a Republican or a Democrat . . . was president."

Even many Negroes seemed willing to accept second-class citizenship. Booker T. Washington's famous Atlanta speech of 1895 amounted to a Negro ratification of Hayes's "let alone" policy, of Grady's "New South" approach, of the Supreme Court's "separate but equal" dogma. As spokesman for his people, Washington yielded, at least for the time, any claim to dominate Southern political life and reassured his white hearers: "In all things that are purely social we can be as separate as the fingers, yet one as the hand in all things essential to mutual progress."

By the end of the century, Professor Logan writes, it was clear that "the Terminal at the end of the Road to Reunion was massive and apparently indestructible. It was also ugly. On the pediments of the separate wing reserved for Negroes were carved Exploitation, Disfranchisement, Segregation, Discrimination, Lynching, Contempt."

With genuine passion and great scholarship, Professor Logan has revived this truly tragic era in our history, and his book is not merely one of the most important contributions to Negro history yet to be published but also an illuminating addition to the general political and intellectual history of the period. This is an authoritative discussion of the Negro's rôle in politics, in the courts, in the economy,i n the press, and in the periodicals.

So careful and accurate a study stimulates a desire for more information and, one may hope, for further research. Professor Logan has told us so much of what people said about and did to Negroes, one wishes he had also discussed, in more detail, what the Negroes themselves thought and felt. It would help, too, to have more information about patterns of Southern-white thinking, for this is primarily a study of Northern opinion. By discussing the Negro's rôle in American "life" and in American "thought" in separate, parallel and often repetitious sections, he has presented the raw materials of history rather than a synthesis analyzing "the reciprocal effect of events on the development of attitudes and of attitudes in changing the course of events," which, as he correctly believes, "constitutes an integral, though elusive thread in the history of mankind."

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Writing with commendable fervor, Professor Logan is not always judicious. His hostility to Booker T. Washington's program is understandable, but perhaps it is a bit excessive. Willing to admit that Gompers' indifference to the Negro "probably saved the labor movement from a complete breakdown, just as Hayes had perhaps saved the Union from another Civil War in 1877," Mr. Logan does not see that Washington's "Atlanta Compromise" was equally necessary as a step toward full citizenship for the recently emancipated Negroes.

But these are minor criticisms of a book which impressively revives a neglected period of American Negro history and movingly tells what Frederick Douglass correctly called "a sad story, disgraceful and scandalous to our age and country."

DAVID DONALD

COLUMBIA UNIVERSITY

Black Moses: The Story of Marcus Garvey and the Universal Negro Improvement Association. By EDMUND DAVID CRONON. Madison, The University of Wisconsin Press, 1955.—xvii, 278 pp. $5.00.

Out of the turbulence of the First World War and its aftermath Marcus Garvey, a Jamaican Negro newly arrived in New York City, spawned and directed the only true mass protest movement of the American Negro, one which reached unprecedented world-wide notoriety and heights of power, wealth and vitality. Mr. Cronon, now a member of the History Department at Yale University, began his study of this movement at the University of Wisconsin and continued it as a Fulbright scholar in England. What results from his examination of a wide range of materials, which have not been probed and sifted to this degree before, is a vivid, detailed and sound portrait of a man and his dreams.

The Universal Negro Improvement Association, with its purpose epitomized in the phrase "Up You Mighty Race"; the Black Star Line, the first maritime enterprise owned solely by Negroes; the Provisional African Republic, with its royal court and hierarchy of nobles; mammoth parades along New York City's streets and huge noisy international conventions in Madison Square Garden—all are excitingly depicted. The amazing affairs of the steamship company are unfolded at length in a discussion of Garvey's trial for using the mails to defraud. As a result of his conviction, which he largely brought on himself by a characteristic conceit in pleading his own case, he was imprisoned and eventually deported as an undesirable alien. In eleven years from 1916 to 1927 a meteor was flung across the sky and burned out.

If Mr. Cronon had confined his study merely to an accurate narrative

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of this fabulous career the value of the text would have been great, for this is the first full-length scholarly work on its subject; by considering the roots and philosophic basis of Garveyism, evaluating Garvey's success, and appraising the reputation of this leader over the years until our own day the author has produced a superior study. Yet for all its excellence certain aspects, essential to a full understanding of this twentieth-century phenomenon, are missing. While emphasizing Garvey's public life Mr. Cronon ignores much of Garvey's personal activities and his manner of living perhaps because this does not purport to be a definitive biography. But the measure of the man is a gauge for the measure of his achievement and sincerity. Even more important to this reviewer is the lack of what might be broadly characterized as a socio-economic approach: a consideration of the response of the Negro community in terms more descriptive and accurate than "Negro masses". What is the background of his major associates? What classes and groups responded to him most strongly? Why? Moreover, Mr. Cronon does not recognize the inherent danger in a similar momentary success by an unprincipled demagogue given to violence nor the true significance of Garvey: not his immediate success or failure but the long-range problem of which he is symptomatic. That Garvey left a legacy in an awakened spirit of racial pride beyond the years of his public career, as the author contends, is no doubt true; but he errs in continuing to characterize Garvey as a "Moses". Was his the *true* promised land? Nevertheless, this reviewer agrees with the appraisal of Garvey: a demagogue, but a sincere man, egocentric, suspicious, conceited, even inept, and naïve.

That this is a study at once thoughtful and exciting, as well as the most important yet published on its subject, cannot be denied. It will serve as the basic work on Garvey and Garveyism until a more complete critical biography and sociological analysis of a high order appears on the bookshelf beside it.

RHODA G. FREEMAN

IRVINGTON, N. J.

The American Rebellion: Sir Henry Clinton's Narrative of His Campaigns, 1775–1782. With an Appendix of Original Documents. Edited by WILLIAM B. WILLCOX. New Haven, Yale University Press, London, Oxford University Press, 1954.—li, 658 pp. $7.50.

Among the documents on the American Revolution deposited by William L. Clements in the Clements Library of the University of Michigan in 1926 were two large manuscript volumes of unusual interest. Entitled "An Historical Detail of Seven Years Campaigns in North America

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from 1775 to 1782", they constituted the apologia of the man who commanded Britain's armies in America for half the duration of the Revolution, Lieutenant General Sir Henry Clinton. The writing of this memoir and the compilation of supporting documents from his voluminous papers occupied Clinton's attention in the years following the Revolution. But when Britain went to war with revolutionary France, Clinton was made Governor of Gibraltar. He died at this post in 1795 before completing the preparation of his manuscript. Now this valuable source has been rescued from undeserved obscurity and issued in the Manuscripts and Edited Texts series of the Yale Historical Publications.

The editor, Professor William B. Willcox of the University of Michigan, is eminently qualified by a long and searching study of the Clinton Papers in the Clements collection to evaluate this memoir and guide the reader through implications and references which are sometimes obscure. He contributes a survey of Clinton's career and a judicious estimate of the man and his military capabilities which provide a valuable introduction to Clinton's own narrative.

Despite the active scene it canvasses, the narrative itself is rarely exciting reading. What Professor Willcox calls Clinton's "tortuous personality" is reflected too often in devious writing to make for readability. Every delightfully pungent comment, such as that on the Battle of Bunker Hill ("A few more such victories would have shortly put an end to British dominion in America", p. 19), is overshadowed by pages of involved apologetics. Clinton's briskest writing treats of the New York campaign in 1776 and his drive up the Hudson in 1777. It is significant that Sir Henry was not commander-in-chief in those years. When he assumed that burden in 1778, his distaste for responsibility and his fixation toward planning the ideal campaign produced a negativism as clearly reflected in the very tenor of this narrative as in his periodic efforts from 1778 through 1782 to resign his command.

The basic honesty of his memoir, however, gives it a value transcending stylistic flaws. That Clinton's post-war defense of his conduct is true to the judgments he made during the course of the struggle is demonstrated by some three hundred documents or excerpts from documents which he used in footnotes to his text. Professor Willcox has arranged this mass of supporting material in chronological order and placed it in an appendix. Many of these documents have never been published before and consequently have an interest beyond their rôle in determining or defining Clinton's strategy. Major John Butler's letter to Clinton describing the Wyoming Valley raids of 1778, William Tryon's report on his attack of July 1779 upon the Connecticut shore, and Lord Rawdon's description of his battle against Nathanael Greene at Hobkirk's Hill

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in South Carolina are examples. In the case of documents which have been previously published, the editor has supplied a citation to the printed source.

The volume includes a fifty-three-page index and four contemporary maps, though the omission of a particular map of the southern theater of operations is to be regretted. The intrinsic value of the Clinton document, enhanced by scholarly presentation and helpful auxiliary features, makes this an indispensable work for the student of the American Revolution.

JOHN F. ROCHE

FORDHAM UNIVERSITY

Federalist Delaware, 1775–1815. By JOHN A. MUNROE. New Brunswick, Rutgers University Press, 1954.—xiv, 286 pp. $5.00.

The thesis of Charles Beard, that clear and sharp economic interests separated mercantile-minded Federalists from Republican agrarians, ignited fireworks of historical polemic which have lasted for several decades. Critics maintain that such emphasis slights other equally important factors of political behavior. Despite the fact that there is but a single reference to the writings of Beard in this volume, a citation concerning an early educationalist, these critics will find valuable corroboration for their views in *Federalist Delaware.*

Facts diametrically opposite to the Beardian interpretation hold true for Delaware: the two lower counties were agricultural but consistently Federalist; the northern county, a commercial and manufacturing region dominated by the bustling port of Wilmington, was just as consistently Republican. This situation was caused, in part, by religious rivalry, the hostility of the Anglicans and Methodists of Kent and Sussex to the Presbyterians of New Castle. During the Revolution the downstate congregations were largely Loyalist, the Presbyterians "fiery advocates for independency" (p. 47). Later, there was a basic Methodist-Federalist alignment resisting the inroads of Jeffersonian rationalism. There were also social and national rivalries, best illustrated by the unfavorable reaction of earlier settlers of English stock to a flood of "new" Scotch-Irish immigrants. The dislike of the latter for the English government, coupled with "their Presbyterianism, their restless striving for position, made them a challenge to the established order. . . . They were the bulwark of the patriotic cause in the Revolution and the main strength of the Democratic-Republican party at the end of the century" (p. 18). A third reason for this peculiar situation was the economic rivalry between north and south Delaware. Federalists retained power at the local

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level by passing laws favorable to the agricultural classes. Their representatives to the national Congress, however, generally coöperated with their New England brethren in supporting measures favorable to the commercial world. (James A. Bayard, for example, sponsored a bankruptcy act that was admittedly unfair to the farmers.) But such actions at the national level did not change the political opinions of the northern capitalist mercantile interests or the southern agrarian faction of Delaware.

The question remains, however, whether Delaware provides a fair and adequate index for judging Beard's thesis. Midway between North and South, Delaware belonged to neither but rather contained elements of both cultures—a microcosm of the entire nation, a wonderful barometer of political opinions. Yet, Delaware was atypical in other respects—small in size, in population, consequently in wealth and in influence. This is the theme of *Federalist Delaware.* "Perhaps it was the lack of a vast, undeveloped frontier which might bring dreams of grandeur and of wealth, perhaps it was the homogeneity of their society, perhaps it was their location, apart, except for New Castle County, from the main routes of travel, with their breath of the exotic and the inspiring, that caused the general spirit of satisfaction; at any rate, they desired little that they did not have" (p. 190). This consciousness of smallness and consequent vulnerability is employed by Munroe to interpret Delaware's actions and attitudes in the Revolutionary War, on such issues as the Articles of Confederation and the Constitution, in the later struggle of Federalists versus Jeffersonians, and in the War of 1812. It serves to explain Delaware's moderation (compared with New England) and conservatism. It serves to explain her Federalism.

Professor Munroe's book is an objective study of Delaware's social, economic and political life over a forty-year period. Scholarly, competent and well balanced, it will be welcomed by historians for filling in a neglected area of our past and for presenting a thought-provoking theme.

MORTON BORDEN

OHIO STATE UNIVERSITY

The Roosevelt Family of Sagamore Hill. By HERMANN HAGEDORN. New York, The Macmillan Co., 1954.—435 pp. $5.00.

This is Hermann Hagedorn's ninth book on Theodore Roosevelt and clearly his best. A biography of a household instead of just the man, it recounts the joys and sorrows, the growing pains and picnics of one of the nation's most remarkable families. With the focus fixed on Oyster Bay, the author traces the meteoric career of Theodore through the political jungles to the presidency, examines some of his political

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and economic philosophy as it emerged against the background of raising six high-spirited youngsters and follows the story through the Bull Moose campaign and the coming of World War I to his death. Describing many of the intimate family details with exhaustive care, the author shows us Theodore Roosevelt as husband and father.

A useful supplement to the more traditional type study of a president, Hagedorn's book provides us with a three-dimensional picture of the man. We see him behind the scenes, playing bear with baby Quentin, roughhousing through the years, in quiet hours with Edith after the reporters, politicians and heads of state have departed. We see the man not only at work but also writing letters to his sons in France, adding a room to Sagamore Hill or playing tennis in his inimitable manner.

Excellent pen portraits of the other members of the clan are presented. Edith Roosevelt's trials and happinesses are portrayed, her strength, "sharp insights", thoughtfulness and wifely devotion are methodically etched. Alice's headstrong personality and the animal exuberance of the Roosevelt boys in the White House are zealously treated. The jaunts of politicians to the hill, the reaction of Oyster Bay villagers to their famous neighbor, and the personal victories and defeats of Teddy are fully covered. The details of the memorable Oyster Bay meeting of Komura and Witte prior to the Portsmouth negotiations are described at length. Thanks to Justice Felix Frankfurter's good memory, the much-disputed attitude of Teddy toward Germany at the outbreak of World War I receives a careful, corrective treatment.

Memorable family scenes are handled with humorous patience. We relive the arrival of the Rough Riders at Montauk Point and hear Quentin say, when asked if he knew what his father was after the 1901 inaugural, "Just Father." We follow the famous pony through the White House corridors, hear a parent's advice when young Ted is placed on probation at Harvard and watch a president interrupt discussions of Cuban reciprocity to play with his boys.

Although the book is more descriptive than profound, the author does justice to Theodore's political convictions, illustrating his strong moral attitude toward public issues. He is particularly careful to detail and justify Roosevelt's attitude toward professional pacifists as war approached. Hagedorn defends Teddy's criticism of "the bland insouciance of the academic mind" (p. 347). The author also pictures Theodore throughout his life appealing to the courage in men rather than to their caution.

The very strength of the book provides its weakness. Centering on Sagamore Hill, the author is obliged to interrupt the political narrative frequently when Roosevelt's activities shift to Washington. Oc-

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casionally the result is a lack of continuity and an incomplete picture of the President's rôle in certain events. At times, there appears to be an excessive amount of irrelevant family detail. Serious students of Progressivism may find the book too adulatory. Some will bewail the absence of footnotes, considered unnecessary by the author who provides a brief summary of his sources in their stead.

On the whole, however, the book furnishes delightful reading about a fascinating family and a famous national shrine. Theodore emerges with all the energy, courage, versatility, love of life and interest in the mundane as well as the momentous that he could wish for. The book also contains some of the best political cartoons of the period.

Charles C. Cole, Jr.
Columbia University

The American People in the Twentieth Century. By Oscar Handlin. Cambridge, Harvard University Press, 1954.—x, 244 pp. $3.75.

The historian of America in the twentieth century has inherited the intellectual traditions and the image of American society developed in nineteenth-century America. He has a legacy of viewing American history in terms of the theological warfare of the Jeffersonians and Hamiltonians, or of a conflict of "sectional" interests over land, or the tariff, or banking. He writes of a homogeneous society (outside of the South), with a common intellectual tradition of Longfellow and Whittier; his America is that of the middle-class white Protestant, living on the land or on the spacious, elm-lined streets of the small town.

No one has expressed so well as Alfred Kazin, in his memorable essay, *A Walker in the City*, how alien are these traditions to a boy born in twentieth-century Brooklyn, the son of Jewish parents, whose cultural roots are in Europe, whose horizon is bounded by a few square city blocks, who strolls not down Main Street but through the neon glare of Pitkin Avenue. Kazin's experience is representative of millions of other Americans, in Cicero or Hamtramck, in Buffalo or Akron. Their experience—the old country, the odyssey to America, how the new land changed them, and how they changed the new land—is one of the great themes of our history, as great a subject for American historians as the epic Western expansion of the nineteenth century.

Oscar Handlin has been the most important historian of the present generation to till this field. In *Boston's Immigrants*, Professor Handlin studied a single ethnic group in a single city, in *The Uprooted*, the alienation of the immigrant from the European village; in *The American People in the Twentieth Century*, he examines for the first time the whole American

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society for which the impact of mass immigration is only a single theme. In looking at American society from this vantage point, Professor Handlin has a number of intriguing things to say, about the problems of defining Americanism, about the process of differentiation, of the importance of voluntary associations to American culture, of the way in which twentieth-century politics has been affected by the efforts of immigrants and natives alike to find a secure group identification. In looking at American politics not in the old terms of sectional conflicts and ideological wars, in seeing the meaning of the struggle for political power in terms of a heterogeneous people rather than a homogeneous one, in turning from questions like whether Calvin Coolidge or John W. Davis would be elected president in 1924 to focus on the elevation of Aram J. Pothier to the governorship of Rhode Island in 1908, Professor Handlin has added an important new dimension to American history.

Yet, at the same time, this volume shows how sharply limited is this approach. It is rewarding to treat America as an amalgamation of ethnic groups, but America is much more than that; in part because the immigrant has been so swiftly assimilated, in part because the white Protestant middle class has always held a disproportionate amount of power. The immigrant boy has not created a new culture; he has taken nineteenth-century American traditions and made them his own. The schoolteachers who talked of the culture of Brattle Street appeared to be telling Kazin of a world light years away from Pitkin Avenue, but in a few short years Kazin would be one of the most perceptive critics of American literature. A history which describes the American people so extensively in terms of separate ethnic groups presents a picture of a culture far more fragmented than it actually is or was.

Professor Handlin's new volume, part of the Library of Congress Series in American Civilization, is a book whose audience is not clear, since it contains too many obscure references to matters like the "Cahenslyite agitation" or "the San Marco Society in Boston" to win the general public, yet is not written in sufficient detail to win the scholar. One hopes that Professor Handlin will now turn to a more ambitious attempt to explore twentieth-century American society in the light of the immigrant experience. When he does, he will have to solve two problems. On the one hand, Professor Handlin's style, despite brilliant passages, bears the unfortunate hallmark of the American "social historian", a penchant for generalizations about America which lack the salt of individual idiosyncrasy. In the present volume, moreover, Professor Handlin has been addicted to phrases like "lulled into security", "cast a pall of suspicion", and "stirred up ugly passions", in addition to numerous academic clichés like "a renewal of the expansiveness

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that persistently stimulated the productive system." Secondly, Professor Handlin does not appear to have resolved in his own mind whether to write of the experience of the immigrant in terms of alienation or of a new birth of freedom; there is no reason why he cannot do both, but one senses an indecision which pushes him to the one extreme of lyric anguish over uprooting and the other extreme of a neo-Pollyannish celebration of the "richness and diversity" of American culture. If he can develop a style appropriate to his theme, and a greater decisiveness in presenting it, we may expect from him in the future one of the great interpretations of twentieth-century American history.

WILLIAM E. LEUCHTENBURG

COLUMBIA UNIVERSITY

Presidential Nominating Politics in 1952. Edited by PAUL T. DAVID, MALCOLM MOOS, and RALPH M. GOLDMAN. Baltimore, The Johns Hopkins Press, 1954.—5 vols. xxii, 256; xi, 369; xi, 363; xi, 344; xi, 298 pp. $17.50.

Although the selection of political party nominees is possibly the crucial act in any electoral system, especially in one as complex as that in the United States, our knowledge of the process, even at the level of the national convention, has been fragmentary. Such accounts as we have of tests of strength, conflicts, and negotiations in various conventions have seldom traced these maneuvers to their roots in the states and localities. The project on which these volumes report, sponsored by the American Political Science Association and the Brookings Institution, aimed at closing this gap. It represents the joint efforts of more than one hundred political scientists, plus those of the three editors, and deals with the selection, composition, and conduct of the 104 delegations to the two national conventions of 1952. To such a research enterprise one feels obliged to apply the standard Dr. Johnson used for the dog walking on his hind legs.

The first volume, subtitled *The National Story*, contains three historical chapters which are straightforward journalistic accounts of the preconvention campaigns and the two conventions. Of the remaining four, one is an intelligent general essay on the process of presidential nominations, one is a summary view of the performance of the various states in the system, and two are evaluative discussions of the operation and possible reform of existing nomination procedures.

This first volume, although supplementary, has no very close organic connection with the remaining four, which constitute the heart of the report. Dealing, respectively, with *The Northeast*, *The South*, *The Middle West*, and *The West*, each of these opens with a brief summary sketch of

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the region and its politics, following which the various states and territories are discussed in separate chapters. The latter are organized in uniform fashion under the following topics: general political characteristics of the state, delegate selection in 1952, composition of the delegations, activities and record at the conventions, aftermath in the state, review and appraisal.

The objective of this study was to "discover, organize, and report a significant body of information" (I, xxii). It is, therefore, journalistic and descriptive rather than analytical, orderly rather than systematic, and it must be judged primarily in these terms. As might be expected, the treatment is uneven from chapter to chapter, some state reports providing a full and thoughtful account, others presenting little more than a list of names, places, and dates. Although the major subdivisions of the chapters are uniform, moreover, it is apparent that there was a minimum of agreement among the contributors on the precise questions on which it was important to collect data, so that these sections present at best only approximately comparable data.

A more serious consequence of this reportorial-evaluative method is that the assumptions and hypotheses of the authors and editors are largely implicit. In consequence the treatment inevitably is guided by a series of unstated preferences amounting in most cases to an attachment to a sort of plebiscitarian utopia. The editors are chary of advocating a national preference primary, but the appraisals in each chapter suggest that the model in the minds of the writers is a nominating process in which an informed and involved party membership indicates its preferences among the contending candidates, and convention delegates, if there must be such, meet peaceably and faithfully to register the result. Only such a model could produce as the principal criterion of evaluation the degree to which the process was "in accordance with the wishes of . . . [the] membership," or the degree to which delegations "were able to give expression to the will of their constituencies."

Although a study of this sort could not be expected to present findings explicitly contributing greatly to our understanding of the nature of the American political party, it does contain a mass of useful data. The determined reader will find here data suggestive of lines of possible investigation to be pursued in more systematic fashion, concerning the myriad forms and functions of American parties, their factional composition, and the factors associated with these variations. Tantalizingly incomplete though the data are in many respects, they are nonetheless provocative, and their assembly and publication was a worthy enterprise.

DAVID B. TRUMAN

COLUMBIA UNIVERSITY

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Politics in America. BY D. W. BROGAN. New York, Harper & Brothers, 1954.—vii, 467 pp. $5.00.

Many years ago Madame de Sévigné remarked that Racine and coffee would soon be forgotten. She was wrong about coffee and now it turns out she was wrong about Racine too. On page 189 of his new book Professor Brogan calls upon Phèdre to illuminate the Mann Act and is aptly answered.

Larded with quotations from Ennius, Virgil, Lucan, from Shakespeare, Milton, Marvell, Pope, Goldsmith, Gray, from Longfellow, Timothy Dwight, Vachel Lindsay, Ogden Nash, and Cole Porter, from Mr. Dooley and Dale Carnegie, from St. Matthew and from the Young Man who said D—, this entertaining treatise introduces a new generation of Englishmen to the mysteries of the American political system. I say a new generation because some twenty years ago Professor Brogan performed the same service for their fathers in a similar book published in this country under the title, *Government of the People.* Time, however, settles. In his earlier work Professor Brogan took rather a dim view of our Constitution and its chances of survival; but, "there's nothing like being used to a thing", and now he finds it adequate to modern needs and its continuance assured. *E pur si muove,* he says—quoting Galileo.

It is not, however, with our Constitution that Professor Brogan is primarily concerned. The party system, race and politics, machines and bosses, politics and morals, the national convention, the campaign—these are the subjects which he has particularly examined. And he has examined them, so to speak, on location. As occasion warranted, he has sat in his study, stood in a bar, slept in a Raines Law hotel. He has never allowed himself to forget that, while George Washington can teach us much, George Washington Plunkitt can teach us more—that the institutions established by our ancestors are now being worked by their epigones. The United States are a going concern, and the special virtue of Professor Brogan is that he makes this fact uncommon clear.

To single out in so excellent a book a historical statement or two for correction may seem invidious. Yet when we are discussing the political system of the United States, where "half at least of politics is past history", it is important that we get history right. On pages 336–337 Professor Brogan tells us that the framers of the Constitution clearly intended the Senate to be a representation of states rather than of the people at large. This, I submit, is the very reverse of the truth. Robert Morris, in the first Senate, violently controverted the doctrine that the Senators were state ambassadors: "We are Senators of the United States and have nothing to do with one State more than another." An examination of the Constitution will bear him out. As to vote, salary

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and tenure the Senators were made independent of the states which chose them: they were to vote by heads and not by states; they were to be paid out of the national treasury and not out of the state treasuries; they were to be removed from office by expulsion, possibly by impeachment and conviction, but not by recall. These arrangements, it is clear, were entered upon deliberately, lest (in Madison's phrase) the Senators should be "the mere agents and advocates of State interests and views, instead of being the impartial umpires and guardians of justice and general good."

In his chapter "Politics and Law" Professor Brogan says there is some room for doubt whether the power of declaring an act of Congress unconstitutional was intended by the framers to be given to the Supreme Court. It is difficult to see where he has found this room. No one, I think, has suggested that the Constitution of the United States was meant to be a mere ordinance subject to being altered, as every other ordinance, by the legislature for the time being. The Constitution was meant to be a paramount law; and to the Founding Fathers the idea of a paramount law carried with it the idea of a power in the judges, a duty in the judges, to declare null and void all legislative enactments in conflict with it. It will be remembered that Jefferson regarded the constitution of Virginia as not being a "real" constitution; accordingly in 1784 he wrote to Pendleton recommending that a state convention be called, one of whose objects should be "the making our constitution paramount the powers of the ordinary legislature so that all acts contradictory to it may be adjudged null." In 1786 he again complained—this time to M. de Meusnier—that in Virginia, where a great proportion of the legislature considered the constitution but as other acts of legislation, laws had frequently been passed controlling its effect. "I have not heard", he continued, "that in the other States they have ever infringed their constitutions; and I suppose that . . . the judges would consider any law as void, which was contrary to the Constitution." If we carry in our minds the connection which the Founding Fathers made between paramount law and judicial duty, we shall have no difficulty in understanding why the Constitution does not state in terms the rule of construction which the judges are to follow. It would have been just as childish to tell the judges to prefer the Constitution to the statute, the intentions of the people to the intentions of their agents, as it would have been to tell them, when they had to act upon the interfering statutes of Congress alone, to apply the ancient maxim, *Leges posteriores priores contrarias abrogant.* The framers were not children, so they did neither.

PRINCETON, N. J. LUCIUS WILMERDING, JR.

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BOOK NOTES

In *Essays in Public Finance and Fiscal Policy* (New York, Oxford University Press, 1955; xvii, 375 pp. $4.75) Gerhard Colm, with the editorial assistance of Helen O. Nicol, has assembled seventeen of his essays in public finance and fiscal policy written over a twenty-year span, 1934–1954, and has added a concluding essay, "Setting the Sights". Three of the papers have not been available before in English; they deal with public finance concepts in national income analysis, and the nature of national economic budgets. Some of the other essays have been shortened to avoid repetition or to omit parts no longer of sufficient interest, and some changes have been made to clarify meaning, but the author has avoided the temptation to rewrite essays in a way that might have "advanced his standing as a prophet." But his standing as a prophet is quite good enough anyway, in terms of prophets' usual batting averages, and in any case it is unimportant beside his achievements in grasping what were the important fiscal policy problems of the time and in probing for solutions. All of us who have been thus stimulated by Dr. Colm are grateful to him for bringing together in one volume the analyses to which those who teach public finance, particularly, will want to return from time to time. And the complete bibliography of Colm's writings, covering eight pages of fine print at the end of the volume, both testifies to the unflagging industry that has fueled his catholic concern over matters of economic policy and serves as a useful finding list for the public finance scholar. This bibliography confirms what the essays printed in this volume imply: Dr. Colm's interest lies almost wholly in the field of macro-economics, and in those parts of that field that have immediate bearing on economic policy of governments. His concluding essay, "Setting the Sights", defends the projection of economic quantities over the years ahead as a means of demonstrating what steps must be taken if certain goals are to be achieved. He believes that "the field of gap-bridging between the aggregative formulation of general economic goals on the one hand and specific targets for specific policies on the other is still too much neglected in economic analysis." Perhaps; but since economists, like other resources, are scarce, greater allocation of their time and effort to this field might prove to be somewhat premature in view of the fact that our tool chest of analytic instruments is still so inadequate. Luckily, there is no possibility of setting up an allocation board; the relative number of tool-

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makers and tool-users, to employ Pigou's phrase, will continue to depend largely on accidents of orientation of talents and interest. In retrospect, among the many contributions that Dr. Colm has made to the formulation of economic policy, perhaps the most useful of all remain the early essays of the 1930's, when he, along with a very few others, insisted on a reorientation of public finance thought in terms of the immense problems posed by the years of deep depression. One may demur with respect to a few of the analytical details without detracting from the significance of these essays in awakening scholars and the public alike to the need for shaking off old taboos and facing up to the new problems.—CARL S. SHOUP, Columbia University.

There has been some learned discussion of Thomas More's political ideas in recent years. J. H. Hexter, in his excellent little book, *More's Utopia: The Biography of an Idea* (Princeton, Princeton University Press, 1952; xii, 171 pp. $3.00), offers an interpretation that he rightly calls "unimpeachably orthodox; it coincides precisely with the opinion of those contemporaries of More who were most likely to judge his meaning aright" (p. 14). After an ingenious analysis of the order in which *Utopia* was written (Hexter holds that most of Part I and the Conclusion of Part II were added to a finished manuscript) he considers its meaning. In the *Utopia*, he argues, More was not primarily a religious philosopher, nor was he a modern socialist writing before his time, but "a Christian humanist uniquely endowed with a statesman's eye and mind, a broad worldly experience, and a conscience of unusual sensitivity, who saw sin and especially the sin of pride as the cancer of the commonwealth" (p. 78). More's attack on private property and his portrayal of a society without it are thus a critique of the cause of the present evil and a defense against the contention that property is essential to the preservation of incentive and public order. Hexter calls attention to More's realism—his Utopia is the best state, but it is inhabited not by gods but by men whose evil propensities are held in check by their social order. In part III of his book, Hexter tries to solve the problem that he posed at the outset—why should More have made additions to a coherent manuscript? He speculates that the additions are the fruit of More's inner conflict over the question of advising the prince—a conflict that involved both the personal question whether More should take office with his king and the general question of how a prince secures good advice. Good institutions, both in the real world and in Utopia, depend on the willingness of thinking men to serve the commonwealth; on the other hand, an advisor is likely to become the slave to policies he detests. In the *Utopia* More solved the dilemma by urging a refusal to serve; two years

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later, in real life, he solved it by becoming an advisor to Henry VIII. Hexter's book is convincingly argued throughout, and seems to bring us closer to More's meaning than other recent interpretations.—Peter Gay, Columbia University.

With the steady revival of independent German action in foreign affairs, hasty observers of the European scene, having one eye cocked at the Soviet Union, are making the inevitable superficial comparisons between the present situation and the period of the "Rapallo policy" in the Weimar days. Consequently it is good to have a sound, workmanlike study of the 1918–1934 period in Russo-German relations available—*Russia and the Weimar Republic* by Lionel Kochan (Cambridge, England, Bowes & Bowes, 1954; 190 pp. 25*s*.)—a book combining thorough research with an understanding of the political factors underlying the shifting events of the time. Kochan analyzes the manner in which both Soviet and German foreign policy reflected internal differences of opinion; he is less adequate (perhaps because he has written a short book) in describing the effects of foreign policy views on domestic political developments. The author clearly grasps the distinction in motivation as between the two states—for the Soviet Union, the Rapallo policy was a defensive device, designed to prevent the formation of an all-European anti-Soviet coalition, while for Germany, the policy of friendship with Russia was an offensive maneuver, designed to exert pressure on the French and British for revision of the Versailles settlement. Thus Soviet policy was based on continued frustration of German ambitions, and it is questionable, in view of the growing *rapprochement* between Germany and the West, whether the Rapallo policy could have been maintained had there not taken place the emergence of Hitler (whose significance, incidentally, as Kochan shows, was grievously misunderstood by the Soviets). Other aspects of the problem which the author handles well include: the attitude of the German Right, particularly that of Seeckt and the other protagonists of the "Eastern orientation" toward the Soviet Union, the rôle played in the formulation of Soviet policy by the expectation of German revolution down to the blunders of 1923, the extension of German-Soviet coöperation into the military and economic fields, and the rôle of common hostility to the Polish state as a binding element in the alliance. As for the famous Rapallo Treaty itself, Kochan describes its inception in detail, concluding correctly that its importance lay more in subjective reactions to it than in its contents. The chief quarrel one would have with this book is the author's overly sweeping extension of the dynamics of the Rapallo period to the late '30s, when the relative positions of Germany, the

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U.S.S.R. and the Western Powers had changed considerably. The 1939 Pact was not intended to shield a weak Germany, but to allow a strong Germany to draw the sword; for Russia, it was a question of safeguarding its position in the impending conflict, rather than preventing the formation of a hostile coalition. Kochan uses a large number of sources well, and the book includes a useful bibliography.—HENRY KRISCH, New York, N. Y.

When the discussion in Gordon Shepherd's *Russia's Danubian Empire* (New York, Frederick A. Praeger, 1954; xi, 262 pp. $4.50) is dealing with the "inside" aspects of the coming of the Communists into power and the way the Communist leaders have been distributing their spoils, killing each other off, the way the government machinery is manipulated on their behalf, and the efforts of the Communist parties to deal with the churches, the peasants and the workers, this little book offers numerous details, many of which will supplement what has been known from other studies and sources. In this respect, the work will be found diverting by the specialists. Those who are academically-minded, and have a more solid grounding in the numerous studies covering this area, will be rather disappointed in the often confused way in which Shepherd deals with the complicated problems, and with his wild and unfounded hopes. A geopolitically-minded student will shudder when hearing that "the term 'Danubian satellites' covers, in fact, the whole of the Cominform except Poland and East Germany, which belong together in what is anyway a separate strategic concept" (p. x); Shepherd, curiously enough, has not heard about the "Komekon" grand plan for the whole area. Frequent mention is made of Austria and Yugoslavia—but in an offhand manner, although, again, they are not an integral part of the U.S.S.R.'s Danubian plans. We read that in the troubles between Hoxha (for some reason, spelled by Shepherd as Hodja) and Mehmet Shehu, in Albania, "the Kremlin's voice in the matter is very distant!" (p. 28). To state that "the peoples of the Danube Basin still have a strong underlying sense of their common welfare and their common mission" (p. 242) is an utter failure to understand their historical ideologies. In what respects has "the political initiative in the Danube Basin passed from the hands of the Kremlin" (p. 223)? For some reason, Shepherd also thinks that the beginning of the "Eisenhower Era is indeed of special significance for Eastern Europe," for "both the American President and his new Secretary of State, John Foster Dulles, have committed themselves to the cause of the 'liberation' of the satellite peoples and have denied the legal validity of any international treaty clauses by which their absorption into the Soviet bloc was facilitated. We can look

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later at some of the alluring blossoms and hidden thorns of this policy of 'containment-plus' " (p. 224). When reading this, the reviewer got the impression that Shepherd was kidding. Equally juvenile are his suggestions in Part Three, where he asks, "Is 'Liberation' Possible?" If the reviewer's assumption that the author is an English correspondent is correct, that might explain why he thinks that all the literature on the area seems to be of English authorship (p. 4).—Joseph S. Roucek, University of Bridgeport.

Congressional Quarterly Almanac, 83rd Congress, 2nd Session—1954, Volume X (Washington, Congressional Quarterly News Features, 1955; 795 pp. $25) indicates once again the debt owed by political scientists to careful and systematic journalism. Around a nucleus made up of tabulations of every Congressional roll-call vote in 1954, the *Almanac*'s compilers have chronicled in an eminently usable form the whole legislative activity of the session, including the by now well-known tables of individual Congressmen's records of party allegiance. Both the praise and the reservations found in David B. Truman's lengthy critical note on the ninth volume of this series (in 69 *Pol. Sci. Quart.* 315–16, June 1954) are applicable in equal measure to the present work, particularly his *caveat* on the use of the *Almanac*'s percentages of party support for presidential proposals. Deserving of special mention is a section of fifteen pages (pp. 643–58) on investigations. Here, in a well-organized and easily usable form are all the basic data for 1953 and 1954: a list of all probes, with names of committee and subcommittee chairmen and the amount appropriated for each, and longer textual summaries for the more important of these Congressional activities.—Merton L. Reichler, Columbia College.

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FRANZ L. NEUMANN

With deep sorrow the Editors of the POLITICAL SCIENCE QUARTERLY record the death of their colleague, Franz Neumann, who was killed in an automobile accident in Switzerland on September 2, 1954.

Franz Neumann was a scholar for whom political science was closely linked to political action. The struggle against all forms of tyranny of man over man was the very content of his life. The beginnings of his intellectual development fell within the turbulent years of the early Weimar Republic. During his studies at the University of Frankfurt a.M. he came under the influence of Hugo Sinzheimer, the founder of German scientific labor law and one of the architects of the Weimar Constitution. From him he received the decisive impulse for his own work on labor law. At the same time, Franz Neumann strengthened his contacts with the German Social Democratic labor movement. As lawyer for the building trade unions, as teacher at the *Hochschule für Politik* in Berlin, and at numerous trade-union schools he left a strong imprint both on the development of German labor law and on the minds of those whom he counselled, taught and represented. His book, *Koalitionsfreiheit und Reichsverfassung*, an analysis of the relation between constitutional order and labor organizations under a democratic system, is the fruit of his theoretical insights and political activity during these years.

The assault on the German labor movement which began with the ascent of Nazism drew Franz Neumann more and more into political activity. The unions and the Social Democratic party sought and received his support in their legal struggle against restrictions and oppression. At the end of Germany's democratic régime early in 1933 the Social Democratic party entrusted him with the ungrateful chore of becoming their legal adviser. In spite of the extreme danger inherent in this position, he did not flinch. He was one of the first to be expatriated by the Nazi régime.

He emigrated to London. Now he thought it his main task to examine the reasons for the downfall of German democracy. He began a systematic study of political theory. Theory was for him not abstract speculation but a necessary guide and precondition for political action. He believed that progress in freedom depended on the progress of democratic socialism, that the failure of German socialism was not final, that knowledge of past errors and a thorough analysis of the historical forces determining the present era would help to rescue what had been lost. This conviction lent the main impetus to the various theoretical studies which he undertook during his association with the London School

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of Economics 1933–1935. Harold Laski became his teacher and his friend. He wrote his Ph.D. thesis on *The Rule of Law*, in which he analyzed the changing political function of law while emphasizing its lasting value under the conditions of modern industrial society. His efforts were unceasing to keep in close touch with the development of the dispersed anti-Nazi groups and organizations, to give their fight against Fascism a firm theoretical and political foundation.

In 1936, Franz Neumann came to the United States and joined the staff of the Institute of Social Research under Max Horkheimer. In close collaboration with the Institute's staff, he elaborated and tested the conceptions which were to constitute the core of his work. They were applied in the two articles which he contributed to the Institute's review: "Der Funktionswandel des Gesetzes im Recht der bürgerlichen Gesellschaft" (1937) and "Types of Natural Law" (1939). In 1942 he published his *Behemoth*. Here he broke through the protective ideological surface of Nazism and revealed the substance behind the overt features of fascist totalitarianism in its social and economic structure. When the war against Nazi Germany broke out, he worked in the Board of Economic Warfare, in the Office of Strategic Services, and in the State Department's Office of Intelligence Research. He contributed to the planning of Military Government and of an occupation policy designed to cut off the roots of Nazism and to rebuild Germany with the help of the truly democratic groups in that country.

In 1946, he became lecturer at the School of International Affairs and two years later professor of government at Columbia University. From now on, teaching became for him a true vocation. He now concentrated his theoretical efforts on the history and philosophy of dictatorship. On frequent trips to Germany he tested his notions; he kept in close contact with the labor movement and with the democratic groups in all spheres of German society; he became the chief architect of the Free University in Berlin.

He became ever more apprehensive of the intensified anti-democratic and neo-fascist trends the world over. He took ideas and ideals very seriously—for many he seemed too serious, too unbending. But he was unbending only against ignorance, oppression, and intellectual corruption. His friends retain the image of rare human and intellectual sincerity, loyalty and warmth.

His last published work was a paper which he read at the Free University in Berlin in May 1954: "Anxiety in Politics". It was not an escape into psychology, but the title epitomizes the political situation of man in contemporary society.

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